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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
History shows Aboriginal housing to be a politically contested realm as two quite 
different peoples attempt to negotiate different social, economic and cultural values in 
constructing a shared future Australian built environment. Housing procurement, 
defined herein as ‘the act or process of bringing into being a building that was not 
there before and embraces all the activities that might be necessary to that objective’, 
has at times been sporadically linked to other forms of government service delivery 
outcomes and objectives in remote Aboriginal communities such as construction, 
maintenance, training, employment, education, governance, management, health, and 
sustainability. Yet still further program values have emerged in recent years that can 
best be described as ‘symbolic capitals’ inclusive of leadership, mutual respect, 
positive cultural identity and other life-skills outcomes. 
Secondary outcomes of the housing process are what we loosely term the ‘socio-
economic capitals’ of housing procurement: outcomes that are in addition to the 
physical asset of the house. Specifically, this study explores the relationships between 
remote Indigenous housing procurement and the broader socio-economic capitals of 
Indigenous communities. It contributes to an understanding of the potential longer-
term economic, social, health and cultural outcomes of current and future housing 
policies and housing delivery programs. 
Remote Indigenous housing procurement practice occurs in a complex context of 
political, market, and industry dynamics. Achieving high-level outcomes beyond the 
physical units of houses is fraught with difficulty in these contexts. Despite this, there 
are some procurement success stories and, with this in mind, this project aims to 
assess what has been achieved during the last decade in the procurement of 
Aboriginal housing, as grounded in actual practice. The delivery of Aboriginal housing, 
if done well, would not only diminish livelihood vulnerabilities, but would also 
strengthen self-governance and generate services responsive to community demand. 
The significance of a better understanding of housing procurement systems within the 
context of remote Indigenous communities has potential benefit for all peoples 
engaged in the built environment sector. 
Partly due to the paucity of research in this field, the current research project is a 
valuable addition to the body of knowledge regarding housing procurement processes 
in remote Aboriginal communities in Australia. It has the potential to create greater 
awareness of good practice administrative processes leading to more positive 
outcomes of culturally responsive housing by using the social and economic capitals 
that Aboriginal people can bring to procurement. If there has been one clear outcome 
from this research project, it is that the procurement process is arguably just as 
important as the final housing product itself. Focus needs to be placed on a 
meaningful process and the product that eventuates must conform to statutory and 
regulatory standards. Procurement driven by the scenario of maximum numbers of 
houses on the ground as fast as possible ignores the potential to value add multiple 
Aboriginal social and economic capitals. 
Understanding procurement in remote Indigenous settings 
In attempting to understand the relationship between housing procurement and 
Aboriginal capital networks in remote communities, the research report begins by 
presenting the common procurement strategies and associated contractual 
methodologies used in the Australian construction industry. Most forms of building 
procurement rely on legally binding contracts that establish the scope of works and 
specify the outcomes to be achieved during the contracted works. Currently, in the 
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Australian construction industry, there are nine formal contractual methods used in the 
provision of mainstream construction projects. These are: 
1. Documented Design (Traditional ‘Lump Sum’), also known as ‘Construct Only’ 
2. Design Development and Construct (DD&C) 
3. Design, Novate and Construct (DN&C) 
4. Design and Construct (D&C) 
5. Design, Construct and Maintain (DCM) 
6. Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) 
7. Managing Contractor 
8. Alliance (Co-operative) Contracting 
9. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
10. Owner-Builder. 
A review of the last 10 years of housing procurement projects in remote Aboriginal 
communities shows the prevalence up to 2005 1  of small-scaled housing projects 
partly administered by individual Indigenous Community Housing Organisations 
(ICHOs) and funded entirely by state and federal government departments through 
programs such as Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP) and the 
National Aboriginal Health Strategy (NAHS) (e.g. see Vanstone 2004). Pertaining to 
selected case studies in this report, currently in the states of Queensland, South 
Australia and the Northern Territory, there are a number of government programs that 
deliver Indigenous-specific forms of housing, through different statutory and 
organisational structures, such as State-Owned and Managed Indigenous Housing 
(SOMIH) authorities, Indigenous local governments, Indigenous Community Housing 
Organisations (ICHO) and Indigenous Community Organisations (ICO) (AIHW 2009b, 
p.1, p.11). 
All are funded in one form or another through various Commonwealth or state 
programs, either under the National Partnership Agreement (NPA) on Remote 
Indigenous Housing, the National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA). SOMIH are 
dwellings owned and managed by the particular state or territory housing authorities 
funded through National Partnership Agreements on housing affordability, 
homelessness and social housing. 2  Under the NPA some Indigenous community 
housing organisations (ICHOs) and ICOs may or may not act as agents for state or 
territory housing bodies and may participate in one or a range of procurement 
activities such as new builds, repairs and maintenance and major refurbishments.3 In 
reviewing the literature on contractual methodologies in Aboriginal housing delivery, it 
was difficult to find in-depth accounts of the actual procurement strategies. Therefore, 
the fieldwork phase of this project conducted a detailed investigation of the actual 
parameters and formal agreements evident in the case studies above in order to 
independently evaluate the effectiveness and outcomes of those programs. 
                                               
1 When ATSIC was disbanded by the Howard Government, announced on April 2004 with the proposal 
for Regional Councils to be closed by May 2005. (Source: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2004-
05/05cib04.htm#abolition. Accessed: 27 October 2010) 
2 Web: http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/housing/progserv/affordability/affordablehousing/Pages/default.aspx 
(Accessed 02 November 2010) 
3 Web: http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/housing/progserv/affordability/affordablehousing/Pages/NPA 
SocialHousing.aspx (Accessed 02 November 2010) 
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The case studies 
In order to examine in more depth a range of the types of social and economic capital 
benefits outlined above, the researchers, with input from their AHURI User Group, 
selected four best-practice case studies. The final selection of four primary case 
studies was based on a range of criteria, including the existence of project documents, 
gaining project document access permission, capacity of original participants to 
facilitate such access, community access permissions, and the cost of community 
visitation, as well as the actual suitability of the case study for procurement analysis. 
In responding to the program objectives, those case studies selected for analysis 
were: 
 The Thursday Island Redevelopment Project, ATSI Housing, Qld. 
 National Aboriginal Health Strategy-funded ICHO Project: Bynoe CACS Ltd, 
Normanton, Qld. 
 South Australia Housing-funded project at Koonibba, SA. 
 The Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program (SIHIP), NT. 
The Thursday Island Redevelopment Project (TIRP) was chosen due to its complex 
social and cultural agenda and is one of the largest and most successful housing and 
infrastructure delivery programs ever undertaken in a remote Indigenous community 
in Queensland. The SIHIP project was selected due to its scale and complexity in 
being Australia’s largest ever delivery program for remote Indigenous housing and 
infrastructure. Both the Housing South Australia, Koonibba and NAHS Normanton 
housing projects were chosen as an important contrast to the scale of the TIRP and 
SIHIP projects. The authors felt that a contrast of scales and complexities would 
provide ample areas for comparative discussion relevant to future procurement 
strategies in both large and small procurement projects. 
The spectrum of case study scales elicited varied analysis of social capitals. The two 
smaller-scale case studies, Koonibba and Normanton, provided opportunity to 
scrutinise social and economic capital outputs in greater detail, generating findings 
that can inform procurement programs across all scales. In contrast the two large-
scale case studies, TIRP and SIHIP, offered greater social capital outputs due in part 
to higher economic capital investment and larger program size. Hence, on the basis of 
these four case studies, increases in program funding produced definitive increases in 
social capital outcomes across different program packages or stages. 
Findings on ‘capitals’ in Indigenous housing procurement 
The findings on the various types of capitals explored in the case studies are analysed 
in Chapter 6 of this report. 
First, social capitals in remote Indigenous contexts are described as networks that are 
all-important in everyday life and often outstrip economic capitals. The study found 
that, in terms of procurement and its relationship to social capitals, the better a given 
community’s social capitals are understood and respected, the better any potential 
housing procurement system will be. Manifestation of social capitals across the case 
studies varied, partly dependant on the extent of purposeful intention to engage with 
such. It can also be expected that different communities will exhibit potentially varying 
extents of social capitals dependent on a multitude of given circumstances including, 
but not limited to, extent of remoteness, local levels of leadership, social organisation, 
skill capability, adherence to local custom and cultural traditions among others. 
Literature analysis shows that in the mainstream market context, social capital has the 
potential to develop into leveraged economic action. By contrast, Indigenous social 
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capital investment appears to yield only limited economic gain and does not usually 
manifest as capitalistic economic development largely due to the nature of the unique 
political economy of discrete remote Indigenous settlements. The driving force of 
remote Indigenous social capital generates the culturally destined ‘economically 
rational strategy’ of ‘pooling limited cash’ that both sustains and perpetuates high 
Indigenous mobility; thus customary social capital outstrips physical capital and other 
livelihood options. 
Turning to the generation of economic capitals, the SIHIP alliance procurement 
method was able to provide sufficient contractual size and flexibility to explore the 
potential for the enhancement of local small-to-medium sized enterprises that were 
‘incubated’ through the management structure of the alliance members to benefit from 
the economic scale of the available budgets for the duration of the program. Emerging 
examples largely centred on a range of pre-existing Aboriginal enterprises with 
notably a capacity and specialisation in different economic activities related to the 
construction industry. 
With respect to cultural and ethical capitals in remote Indigenous communities, the 
analysis concluded that design professionals cannot successfully design housing and 
plan settlements for Aboriginal people unless there is an understanding of their 
everyday social behaviors and climatic/geographic context. The customary use of 
domiciliary space supports distinct types of household groups and sub-groups, typical 
diurnal/nocturnal behaviour patterns suited to different seasonal periods as well as 
characteristic socio-spatial structures. Culturally distinct behaviour includes set forms 
of approach and departure, external orientation and sensory communication between 
domiciles, different concepts of privacy and crowding, sleeping behaviour, and 
sleeping group composition, cooking and use of fire, and storage of possessions and 
resources. 
Cultural appropriateness in house design relates to how well the finished product 
functions to support occupants’ beliefs, values and their associated domiciliary 
behaviours and household structures. The contractual system itself is important in this 
respect, however, it appears that projects with short timeframes and grand 
expectations in achieving large numbers of houses will automatically severely limit or 
even preclude time-intensive or householder responsive consultation due to the focus 
on standardising house design and the dominance of speedy economies of scale. 
Consequently, it appears that large-scale flexible contractual processes such as 
managing contractor or alliancing, would lend themselves to this methodology, 
whereas small-scale traditional lump sum contracts would lend themselves to intense 
pre-design consultation and individualisation in house design, which appears to 
produce better results in relation to cultural appropriateness in house design. 
In terms of governance as a form of capital and its relationship to procurement 
processes, improved housing procurement in remote Aboriginal communities will not 
produce quality governance structures within communities; however, improved self-
governance systems within remote communities will result in greater information 
dissemination and accountability, and thus better housing procurement. It is therefore 
difficult to choose any one particular contractual strategy over another in relation to 
strengthening and working with governance as a social capital. In saying this, after 
reviewing the governance literature and case study analyses, the authors believe that 
an improvement in self-governance mechanisms, whereby Indigenous people 
administer infrastructure and housing programs themselves will result in the positive 
development of Aboriginal housing procurement throughout Australia. While this 
seems an obvious statement, history has shown this pursuit to be a difficult 
achievement. 
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Turning to the capitals of employment, training and education, the economic context 
of remote settlements bears greatly upon the sustainability of such livelihood factors. 
Economic opportunities are usually stifled due to geographic location, small 
populations and high circular mobility. In many instances the largest capital 
investment by governments in remote communities is settlement housing and 
infrastructure projects per se, yet variable project delivery often leads to varied 
opportunities for employment and training. The Normanton and Koonibba case 
studies showed that when Indigenous labour was involved in housing procurement 
there was a mismatch of time-pressured delivery, which limited a given community’s 
capacity to participate. Subsequently, the dominance of time-pressured delivery 
frameworks has reduced the capacity to develop human capitals which in turn has 
impacted on the management of housing procurement, resulting in a preference for 
limited unskilled Aboriginal labour involvement. 
In terms of incorporating local labour and implementing training programs within the 
range of different procurement strategies, the case studies illustrate that the issue 
becomes one of risk mitigation for both the proprietor and building contractor. The risk 
relates to timeframe and budget overruns given the workplace reality of a more 
transient, possibly truant, and low-skilled semi-literate labour force in many remote 
communities. Of the contractual procurement options discussed previously, both the 
traditional contracting approaches would see the contractor taking on the risks 
associated with labour force truancy whereas more flexible forms of contracting such 
as alliancing or partnering would see all parties sharing those risks. Furthermore, case 
study analyses illustrate that the majority of best practice outcomes generated through 
procurement were the result of excellent internal government coordination at the local, 
state and Australian government level, illustrating a positive connection between Top-
Down (strategic) meeting Bottom-Up (grass-roots) processes. 
Unfortunately the case studies appear to have yielded the least data on health 
capitals compared to the other capitals under consideration. Nevertheless, in looking 
at the relationships between housing procurement processes and reducing livelihood 
vulnerabilities, two main health strategies that were found to be possible in 
procurement were reducing crowding and improving health hardware performance. To 
improve environmental health and reduce crowding in remote Aboriginal housing 
requires both technical and social design considerations. 
Challenges to building ‘capitals’ in housing procurement 
One of the major findings of this study has been that numerous best practice housing 
procurement examples exist in the Australian Indigenous housing context. Given this 
situation, the authors are led to question the reasons underlying the continual 
generation of variable, and often poor, housing results. The answer appears to relate 
to a number of fundamental challenges that need to be improved in order for best 
practice housing procurement to become a widespread achievement in Indigenous 
housing delivery. Consequently, the main obstacles or project disruptions identified 
during the case study analyses are as follows, being discussed in greater detail in the 
report: 
 The challenges of achieving employment and training capitals within the 
procurement parameters of government funding cycles and remote settings. 
 The problems of strategically addressing multiple program objectives with 
conflicting timelines. 
 Managing risks that impact on project planning and execution, both ‘up’ risk 
(elections, politicians, senior public servants, media) and ‘down’ risk (community 
and cultural factors, remote undocumented building sites and climate). 
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 Maintaining continuity of Indigenous employment both during and after the 
procurement process. 
These problems present difficult challenges for governments, builders and 
communities who wish to collaboratively enhance socio-economic capitals in the 
housing procurement process. The case studies contain various attempts, some 
successful, in strategically addressing the contractual challenges of working in remote 
environments with the numerous recurring unforeseen human and natural 
environmental problems of remote Indigenous community contexts that typically occur. 
A model for housing procurement in remote Indigenous 
communities 
Mainstream housing procurement contracts and methods that are driven by the 
economic imperatives of minimising financial risk and maximising financial gains, all 
with expected delivery in set timeframes, do not readily lend themselves to integration 
with the largely unskilled, highly mobile labour markets of remote Indigenous 
settlements. The case study evidence suggests that a somewhat different 
procurement system needs to be implemented, one that borrows from local Aboriginal 
social capitals, and that is fostered at communal or regional levels. Consequently, 
particular aspects of Aboriginal social, cultural and economic capitals seem to have 
been in conflict, mismatched or not recognisable under the rigid parameters of 
conventional mainstream housing procurement delivery. If Indigenous people are to 
derive improved livelihood outcomes from housing and infrastructure programs, there 
needs to be recognition at both state and federal government levels that rushed 
program agendas often strip long-term benefits, and may contribute to the burden of 
livelihood vulnerabilities due to increased house maintenance costs and reduced 
social benefits. 
Thus, this report contains an argument that an intercultural and hybridised approach 
to sustainability is needed, based on the procurement realities faced by remote 
settlements; and that this is possible through an engagement with multiple Aboriginal 
‘capitals’ consisting of social, cultural, health, employment, training and governance 
capitals within a sustainability livelihoods approach. Consequently, the case study 
analyses investigate the relationship between Indigenous social and economic 
capitals and procurement systems in an attempt to draw conclusions as to which 
direction procurement scenarios should head in the future in order to benefit all 
stakeholders more equitably in a given project. 
The conclusion of the report addresses what a best-practice procurement model might 
look like and how appropriate construction systems can be developed in remote 
settings given a high likelihood of interrupted employment and circular mobility 
behaviour where Aboriginal social priorities often outweigh economic priorities, with 
individuals choosing family obligations and responsibilities over their own personal 
material desires. This situation affects procurement strategies given that housing 
procurement takes on a typically linear program until practical completion. 
The case studies show that incorporating the entire repertoire of the social and 
economic capitals into a specific procurement agenda may not necessarily occur in all 
circumstances. In a particular project case, the specific human and environmental 
context of a community would also assist in pinpointing which procurement system, 
and thus, contractual strategy to employ in order to gain as much advantage for a 
project from the existing Indigenous capitals present in that community. For example, 
there may be a general shortage of skilled labour in a community, which might lead 
procurement designers down a mainstream, traditional lump sum path that relied on 
an external contractor; whereas, in those communities that have numbers of skilled 
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and semi-skilled labour, a mentoring methodology may suit, whereby a community 
organisation enters into a partnership-form of contract with a mainstream builder to 
carry out work in order to lever up to undertake subsequent construction projects on 
their own. Moreover, flexible contractual arrangements can cater for changing 
circumstances as programs evolve and local enterprise corporations gain confidence 
and capacity to take on more challenging contractual roles. 
The contractual methodology is a tool in the procurement process that can be 
effectively used to gain social and economic capital incorporation into contemporary 
housing provision, but if applied non-strategically, may have inadvertent negative 
impacts on such local capitals. Procurement is only a small part in the larger picture of 
quality of life in remote Indigenous communities, however, it does offer an opportunity 
to improve human livelihoods if designed and administered correctly. The case 
studies have shown that when the designers of a specific procurement system 
engage in a meaningful way with Indigenous people in working towards a shared 
understanding through participation (and not just consultation for its own sake), the 
outcome is likely to be better than not having done so. Another area of importance is 
the relationship between quality social capital outcomes and community engagement 
time. Projects need adequate time for pre-planning in order to not only establish how 
to approach a particular problem, but also how to design a constructive exit strategy 
for when a specific project comes to an end, so that gained capitals are not then lost. 
Additionally, there needs to be a concerted effort to evaluate and measure project 
outcomes. 
Lessons learned from the case study analyses illustrate that the contractual 
frameworks chosen for a particular project did indeed have a consequential 
relationship in the incorporation and enhancement of Indigenous social and economic 
capitals in housing provision. It is therefore possible to create more innovative, cost-
effective housing delivery methods in remote communities. However, the analyses 
illustrate that rather than attempting to design a one-size-fits-all contractual process 
for the remote Indigenous housing sector, it appears preferable to start with a 
strategic flexible delivery framework to support social and economic capital 
objectives—an approach that tends towards a ‘horses-for-courses’ ideology rather 
than a blanket approach tending toward a single definitive answer. Drawing from the 
findings of the four case studies, an integrated procurement strategy would be 
comprised of as many as possible of the following elements: 
1. Be adaptable to both large-scale and small-scale project contexts. 
2. Be able to incorporate a joint venture or partnership structure into its contractual 
framework whereby an Indigenous community, organisation or enterprise could 
align contractually with a mainstream building contractor and/or government. 
3. Have the ability to be flexible to allow for major shifts as the program progresses. 
4. Directly encourage and foster collective teamwork and administration mentoring in 
order to build capacity within the Indigenous participants in the system so as to 
achieve open building licences for future work. 
5. Offer incentives for mainstream building contractors to participate through risk 
mitigation. 
6. Offer incentives to proprietors in having an open-book scenario to all project costs. 
7. Adopt culturally appropriate design standards (as opposed to mainstream social 
housing ‘minimum design standards/guidelines’) with the SIHIP Design Guidelines 
being the best practice benchmark at the time of writing (Wigley 2008). 
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8. Be responsive to shifts in timeframes in the delivery system, so as to facilitate 
flexibility in response to remote community politics and social and climatic 
contexts. 
9. Give time for appropriate community-based consultation during both the design 
and delivery processes. 
10. Incorporate meaningful training and employment outcomes in the local 
communities where the program is based in an attempt to create as much 
economic stimulus through labour programs as possible. 
11. Have a longevity of at least five years so as to result in meaningful training 
outcomes whereby local labourers have an opportunity to carry their training 
through to full certification. 
12. Have a long-term exit strategy that not only incorporates training outcomes, but 
establishes a tenancy and asset management program, in addition to a repairs 
and maintenance program within given communities. 
13. Be immune to government political cycles. 
14. Adhere to healthy-living environmental and house design practices. 
15. Achieve cultural capitals through town planning and house design and community 
consultation through Housing Reference Groups (HRGs). 
16. Achieve balance between open-ended scoping and a prescribed approach to 
formatting project briefs. 
17. Be open to innovation and change as the program proceeds. 
18. Encourage the integration and cooperation of government departments in the 
contractual framework. 
The list above is not intended to be an exhaustive representation of what makes a 
good procurement system; but does represent the key elements drawn from the case 
study findings, for a good-practice procurement framework for future government and 
non-government housing projects in remote Indigenous communities. In gaining 
relevance in remote Indigenous communities, the procurement system will be 
confronted with many challenges, most notably in relation to governance structures 
and frameworks at both a local and government level. 
While functional for one-off projects, it was found that the conventional lump sum 
contract gave less opportunity in regard to incorporating many of the social capitals 
discussed. This is in contrast to the ‘strategically administered lump sum’ as 
exemplified in TIRP, as well as other procurement methods such as ‘alliancing’. 
Furthermore, large-scale contract packages offered greater flexibility and capacity to 
incorporate holistic planning and design that encompassed everything from settlement 
infrastructure on the one hand to targeted socio-economic capitals on the other. 
From the case study analyses it can be seen that the ‘strategically administered lump 
sum’, ‘alliancing’, and ‘relationship MC’ methods of procurement all have the potential 
to deliver many of the outcomes listed in the above table. The design of a 
procurement system that maximises the above outcomes of the strategic framework 
can be termed an ‘integrated project delivery framework’. Such a framework 
maximises opportunities for the incorporation of the broad range of capitals described 
above into housing delivery systems and procurement. 
End point 
Partly due to the paucity of research in this field, the current research project is an 
invaluable addition to the body of knowledge regarding housing procurement 
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processes in remote Aboriginal communities in Australia. It has the potential to create 
greater awareness of good practice administrative processes leading to more positive 
outcomes of culturally responsive housing by using the social and economic capitals 
that Aboriginal people can bring to procurement. In order to appropriately procure 
Aboriginal housing in remote communities in Australia, an envelope of ‘ethical 
fairness’ needs to cover all participants in the process; be they building contractors, 
Aboriginal occupants, government officials or others in procuring quality housing 
outcomes that attest to a shared future built environment that will last the test of time 
and that are representative and responsive to cultural settings with different social and 
economic values. 
This research project has shown that, irrespective of the differences in program scale, 
contract type, funding, duration and outcomes, significant challenges inevitably arose 
for each of the case study projects in generating socio-economic capitals. Varied 
infrastructure and resource constraints contributed to an expansion and/or contraction 
of capacity relative to the scale of hybrid economies operable for the duration of the 
program. However, a clear finding is that procurement limitations are not simply due to 
constrained resources and remoteness, but to the inherent complexities of 
organisational practice within governments, communities and industry. A key finding is 
that a significant shift in organisational culture can facilitate system improvement 
through redesign in order to improve service delivery outcomes and meet the 
challenges and complexities of program execution achieving ‘capital’ outcomes under 
unforeseen remote conditions that delivery teams cannot fully control. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent history shows Aboriginal housing to be a politically contested realm as two 
quite different peoples attempt to negotiate different social, economic and cultural 
values in constructing a shared future Australian built environment. Historically, 
housing procurement in remote Aboriginal communities has at times been 
sporadically linked to other forms of government service delivery outcomes and 
objectives such as construction, maintenance, training, employment, education, 
governance, management, health, sustainability; yet still further program values have 
emerged in recent years that can best be described as ‘symbolic capitals’ inclusive of 
leadership, mutual respect, positive cultural identity and other life skills and quality 
outcomes. 
These secondary outcomes of the housing process are what we loosely term the 
‘capitals’ of housing: outcomes that are in addition to the physical asset of the house. 
The idea of a research study on the relation between the procurement methods and 
the social, human and economic capitals in Indigenous housing seems even more 
compelling given the shifts in Indigenous policy in the Australian Government during 
the early 2000s. 
If one is to track through Indigenous policies from the early 1970s (starting in the 
Whitlam era), one finds the persistent inclusion of a range of capitals in housing 
delivery, initially generated from the policies of self-determination and self-
management (the Fraser era). The late 1970s and 1980s saw a flourishing of self-help 
construction, Aboriginal pre-fabricated house manufacturing companies, concrete 
block-making, house maintenance teams, landscaping enterprises, housing 
management committees and cooperatives, and even the employment of architects 
within Aboriginal-controlled agencies (Memmott 1988). By the 1990s government 
policies across many jurisdictions subscribed to levels of Indigenous decision-making 
and governance which became formalised within the many Indigenous Community 
Housing Organisations (ICHOs), the Regional Councils of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and the various state housing units with state 
bodies, such as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing (ATSIH Qld), the 
Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory (IHANT) and the South 
Australian Aboriginal Housing Authority (SAAHA). All of these structures were 
dismantled or disempowered in the first decade of the new millennia (early 2000s), 
due to internal reviews garnering a swing back towards mainstreaming. 
However, policies tend to move cyclically through time like a pendulum, and at the 
time of writing there was renewed interest in the potential capitals of Indigenous 
housing and an opportunity to re-examine how they might be achieved within a 
renewed call for the economic sustainability of communities and for ‘Closing the Gap’ 
in Aboriginal life expectancy, health, education and poverty under the Australian 
Government’s Indigenous targeted National Partnerships Agreements with the various 
states and territories. 
Given that the construction of houses is delivered using the practical and legal 
mechanism of a building contract into which design documentation and specifications 
are incorporated, it is surprising that no study to date has directly addressed the 
relation between what we term the ‘procurement method’, and the social, human and 
economic outcomes of the supply of housing, or the ‘social, human and economic 
capitals’. As will be discussed in this research report, the significance of a better 
understanding of housing procurement systems in remote Indigenous communities 
has potential benefit to all peoples in the Australian built environment sector. 
Aboriginal housing procurement, if done well, would not only provide a contribution 
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towards the reduction of livelihood vulnerabilities, but would create a powerful voice 
for strengthening self-governance and achieving services responsive to demand. 
1.1 The study and its aims 
This project explores the relationships between Indigenous housing procurement and 
the broader social and economic objectives or ‘capitals’ of Indigenous communities. It 
contributes to an understanding of the longer-term economic, social, environmental, 
health and cultural outcomes of past, current and future housing policies and housing 
delivery programs. The types of desirable outcomes from housing projects and their 
relative weightings vary across jurisdictions and between communities, but the 
following criteria for such outcomes are frequently encountered in the policy and 
program literature: 
 Involving Indigenous decision-making through consultation. 
 Achieving competitive housing delivery costs and economies of scale. 
 Sustaining local Indigenous building and maintenance teams in employment and 
training. 
 Ensuring that design complies with environmental health criteria. 
 Establishing a portfolio of high standard designs (cost effective, culturally and 
environmentally sustainable, disabled/elderly access). 
 Ensuring that routine maintenance is consistent with local community capacity. 
 Matching building contract sizes and performance goals with the regional 
capacities of private sector building contractors. 
 Affordability with regard to energy usage and maintenance costs. 
 Tenant satisfaction with the housing product and procurement process. 
While a number of theoretical frameworks have been devised to classify and describe 
this range of benefits based on individual project reports, ideological arguments and 
limited case study material, there are no published comparative analyses of case 
studies on what we refer to as the ‘socio-economic capitals’ of housing procurement. 
Housing procurement practice occurs in a complex context of political, market and 
industry dynamics. Achieving high-level outcomes beyond the units of houses is 
fraught with difficulty in remote Indigenous housing. For example, contractual 
requirements on building contractors to use local Aboriginal labour or purchase 
Aboriginal Council-supplied materials can introduce hidden risks, which in turn inflate 
tender prices in a market-driven economy. Despite this, there are some procurement 
success stories, and with this in mind, this project aims to assess what has been 
achieved during the last decade in the procurement of Aboriginal housing, as 
grounded in actual practice. These aims also partly address the AHURI Indigenous 
Research Agenda 2009 on sustainability relating to the financial implications of 
different procurement systems in meeting asset management practices and housing 
outcomes for Indigenous people in remote areas (AHURI 2008, p.21). 
Let us briefly overview the contents of this research report. The remainder of this 
chapter deals with methodological issues, first by describing the ‘Research 
background’ and how the study builds on earlier AHURI reports, which leads into the 
formulation of the set of research questions underpinning this research. The chapter 
continues with a detailed discussion of the contractual methodologies encountered in 
current building procurement systems before presenting an overview of the capitals of 
Indigenous housing, dealing separately with social and economic, cultural and ethical, 
health, employment and training, and lastly governance. The chapter concludes by 
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presenting the case study selection process and the methodology implemented in 
carrying out the research task. 
Chapter 2 presents a case study analysis of the medium-scale Thursday Island 
Redevelopment project undertaken by the Queensland Department of Housing 
between 1996 and 2000; Chapter 3 focuses on a small-scale Australian Government 
funded housing project carried out under the auspices of the National Aboriginal 
Health Strategy in Normanton, Northwest Queensland; Chapter 4 presents another 
small-scale case study in the community of Koonibba in western South Australia on 
housing procured by Housing South Australia; and Chapter 5 analyses research 
undertaken into the large-scale Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure 
Program currently underway in the Northern Territory. Finally, Chapter 6 
comparatively analyses the research findings in setting out how each of Indigenous 
capitals might be more logically or appropriately gained or enhanced through a 
particular type of procurement process, and concludes by recommending what factors 
need to be considered in designing an appropriate housing procurement model for 
remote Indigenous environments. 
1.2 Research background 
Drawing on a body of previous and current housing research, and using the AHURI 
report by Long et al. (2007), An Audit and Review of Australian Indigenous Housing 
Research as a starting point, the current authors have conducted a more in-depth 
literature review to assist in defining the social and economic capital frameworks of 
current Indigenous housing procurement in Australia. This is set out in depth in our 
Positioning Paper (Davidson et al. 2010), but in particular, reference is made to recent 
AHURI reports by Fien et al. (2007, 2008) who in turn drew upon previous AHURI 
work by Long et al. (2007), Memmott et al. (2006), Memmott (2004), Memmott and 
Chambers (2003), Moran (2004, 1999), Memmott and Moran (2001). Fien et al. (2008, 
pp.85–103), through an integrated process of intense literature analysis grounded in 
three remote field studies (Mimili, Palm Island, Maningrida), compiled a Design 
Framework for Indigenous Housing that consists of six principles of sustainability, 
being: 
1. cultural appropriateness 
2. environmentally sustainable 
3. healthy living practices 
4. employment opportunities and economic development 
5. life-cycle costing 
6. innovation in procurement, ownership and construction systems. 
These principles are combined with the specification of key decision-making points for 
their application through consultation in the housing system at settlement planning, 
housing design, construction and post-occupancy management phases. 
Fien et al. (2008) derive an extensive list of best practice principles, many of which 
have also been similarly devised elsewhere by Memmott (1989a, 1991). But it must 
be noted that the full list of the design framework is so demanding and so far reaching 
it is doubtful whether most or even a modest number are likely to be incorporated 
under conventional procurement methodologies. For a senior public servant in a 
government department or a professional consultant (project manager) to successfully 
implement all these program principles would not only require a very high level of 
professional expertise, but also a shared willingness and capacity to engage in them 
by the many other players in the housing process; what Ackfun (2008, p.75) has 
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referred to as the collective ‘mindset of attitudes and values’ of all the participants in 
the housing procurement process (policy-makers, managers, contractors, 
stakeholders, clients, employers). Thus, it is the idiosyncratic application by these 
players who are called upon to execute bureaucratic programs that can vary the 
scales of success or failure of any carefully devised policy or program (Moran 2006a, 
pp.152–159). Unfortunately, in Australian Indigenous housing, very seldom is such an 
ideal realised due to the aforementioned complex reality of political, market, and 
industry-driven dynamics. 
Dr Bruce Walker, Director of the Centre for Appropriate Technology (CAT) in Alice 
Springs has called for an even further expanded agenda in housing procurement 
beyond cultural factors, health objectives, appropriate technology and cost 
optimisation, to encompass investment in the economic development of the livelihood 
options, social capitals and social assets of Indigenous communities as part of a total 
regional reform and development system (Walker 2008, p.38). Under this wider 
umbrella would fit such exemplar initiatives as the recently formed Inaugural 
Australian Indigenous Minority Supply Council (AIMSC) which aims to assist 
Indigenous business entrepreneurs (including those in the housing industry sector) to 
gain access to the procurement processes of Australia’s top corporate companies; 
and Myuma Pty Ltd under the auspices of the Dugalunji Aboriginal Corporation 
(Camooweal) in establishing its own pre-vocational courses in training Aboriginal 
people for the mining/construction industry and positioning them with jobs (Memmott 
2007, 2010). In an attempt to move towards such a broad housing outcome and 
framework, the current research seeks to ground an understanding of housing 
procurement in actual practice and within a longitudinal perspective that covers the 
post-occupancy period so that housing outcomes can be adequately assessed—an 
area of housing research fraught with empirical challenges. 
It could be asked why this is necessary or significant if the design framework for good 
housing procurement is already developed within the literature? The problem is the 
current lack of well-documented evaluations of Aboriginal housing procurement in a 
total sense. There are a few early comprehensive case studies such as Heppell and 
Wigley 1981 (Mt Nancy in Alice Springs) and Memmott 1991 (Wilcannia), but they are 
somewhat outdated with respect to contemporary professional practice standards and 
contractual methodologies, although some key principles are worth re-visiting. An 
extensive literature review has shown that there are comparatively few recent 
documented examples, and those that are available are often embedded in 
unpublished documents such as professional reports or theses e.g. Howorth 2003 
(Central Australia—Apatula ATSIC Region, NT), Fantin 2003 (North East Arnhem 
Land, NT), Grant 1999 (Oak Valley, SA), Go-Sam 1997 (Mutitjulu, NT); or are only 
confined to one outcome or one subset of outcomes of the procurement process. An 
exemplar category of the latter type comprises post-occupancy housing evaluations 
that confine themselves to houses as functional products rather than the procurement 
and decision-making process, for example, Memmott (1989a, b) on the Tangentyere 
Council housing design assessment, Architects Studio et al. (2000) on the NT IHANT 
housing POE; the recently published fieldwork findings in Fien et al. (2008) of case 
studies at Maningrida (NT), Palm Island (Qld) and Mimili (AP Lands), all fall mainly 
within this latter category. 
In February 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), including those 
most relevant to the case studies in this report (the Commonwealth Government and 
the state governments of Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory) 
became mutually bound in Indigenous housing provision to remote communities 
through the ‘National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing’. A 
number of the proposed outcomes and outputs of this ten-year strategy as set out in 
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this Agreement coincided with the type of socio-economic capitals being examined in 
the current research study, viz: 
 Reduced overcrowding, particularly in remote and discrete communities. 
 Robust and standardised tenancy management. 
 Increased employment for local residents. 
 Resolution of land tenure to secure economic development opportunities and 
home-ownership possibilities in economically sustainable communities. (COAG 
2009, p.5.) 
However, a retrospective review of Indigenous housing policies throughout the latter 
half of the 20th century and the early 21st century would reveal that they all 
incorporated various combinations and permutations of the socio-economic and 
cultural capitals that are the subject of this study. For example, in the 1990s the 
National Aboriginal Health Strategy (NAHS) directed policy towards Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander health outcomes through housing (Jones 2000, pp.229–230) 
and ATSIC’s Community Development Planning program embraced social and 
community development combined with settlement infrastructure upgrading (Jones 
2000, pp.294–298). And, in 2003, the ‘Building a Better Future: Indigenous Housing to 
2010’ policy of the Housing Ministers Advisory Committee (HMAC) aimed to improve 
the capacity of Indigenous community housing organisations and to achieve safe, 
healthy and suistainable housing (Thompson 2004, p.85, p.86). Further examples 
could be cited from earlier periods despite the vastly different political contexts of the 
time; for example, even in the 1960s there was widespread experimentation with 
Aboriginal construction teams and homemaker programs (Thompson 2004, Chapter 
4). There is no reason to assume that the achievement of such broader social and 
economic capitals will not continue to play a role in current Indigenous housing 
procurement policies of Australian and state governments. A retrospective approach 
to seeking good practice case studies from past policy eras is thus still potentially 
useful to inform future practice in Indigenous housing. 
1.3 Research questions 
In order to examine in more depth a range of the types of social and economic capital 
benefits outlined above, the researchers, with input from their AHURI User Group, 
have selected a number of best practice case studies. The project generates and 
discusses strategies, guidelines, principles and measures for good Aboriginal housing 
procurement practices in remote Australia. 
In order to successfully undertake the research program, the authors formulated a list 
of working research questions with which to guide investigations. A number of these 
research questions set the research agenda for the earlier Positioning Paper 
(Davidson et al. 2010); with the remaining establishing the research framework for 
case study analyses undertaken in Stage 2 of this investigation, and presented 
herewith. 
The relevant questions for case study analysis in the Final Report were refined from 
the Positioning Paper, and are as follows: 
1. Which social and economic capitals are demonstrable from the case studies, and 
to what extent might they encompass construction, maintenance, training, 
employment, education, leadership, governance, service delivery, management, 
health, sustainability, mutual respect, positive cultural identity and other life skills 
outcomes? 
2. What examples of good practice housing procurement in building socio-economic 
capital in communities, can be identified through the case study analyses? 
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3. What obstacles or project disruptions can be identified in specific case study 
analyses that prevented such socio-economic capitals being realised in 
communities? 
4. In successful case studies, how enduring have these social and economic capitals 
been? 
1.4 Understanding contractual systems in procurement 
In attempting to understand the relationship between housing procurement and 
Aboriginal capital networks in remote communities, the common procurement 
strategies and associated contractual methodologies used in the Australian 
construction industry are presented below. Most forms of building procurement rely on 
legally binding contracts that establish the scope of works and set out the terms of 
reference to be undertaken during the contracted works. Currently in the Australian 
construction industry, there are nine formal contractual methods used in the provision 
of mainstream projects and one informal method identified at the end of the list, these 
being: 
 Documented Design (Traditional ‘Lump Sum’), also known as ‘Construct Only’. 
 Design Development and Construct (DD&C). 
 Design, Novate and Construct (DN&C). 
 Design and Construct (D&C). 
 Design, Construct and Maintain (DCM). 
 Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP). 
 Managing Contractor. 
 Alliance (Cooperative) Contracting. 
 Public Private Partnerships (PPP). 
 Owner-Builder (informal). 
1.4.1 Documented Design contracts 
In general, the Documented Design or ‘traditional lump sum’ contract is an agreement 
between two parties, commonly referred to as the proprietor (client/owner) and head 
contractor (builder), for works to be completed for a fixed monetary amount. This 
‘construct only’ process typically involves the proprietor engaging an independent 
design consultant (such as an architect) who is responsible for the overall design 
intent and scope of work. This design work forms the basis for a tendering process 
whereby a number of contractors are invited (either through public or private 
notification) to compete for construction services. The perceived advantage to this 
form of contract is its provision for greater control by the proprietor over design quality 
prior to, and during, construction. The perceived disadvantage of this system is the 
resultant risk borne by the proprietor in relation to time and cost overruns that have 
the potential to lead to an adversarial contractual environment (Connell Wagner 2007, 
p.2). Consequently, this form of contractual mechanism is appropriate for projects 
where (a) design quality is critical; (b) the proprietor is skilled enough to manage the 
design process; (c) flexibility is needed during the construction process to account for 
design parameter changes; (d) there is confidence in the design consultant to 
understand all brief requirements; and (e) there is enough time available for detailed 
design and documentation to occur (NSW Government 2008, p.4). 
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1.4.2 Design Development and Construct (DD&C) contracts 
According to the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA), forms of Design and 
Construct (D&C) procurement (which includes DD&C, DN&C and DCM) harks back to 
pre-modern forms of contract whereby a master builder or architect maintained 
absolute control over all aspects of project design and delivery (DBIA 2009). Under a 
typical D&C process, the head contracting entity enters into an agreement with the 
proprietor whereby they assume all project risks in further developing the proprietor’s 
already established conceptual design and project brief. Once the D&C contract is in 
place, the contractor oversees the preparation of detailed design and construction 
documentation and then manages construction in order for the project to achieve 
practical completion. Under this form of procurement process, the contractor tenders a 
lump sum price and assumes all responsibility for errors and omissions in their design 
documentation, which is ultimately beneficial to the project proprietor. Commonly, 
D&C contracts are used when there are significant financial risks associated with time 
delays and potential project scope changes and the proprietor does not have the skill 
to manage the design, documentation and consultant coordination process 
themselves. 
1.4.3 Other contractual forms 
A review of Australian procurement history shows a number of other variations to the 
common D&C contractual system, including: Design, Novate and Construct (DN&C) 
which is used when a single designer is required for the entirety of the project and 
involves ‘novating’ the design team from the employ of the proprietor to the contractor 
who then assumes ‘full and unambiguous responsibility for the whole of the design as 
well as the construction’ (NSW Government 2008, p.5); and Design Construct and 
Maintain (DCM) which has an additional post-construction maintenance period 
included in the original contract. According to the Procurement Practice Guide (NSW 
Government 2008, p.8), for proprietors, maintenance stipulations work better in D&C 
procurement than traditional lump sum scenarios as the contractor retains full legal 
responsibility over the entire process from design through construction to post-
construction maintenance. In this model, the benefit to the proprietor is the 
contractor’s liability period which is typically six years and three months post-
construction and which can be extended through maintenance clauses in the contract 
(NSW Government 2008, p.9). 
Also included within the D&C procurement framework is the Guaranteed Maximum 
Price (GMP) contract whereby a head contractor guarantees the project proprietor a 
‘maximum’ price for the construction works (NSW Government 2008, p.10). The 
contractor assumes all responsibility for cost over-runs and timeframe extensions; 
while the proprietor may provide further incentive with early completion bonuses. The 
major benefit to the proprietor in using GMP contracts is the mitigation of financial risk 
by having a contracted maximum price while the greatest threat is the reduction in 
project scope and quality to meet contracted cost and time objectives (Connell 
Wagner 2007, p.4). The authors have yet to find evidence of D&C forms of 
procurement being used in remote Aboriginal communities over the last ten years. 
The risk profile of the D&C process may account for this lack of use as building 
contractors choose to shy away from perceived unforeseen risks associated with 
building in remote communities. 
The Managing Contractor (MC) process combines elements of both ‘traditional’ and 
D&C procurement systems whereby the contractor takes on the role of a traditional 
project manager to deliver the contracted works to an agreed Target Construction 
Sum and Target Date for completion (NSW Government 2008, p.11). The MC contract 
is awarded on the basis of negotiating a number of non-price criteria and 
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management fees that cover the contractor’s costs in consultant coordination, 
authorities’ approvals processes and liaison with user and client groups. Once the 
project scope and deliverables are established, the contractor then tenders a 
Guaranteed Construction Sum (GCS) and Date for Practical Completion (PC), after 
which they are then liable for any cost overruns as well as typically being entitled to a 
50 per cent share with the proprietor in any cost savings upon completion. Due to the 
extra time and resources spread across the design and build process, administration 
costs may be more for an MC when compared to a traditional construct only Lump 
Sum process (Connell Wagner 2007, p.5). Typically, the major benefit of MC 
procurement is better communication between proprietor, contractor and key 
stakeholders during the design and construction process which has the added 
advantage of minimising time delays resulting in better cost controls than most other 
forms of construction procurement. 
A summary of commonly used contractual types categorising procurement 
circumstances in which they may be applied has been developed by the authors and 
included in Table 1 below. 
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Two additional procurement systems are Public Private Partnerships (PPP), which 
involve private sector companies financing the design, construction, operation and 
maintenance of public assets for a given period of time (Connell Wagner 2007, p.8) 
and the Owner/Designer/Builder (ODB) facilitation process whereby a project 
manager (possibly an architect or engineer) assists a given community or household 
in constructing required infrastructure and housing. Again, due to a lack of 
documentary evidence in the literature, the authors are yet to ascertain whether PPP 
processes have been used in housing procurement in remote Aboriginal communities. 
However, one of the best-known examples of an ODB system is the work of architect 
Paul Haar at Mount Catt Arnhem Land and St Paul’s Village on Moa Island in the 
Torres Strait. In describing his design facilitation methodology, Haar states that ‘[o]ne 
cannot underestimate the value of allowing remote communities to appropriate their 
own dwelling experience, to design, construct and take pride in their own homes, and 
to again embrace housing “as a symbol of the self”’ (Haar 2003, p.96). Other 
community development organisations such as Emergency Architects Australia4 are 
known to use this method of ODB facilitation in their housing aid projects in Asia and 
the Pacific. Due to its grass-roots approach, the ODB process appears unsuitable for 
large-scale housing projects controlled by a central administration such as 
government. 
1.4.4 Alliance contracting 
Alliance contracting or Project Partnering is a relatively new form of procurement in 
the Australian construction industry and involves two or more entities entering into an 
agreement to ‘work cooperatively, reaching decisions jointly by consensus and using 
intensive relationship facilitation’ (NSW Government 2008, p.13). In managing 
relationships, alliance contracting calls for a commitment from all parties to common 
objectives, cooperative action and collective decision-making in sharing information 
and knowledge in a non-adversarial social environment (Connell Wagner 2007, p.7). 
                                               
4 See Emergency Architects Australia (2010). 
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Yeung et al. (2007, p.219) define the alliancing model as having its origins from the 
German philosopher Wittgenstein’s idea of family-resemblance, where a complicated 
concept can be understood as a network of overlapping similarities. The model is 
broadly subdivided into contractual and relationship-based components, nominating 
the former as hard and the latter as soft. Alliancing is seen as a model to flexibly 
structure and define vague elements within the contractual arrangement. Although the 
definition of the model has had little industry consensus, it is conceptualised as having 
necessary elements of formal contracts comprising real gain-share/pain-share 
elements and so called vague relationship-based elements identified as trust, long-
term commitment, cooperation and communication. 
Alliance contracting is useful for long-term projects with complex social and technical 
parameters where the project scope is uncertain or unknown at the outset with all 
stakeholders sharing the risk collectively. Furthermore, alliancing is used to combine 
‘a relationship management system and a delivery system’ where ‘partnering [is] 
underpinned with economic rationalism’ and ‘agreed profit and loss outcomes are 
contractually binding on all parties’ (Yeung et al. 2007, p.223). The ‘Alliance’ contract 
model has been earmarked as a potential opportunity to introduce innovative 
constructions systems in order to garner regional models of housing procurement and 
achieve cost efficiencies (Fien et al. 2007, pp.34–35). Currently, the Northern Territory 
Government is administering an alliance/partnering system for the large-scale 
procurement of housing in remote Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, 
which involves a joint management structure with the Australian Government. 
Interestingly, the Australian Institute of Architects (AIA) neither endorses nor rejects 
this contractual methodology, but does maintain its endorsement of lump sum 
contracts as the ‘best way to deliver ‘one-off’ construction projects and cautions 
architects to consider carefully before entering into alliancing contracts’ (AIA 2009b). 
As a point of comparison, the figure below models the risk transfer associated with 
traditional forms of contract and project partnering (alliancing). 
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Figure 1: Comparison between traditional and alliance forms of contract 
 
Source: Extracted from the Department of Treasury and Finance 2006, p.10. 
A review of the last 10 years of housing procurement projects in remote Aboriginal 
communities shows the prevalence up to 2005 5  of small-scaled housing projects 
partly administered by individual Indigenous Community Housing Organisations 
(ICHOs). They were funded entirely by state and federal government departments 
through programs such as Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP). 
CHIP was complemented by the NAHS program which was of a larger-scale and 
embraced infrastructure (power, water, air strips, roads, sewerage) as well as housing. 
However, it should be noted that in comparison to the current SIHIP program (see 
later in this report) NAHS was also towards the smaller end of the scale (e.g. see 
Vanstone 2004). Pertaining to selected case studies in this report, currently, in the 
states of Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory, there are a number 
of government programs that deliver Indigenous-specific forms of housing, through 
different statutory and organisational structures such as, State Owned and Managed 
Indigenous Housing (SOMIH) authorities, Indigenous local governments, Indigenous 
Community Housing Organisations (ICHO) and Indigenous Community Organisations 
(ICO) (AIHW 2009b, p.1, p.11). All are funded in one form or another through various 
Commonwealth or state programs under the National Affordable Housing Agreement 
(NAHA). SOMIH are dwellings owned and managed by the particular state or territory 
housing authorities funded through National Partnership Agreements on housing 
affordability, homelessness and social housing.6 Under the Northern Peninsula Area 
                                               
5
 When ATSIC was disbanded by the Howard Government, initially announced on April 2004 with the 
proposal for Regional Councils to be closed by May 2005. Source: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/ 
cib/2004-05/05cib04.htm#abolition (Accessed: 27/10/10) 
6
 Web: http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/housing/progserv/affordability/affordablehousing/Pages/default.aspx (Accessed 
02/11/10) 
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(NPA), some Indigenous community housing organisations (ICHOs) and ICOs may or 
may not act as agents for state or territory housing bodies and may participate in one 
or a range of procurement activities such as new builds, repairs and maintenance and 
major refurbishments.7 
1.5 Understanding the social and economic capitals of 
Indigenous housing procurement 
Let us consider the various types of capitals elicited in our earlier Positioning Paper 
(also see for a full discussion on the literature underpinning these concepts). 
1.5.1 Social capitals 
Social capital consists of networks of social relationships formed for mutual benefit 
and based on norms of trust, reciprocity and unity. Although Indigenous social capital 
investment appears to yield only limited economic gain and does not usually manifest 
as capitalistic economic development largely, there is a possibility of exploring 
whether informal Aboriginal groups such as socio-spatial kin-based residential 
groupings, customary gendered activity groups, hunting or craft manufacturing groups, 
and ceremonial or ritual groups, can play roles in the housing economy or in housing 
management. Such social capital would need to be localised and contextualised due 
to the distinct economic and social circumstances in remote settlements. For 
purposes of identification and evaluation, it is possible to measure social capital 
strength, although it is necessary to combine a quantitative scaling approach with a 
qualitative assessment to capture the distinctive cross-cultural mix of values and 
networks in Aboriginal communities. (Davidson et al. 2010, Section 3.2) 
1.5.2 Cultural and ethical capitals in procurement 
A related dimension to social capital is cultural capital which can play a significant role 
in housing design. The ‘cultural design paradigm’ involves the use of models of 
culturally distinct behavior to inform definitions of Aboriginal housing needs (Memmott 
& Go-Sam 2003, p.13). These need to be generated from effective consultation with 
end users, requiring specialist expertise in cross-cultural skills. This approach 
provides opportunity in housing procurement for the reinforcing of cultural identity, 
thereby strengthening social and cultural capital. Ethical capital is further generated 
from a consistent application of primary ethical principles of mutual respect, mutual 
rights and mutual responsibilities in meeting the reasonable culturally specific needs 
of householders. 
1.5.3 Health capitals and procurement 
A form of human capital that can be generated from housing procurement is health 
capital. Houses and associated environments can contribute positively to sustaining 
Aboriginal health and reducing livelihood vulnerabilities. Surveys are available to 
assess the quality of the health hardware, i.e. ‘the physical equipment necessary for 
healthy, hygienic living’, which provides a measure of health capital in Indigenous 
housing (Davidson et al. 2010, Section 3.4). Another form of health capital is arguably 
generated by supporting the social and psychological functions of housing. A 
significant way to do this is to reduce crowding. However, due to the complexity of 
cross-cultural measurement models, ‘crowding’ is also a specialist area of research 
and design practice; and needs to encompass the complex Aboriginal inter-
relationships of kinship, household density, behavioural norms and values, and the 
functional state of house infrastructure as well as the hygienic condition of houses and 
                                               
7
 Web: http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/housing/progserv/affordability/affordablehousing/Pages/NPASocialHousing.aspx 
(Accessed 02/11/10) 
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psychological well-being. Crowding is defined in terms of stress arising from the 
unwanted presence of others as opposed to density per se, and this problem can 
manifest in diverse ways within different cultures. The problem of quantifying and 
measuring crowding reduction in Indigenous housing in order to reduce psychological 
stress and infectious disease transmission is similarly difficult, and although coarse 
measurements are regularly made using conventional occupancy standards, they are 
not necessarily an accurate guide as indicated by some of the culturally distinctive 
examples given. 
1.5.4 Employment and training capitals in procurement 
Housing and infrastructure procurement, as one of the largest capital investments by 
governments in remote communities, has a clear potential to generate employment 
and training capitals and thereby provide improved wealth creation and economic 
sustainability for Aboriginal people. Achieving economic outcomes to improve 
livelihoods in remote regions of Australia, where there are considerable economic 
vulnerabilities of labour and skills shortages, which simultaneously exist alongside 
high unemployment in Aboriginal settlements, has proved elusive. Upward pressures 
from macro-economic forces cause tight labour markets that have threatened social 
housing programs with fixed budgets as they increasingly compete with industries that 
are equipped with greater purchasing power (Szava et al. 2007); while declining 
housing affordability in remote settlements has dual regional social impact at the 
policy level on efficiency and equity (Haslam McKenzie et al. 2008, pp.10–16). The 
economic context in remote settlements bears greatly upon other sustainability 
livelihood factors, such as cultural and human capitals of employment, training and 
education, albeit in a context where limited economic opportunities are stifled due to 
geographic location, small populations and recurring circular mobility (Moran 2009, 
np). 
The capacity for Indigenous groups to form entrepreneurial business to participate in 
the government-sponsored building activity in their own communities is equally limited, 
as such groups typically lack a range of necessary capitals (financial, human, 
technological) as well as relevant management skills, business acumen and market 
accessibility (Foley 2008; Furneaux & Brown 2008; Pearson & Helms 2010). 
1.5.5 Governance capitals in procurement 
Capacity building of local governance capital is also necessary to obtain sustainable 
capitals including training and employment outcomes. Housing procurement can 
contribute to both local and regional forms of Indigenous governance. However, there 
is generally an imbalance in power relations and capacities between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal governance systems, one which needs to be corrected in order to 
generate the best capital outputs from housing procurement. The latter includes local, 
state and federal government representative bodies and their associated funding 
cycles that require coordination at the scales of the settlement and the region. 
Procurement problems result when there is not a collective mindset of values and 
attitudes among these respective players. 
1.6 Methodological approach and case study design 
While preparing the current research program, a number of early observations and 
further questions regarding procurement strategies, contractual methodologies and 
the complexities of socio-economic capital frameworks in remote Aboriginal housing 
arose. These questions have formed the basis for inquiry and have influenced the 
choice of case studies. As such, the primary case studies combine (i) literature 
analysis, (ii) semi-structured interviews with professionals who were involved in 
procurement, and (iii) field visits to a number of communities to inspect houses, 
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interview community leaders and residents and local Council or ICHO staff involved in 
housing. The final selection of four primary case studies was based on a range of 
criteria including the existence of project documents, gaining project document access 
permission, the capacity of original participants to facilitate such access, community 
access permissions, and the cost of community visitation, as well as the actual 
suitability of the case study for procurement analysis. In responding to the initial 
observations and associated conclusions above, the following list identifies those case 
studies chosen for analysis in this research program: 
 The Thursday Island Redevelopment Project, ATSI Housing, Qld. 
 An NAHS-funded ICHO Project: Bynoe CACS Ltd, Normanton, Qld. 
 A South Australia Housing funded project at Koonibba, SA. 
 The Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program (SIHIP), NT. 
Figure 2: Case study locations 
Note: At the time of writing, the packages indicated were accurate, however changes may have occurred 
since. 
The Thursday Island Redevelopment Project (TIRP) was chosen due to its complex 
social and cultural agenda and is one of the largest and most successful housing and 
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infrastructure delivery programs ever undertaken in a remote Indigenous community 
in Queensland. The SIHIP project was selected due to its even more ambitious scale 
and complexity in being Australia’s largest ever delivery program for remote 
Indigenous housing and infrastructure. Both the smaller-scale Housing SA Koonibba 
and NAHS Normanton housing projects were chosen as an important contrast to the 
scale of the TIRP and SIHIP projects. The logic was that a contrast of scales and 
complexities would generate productive outcomes in comparative discussion relevant 
to future procurement strategies in both large and small procurement projects. 
In compiling this research report, a desktop literature review was undertaken which 
focused on the varying forms of economic and social capital frameworks and 
contractual methodologies pertaining to procurement systems in remote Aboriginal 
communities in Australia. Literature searches were undertaken of citation databases 
as well as government and community organisation websites that yielded numerous 
documents, including research reports and federal and state government policy 
documents (Davidson et al. 2010). While the main research project has combined 
methods of literature analysis and survey questionnaires/interviews from the four 
major case studies above, the previous Positioning Paper weaves the results of 
historical Post-Occupancy Evaluation (POE) studies of Aboriginal housing projects 
into the discussion of social and economic capitals for greater emphasis of specific 
explanations and clarity of argument. Consequently, the authors have drawn on 
several notable examples of Indigenous housing POE studies, all conducted using 
varying methodological approaches and cross-disciplinary frameworks such as 
psychology, sociology, medicine, anthropology and architecture; being Ross (1987), 
Memmott (1989a, b), Memmott (1991), Pholeros, Rainow and Torzillo (1993), Morel 
and Ross (1993), Memmott et al. (2000), Fletcher and Bridgeman (2000), Fantin 
(2003), Parnell and Seemann (2005). For the sake of this report’s length, the authors 
have chosen to leave this review in its entirety in the Positioning Paper (Davidson et al. 
2010) rather than reiterate it here.  
In terms of procurement strategies in Aboriginal housing, we have drawn from a 
varied literature base to formulate an argument surrounding the associated benefits 
and risks of the contractual methodologies used in the delivery of such housing. For 
example, information has been collected from the Australian Institute of Architects 
(AIA 2009a, b) Acumen professional advisory database, the New South Wales 
Department of Commerce Procurement Practice Guide (AIA 2009a, b), Connell 
Wagner’s Discussion Paper, Procurement Methodologies Strategic Intervention 
Housing Program (2007a) prepared for the Commonwealth Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), and the former 
Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory (IHANT) (Connell Wagner 
2007a). These studies and reports generate findings that resonate into current and 
future housing design and delivery practices in remote Aboriginal communities. 
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2 CASE STUDY: THURSDAY ISLAND (QLD) 
2.1 Introduction8  
The Torres Strait Islands, dispersed throughout 48 000 square metres, are the 
remains of a land bridge between Cape York and New Guinea that was flooded at the 
end of the last Ice Age. A distinctive Indigenous island-based culture evolved in 
contrast to the Aboriginal cultures on Cape York and the Papuan peoples along the 
New Guinea coast, despite regular north–south trade with these groups and constant 
diffusion of traits in both directions. During colonisation this demographic and cultural 
profile was overlaid with minorities of European, Asian and Polynesian immigrants. 
Geographically, the Torres Strait Islands are divisible into five distinct clusters 
reflecting subcultural groupings; the island communities within each cluster having a 
tradition of close intermarriage and exchange. The South-Western, Mid-Western, 
Central, Eastern, and Top-Western Islands contain a total of 15 discrete settlements 
(Figure 3). Most of these communities have populations of about 200 or 300 people 
(Table 2), although the largest (Badu) has over 700. A sixth sub-region is the Northern 
Peninsula Area (NPA) on the tip of Cape York. Although this area was traditionally 
occupied by Aboriginal groups, the Queensland Government established new 
communities (Bamaga, Seisa) and new Aboriginal communities (New Mapoon, 
Umagico, Injinoo) during the 20th century and residents have since inter-married. The 
population sizes of these NPA communities are similar to the islands (200 or 300), the 
exception being Bamaga with about 700 people. The total Indigenous population of 
the region as per the 2006 census was 9567. 
Figure 3: Map of the Torres Strait and Northern Peninsula Areas, showing division into 
six sub-regions (Eastern, Central, Top-Western, Mid-Western, South-Western and NPA) 
 
                                               
8
 This description has been previously published in Memmott, P. 2010, The Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology, Volume 43, Number 2, pp. 338–340. 
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The regional centre of the Torres Strait is at Thursday Island (population 2551 of 
whom 1847 are Indigenous) with an associated urban centre at nearby Horn Island 
(population 587), which also has the regional airport and to which daily flights from 
Cairns arrive. Travellers then commute by bus and short ferry trip to Thursday Island. 
Here there is a division between the CBD precinct (Port Kennedy) where 60 per cent 
of population are Indigenous, and the western precinct of the town where 90 per cent 
are Indigenous. Many of the non-Indigenous people are government workers and non-
government organisation (NGO) service providers. Asiatic people who originated from 
the 19th century pearling industry have merged into the permanent population. 
Small planes make daily connecting flights from Horn Island to the various outer 
island communities. The only other ferry service operates between Thursday Island 
and Seisia in the NPA. Indigenous people often travel throughout the region in 
dinghies with outboard motors, to buy supplies at Thursday Island. According to the 
2006 Australian Census, 81 per cent of the population of the Torres Strait was of 
Torres Strait Islander origin, with more than 13 per cent of the region’s total population 
living on Thursday Island. The remoteness of its location makes access to basic 
services and the organisation of civil administration extremely difficult to manage 
which has contributed to a history of ‘neglect’ in the provision of housing and 
infrastructure services for the Island. 
2.2 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing Unit 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing (ATSIH) was a discrete unit and a 
specialist housing provider within the former Queensland Department of Housing. It 
also offered advice and support to assist other service providers, as well as agencies 
(such as QBuild) delivering housing outcomes for Indigenous people. (B.A. 2010) 
ATSIH recognised the special needs of Indigenous households and provided a set of 
culturally appropriate services and products. The unit was responsible for a state-
managed portfolio of approximately 2500 rental properties throughout Queensland 
and provided grant funding for community housing in 34 discrete Indigenous 
communities. The overall housing program was supported by program development, a 
planning and policy service, as well as project management, design, construction, 
technical advisory and tenancy management services. In managing the Rental 
Program, ATSIH construction units undertook new build, maintenance and upgrading 
activities and provided direct training, apprenticeships and employment opportunities 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. 9  Construction managers also 
provided support and assistance to Indigenous community councils in housing 
delivery in discrete communities. In 2001, ATSIH received the Queensland Premier’s 
Award for service delivery in Indigenous housing. 
ATSIH was responsible for direct delivery of housing in urban and regional areas, 
including Thursday Island, as well as supporting housing delivered by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Councils on discrete DOGIT communities. Within the directly 
delivered program, ATSIH delivered an integrated range of functions including 
construction, tenancy and property management. The directly employed construction 
teams were in major regional centres and in other areas ATSIH contracted out 
construction, including to QBuild. On Thursday Island, as in other parts of Qeensland, 
this involved management of housing both in freehold areas and on Reserves. 
Government management of housing on Thursday Island Reserve lands was 
sensitive due to community aspirations for self-determination and control of the 
Reserve lands. Within the community program, ATSIH provided capital funding for 
                                               
9
 Queensland Government Department of Housing 2000, pp.3–4 Queensland Government Department of 
Housing 2000, ‘2000–2003 ATSIH Plan. Aims to improve access for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people to secure, affordable and appropriate housing throughout Queensland’. 
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housing, oversight of construction, specialist project management where requested by 
Councils and policy advice and sector development to support Councils in their 
housing management roles. (R.P. 2010) 
In 2004, ATSIH was restructured after a Queensland Government decision to 
mainstream service delivery in Indigenous communities. This resulted in many of the 
Unit’s functions10 being moved to mainstream areas of the Department. At the time it 
was dismantled, 80 per cent of all senior ATSIH managers were Indigenous, and 110 
out of 140 staff identified as Indigenous people ( A.A. 2010). Furthermore, ATSIH had 
a range of active training and employment programs with 80 Aboriginal people 
employed in construction-related activities and over 150 people in total across both 
the Rental and Community Programs at the time (B.A. 2010). The Unit was also 
responsible for the development of the minimum construction standards for remote 
Aboriginal housing delivery in Queensland (B.A. 2010). During A.A.’s time as ATSIH 
general manager, rental arrears (four weeks or more) fell from 36 per cent to 5 per 
cent across the state, which reflected ATSIH’s policy of working with people rather 
than resorting to immediate legal action, as can be the case of current mainstream 
social housing in Queensland (A.A. 2010). Also, an improvement in regular 
maintenance regimes resulted in a direct reduction in rental arrears. 
2.3 The Thursday Island Redevelopment Project 
In 1996, against the backdrop of an acute housing shortage on Thursday Island, the 
Queensland Government, through the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing 
(ATSIH) unit of the Department of Public Works, initiated a broad scale master 
planning process to resolve the overcrowded living conditions on the island. History 
shows that, at the time, Thursday Island had the state’s highest recorded wait times of 
more than 12 years for residents applying for public housing in Queensland. Not only 
was there an inadequate supply of housing, but local infrastructure had also exceeded 
its capacity, raising health concerns. Accordingly, the Thursday Island Redevelopment 
Project was established in partnership with the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) 
and Torres Shire Council (TSC) ‘to upgrade, replace and develop new housing and 
infrastructure, which would provide the basis for developing safe, secure and more 
culturally appropriate housing in the community’. 11 
There was a great need for housing on TI at this point. For example, one of the 
existing reserve houses had 21 people living in it … in the end this family was 
allocated 12 bedrooms spread across a number of houses with bedroom 
allocations falling under the State’s Allocation Policy for household numbers. 
(M.B. 2010) 
The conditions were particularly poor with, for example, families in one 
community living in one-bedroom accommodation that had been constructed 
as temporary accommodation during the war. One resident said to us: “Please 
don’t paint my housing inside anymore because it just reduces the space even 
more.” The same tenant took us to see white ants falling into the baby’s 
basinet. (R.P. 2010) 
The initial reason for choosing the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project as a case 
study lay with A.A., the former general manager of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
                                               
10
These functions included tenancy and asset management, regional construction centres, 
apprenticeship program, and the Unit’s policy advisory role on the national committee for Building a 
Better Future. 
11
Department of Housing, (QLD) 2001 ‘A Review of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project’, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing, p.2. 
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Islander Housing unit in the Department of Public Works.12 A.A. recommended TIRP 
on the basis that it was one of the most positive housing projects he had been 
involved with in his 25 years working for Queensland and Australian Governments on 
Indigenous projects. A further reason for choosing TIRP related to the scale of its 
development and the overall relevance to a number of the specific ‘capitals’ we have 
been seeking to elucidate through this research. TIRP delivered 69 additional houses, 
55 replacement houses and 113 upgraded homes, and accounted for the employment 
of 383 people and the training of 49 people, but not all of these were of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander descent.13 TIRP had a complex social and cultural agenda and 
is one of the most successful housing and infrastructure delivery programs ever 
undertaken in a remote Indigenous community in Queensland. The process by which 
TIRP was established arose as a direct reflection of the policy agenda of the then 
Minister for Housing and Public Works, Ray Connor. At the time there were 15 
communities on Thursday Island with seven under serious housing pressure. (I.D. 
2010) 
Minister Connor had a statewide policy of reducing waiting times for public 
housing and ensuring wait times were similar across the State. It was notable 
that he did not differentiate TI, as a remote, primarily Indigenous community. 
When presented with the data on wait times and overcrowding he said “What 
will it take to bring TI wait times down to the state average”. We did the 
numbers and identified a dollar amount to build the required houses. Given the 
shortage of freehold land, the poor condition and overcrowding on Reserves, 
limited infrastructure (water is an ongoing issue in the T.S.) and the high level 
of sensitivity in the community about housing issues, we advised the Minister 
that a planned approach was needed that resulted in the best long-term 
benefit for the community, including maximising local employment and training 
opportunities. This seemed like an ideal opportunity to demonstrate good and 
integrated social and physical planning. (R.P. 2010) 
In accordance with the Minister’s stated aims that funding would be committed to 
TIRP on the proviso that a planned approach to housing would be put in place, a 
consortium consisting of a town planner, a cultural heritage consultant, an engineer, 
architect and quantity surveyor was formed to assist ATSIH in the design, 
documentation and project management of the development (I.D. 2010). Accordingly, 
through the TIRP consortium, an extensive project brief was developed by the 
department, to guide the redevelopment strategy. In consultation with key 
stakeholders, including local community members, the Torres Strait Regional 
Authority, Island Coordinating Council and various state government departments 
(DNRM, DPWH, DH, DTMR, DPI), this briefing document ‘examined the opportunities 
and constraints in relation to the potential physical, social and environmental impacts 
of the project’.14 The aim of this initial program of consultation and planning was to 
investigate the desired population capacities of potential sites and the cost 
implications and effectiveness for ‘providing and maintaining both the physical and 
social infrastructure required supporting such a population,’15  as well as ensuring 
                                               
12
 A.A. also identified the Northern Peninsula Area (NPA) ‘Healthy Housing’ program completed by 
ATSIH in the early 2000s as another best practice example of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people leading the procurement process. The Healthy Housing project saw the building of houses in 
Bamaga, Seisa, New Mapoon, Umagico and Injinoo in North Queensland. 
13
 Department of Housing, (Qld) 2001 ‘A Review of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project’, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing, p.10. 
14
 Department of Housing, (Qld) 2001 ‘A Review of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project’, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing, p.6. 
15
 Department of Housing, (Qld) 2001 ‘A Review of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project’, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing, p.6. 
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development was staged in both an environmentally and socially appropriate manner. 
The investigation also identified appropriate strategies for waste, water and energy 
management for the designated development sites. This course of early research and 
consultation led to the Thursday Island Housing Redevelopment Strategy master plan 
which then became the basis for the implementation of the redevelopment project, 
and the justification for funding allocation required by the Housing Minister and 
Cabinet at the time. 
A particular governance issue that made this possible in TI was the autonomy 
of the TSRA and the ability to coordinate with Australian Government 
infrastructure funding. Similarly the long-term commitment of housing and 
infrastructure funding gave credibility to the planning process because there 
was a commitment and the funding to implement the plan. This is most 
unusual and demonstrates that the overarching governance and funding 
arrangements have to support long-term and integrated planning. (R.P. 2010) 
The selection of land available for development relied heavily on knowledge garnered 
during early community consultation, and involved an in-depth analysis of existing 
land use patterns In the early stages of the process, the management group 
investigated land use patterns on Thursday Island with a principal focus on the state-
owned reserve land, zoning and available infrastructure and services (I.D. 2010). Due 
to the historical neglect in procuring appropriate housing numbers up to that point, the 
reserve communities were also those in greatest need of new and 
refurbished/upgraded housing and infrastructure services such as sewerage and 
water supply (I.D. 2010). The reserves were also those areas of Thursday Island with 
the closest traditional and family links to communities on the outer islands of the 
Torres Strait; thus, the potential for a wider positive impact on the whole region. The 
auditing process resulted in development being undertaken in those areas requiring 
urgent housing assistance in the first stage of TIRP. The close relationship and the 
goodwill that had developed towards the project during the initial phases of the project 
resulted in the Torres Strait Regional Authority gifting a large parcel of land on Pearl 
Street for incorporation into the redevelopment project. In addition to the Pearl Street 
allocation and the existing reserve land, the Queensland Government also purchased 
property on Douglas Street and undertook the removal of the existing houses to make 
way for the new housing stock proposed on the site. (A.A. & M.B. 2010) 
2.4 Project planning strategies 
An internal review into the project carried out by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Housing in November 2001 pointed out that the first stage in project planning was 
project identification involving problem definition and the plausibility of project design. 
Problem definition involved understanding the potential issues influencing the long-
term outcomes for the project, and included: 
1. the external environment relating to broad community consensus, standards and 
public opinion 
2. the internal environment involving knowledge of the local cultural context and the 
enormity of the sub-standard housing conditions present at the time 
3. the political priorities of the funding authorities in place at the point of project 
inception. Consideration of these issues then assisted the plausibility of project 
design through the formation of an original consultancy brief which outlined the 
main objectives, the issues to be considered (as detailed above), and a timeframe 
for implementation. 
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Before initiating the broader master planning process, ATSIH formed a Housing 
Redevelopment team 16  based in Brisbane to oversee and coordinate the various 
government departments involved in the project. According to a number of 
interviewees, the success of TIRP began with good communication and coordination 
between the various government stakeholders themselves (A.A., M.B., B.A. & I.D. 
2010). One of the first steps in project management was the establishment, by the 
Redevelopment team, of a Program Management position to ensure project 
administration was in accordance with the stated aims of the Housing Redevelopment 
Strategy (B.A. 2010). The Program Manager’s role involved coordinating the entire 
process from early strategic decision-making to community liaison, training and 
employment through to project completion. This role was also complemented by the 
activities undertaken by the Regional Manager (B.A. 2010) of ATSIH’s Northern 
Construction Division who oversaw the delivery of the project on Thursday Island. 
… the governance and delivery arrangements were important. Having a 
Brisbane based team that could lead coordination of state agencies and act as 
a conduit between the state and the local cross agency coordination structure 
was critical. It was also important that this was supported by Management of 
delivery by Bob Allen in Cairns who had a long history and knowledge. It was 
also important to have the local office with Caroline Cloudy who had such a 
good knowledge of community issues and could feed them into the process. 
(R.P. 2010) 
Furthermore, in organising the higher level management strategy for the TIRP, the 
ATSIH Redevelopment team chose a two-tier management structure comprising of a 
first-tier Steering Committee17 made up of representatives from various government 
departments and agencies including ATSIH, DPW, ATSIPD and DFYCC; and a 
second-tier Community Reference Group comprising the TSRA, TSC, the TRAWQ 
Community Council, the Kaureg Land Council, members of the Waiben, Aplin, 
Tamwoy, Rose Hill and Quarantine communities, an Environmental Health Officer and 
a Social Planning Consultant. According to a number of interviewees, adoption of this 
innovative two-tier organisational structure resulted in improved communication 
between government and the local community, clearer role definitions and 
responsibilities among the various individuals, and speedier resolution of stakeholder 
problems. Regular Steering Committee and Community Reference Group meetings 
were held which led to an enhanced relationship between all stakeholders leading to 
greater respect for local social and cultural values, recognition of stakeholder 
concerns and the general goodwill of all participants towards the project. 
2.5 Project management and staging strategies 
In addition to the two-tier management strategy described above, an incremental and 
staged approach to development was called for so as to reduce the level of 
inconvenience to local residents while the project was being implemented. This 
approach also resulted in better inter-agency coordination with regard to general 
service provision. Additionally, the division of this large-scale project into smaller 
parcels that could be staged (four stages in total) accordingly resulted in greater 
control of contract conditions, monitoring of project outcomes and also the ability to 
                                               
16
 Comprised of A.A., M.B. and B.A. (B.A. 2010). 
17
 The Steering Committee was made up of Alex Ackfun, General Manager, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Housing ATSIH; Melda Boundy, Manager Program Development ATSIH; Robert Allen, Regional 
Manager, Northern Construction ATSIH; Tony Martens, Program Officer ATSIH, Caroline Cloudy, Team 
Leader, Thursday Island Area Office ATSIH; Brian Sheehan, Far North Area Manager, Department of 
Housing; Bob Moorish, North Queensland, Property Services Office, Department of Public Works; 
Representative from Social Impact Assessment Unit, Department of Families, Youth and Community 
Care. 
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adapt and modify project design and procurement processes as the stages 
progressed. Due to setting up regular (monthly) meetings and reporting procedures 
between the steering committee, community reference group, contractors and project 
managers, earlier phases of the development were constantly being evaluated for 
quality outcomes in order to inform the design and delivery processes for latter stages. 
Furthermore, in choosing a contractual mechanism for the implementation and 
delivery of houses, the ATSIH Redevelopment team were guided by the Queensland 
Government Purchasing Policy (now the State Procurement Policy) that stipulated the 
use of the Traditional Lump Sum contracting for all public housing projects (A.A. & 
M.B. 2010). The specific form of contract used for TIRP was AS2124–1992 General 
Conditions of Contract, which, according to I.D., was a good choice at the time due to 
the scale and budget of the project (I.D. 2010). When questioned as to the potential 
use of other forms of contract for TIRP, such as AS4300–1995 Design and Construct, 
I.D. reiterated that under D&C forms of contract and due to its specific contract 
conditions, the project manager is never really sure of what the outcome will be on 
project completion; whereas there is more perceived control in the traditional 
construct-only building contract. A.A. and M.B. stated that the regular reporting 
procedures called for in the AS2124 contract assisted with the reporting processes 
back to the Steering Committee which greatly assisted the planning of future stages of 
the project. 
In order to achieve TIRP’s major objectives, an accelerated program of building 
activity was called for. Given the overall positive outcomes of the project, it is 
interesting how such an accelerated timeframe enabled this to occur. On reflection, 
the majority of interviewees stated that the relationships developed between 
government and the local community through good consultation practices and liaison 
was crucial in facilitating this outcome via an efficient communication strategy. 
Furthermore, having C&B Group as the lead consultant working in parallel with ATSIH 
as one point of contact for the government, made the administration of TIRP much 
simpler (I.D. 2010). I.D., head project manager for C&B Group, reported that ATSIH 
were an extremely professional organisation, and that without ATSIH’s local 
knowledge and experience in Indigenous communities and their relationship-building 
exercises on Thursday Island, TIRP may never have eventuated. (I.D. 2010) 
A number of interviewees reported that due to the size, scale, cultural complexity and 
remoteness of TIRP, there was a lot of initial resistance to the project at the executive 
level of the Queensland Government. In order to alleviate this concern, the 
Redevelopment Team evaluated that the best process to manage political risk was to 
break the project into smaller, more manageable components (A.A. & M.B. 2010). 
Consequently, the master planning design work and engagement of sub-consultants 
occurred in May and June 1996 with the community consultation and final design, 
including construction documentation, completed in the six months to December 1996. 
2.5.1 TIRP staging strategies 
I.D., on behalf of C&B Group, oversaw the master planning of the initial Stage 1 of the 
project, including consultant engagement, design documentation and construction. He 
also sub-contracted to a number of local Cairns-based architects to design and 
manage the contract administration process. In terms of actual staging strategies, 
TIRP was broken into four stages: 
1. Stage 1—the construction of 14 houses at Aplin Reserve (see Table 2), four 
houses at Rose Hill (Bowe Crescent) and 14 demountable houses on a site 
nearby to Aplin. 
2. Stage 2—the construction of 24 townhouses at Pearl Street, four townhouses at 
Milman Street and eight houses and two duplexes on the Waiben Reserve. 
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3. Stage 3 included 18 houses at the Quarantine Reserve, 19 further townhouses at 
Pearl Street and ten townhouses at Hardgrave/Douglas Street. 
4. Stage 4 incorporated the upgrade of 15 individual houses at various locations on 
Thursday Island. 
Figure 4: Map of Thursday Island showing the location of staged packages of the 
Thursday Island Redevelopment Project 
 
Source: AERC 2010. Graphic extracted from Map of Project Stages for TIRP by C&B Group. 
The information for each stage is detailed in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: The four major stages of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project 
illustrating the specific details of each stage of the project 
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* Including most civil and building works, consultants’ fees (including project manager) as well as 
additional variations to the contract. Figures do not include building certification and demolition costs. 
** Managed by Project Services Consortium, DPWH (Information obtained from RTI: Ref (Project 
Services Thursday Island Redevelopment Program — Status Reports) 
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Additionally, to provide accommodation while their existing reserve houses were being 
replaced, and so not to further exacerbate accommodation pressure on Thursday 
Island families at Aplin Reserve, 14 demountable homes were constructed near the 
site before construction. 
Aplin was completely demolished so these people would have nowhere to go 
(except to further crowd other areas of TI) if the department had not provided 
alternative accommodation and relocated households to it. This village was 
also used to house people whose homes were demolished in subsequent 
stages. The need for temporary accommodation was considered from the 
beginning because the Department’s policy was to relocate/rehouse tenants 
when the department withdraws dwellings from its portfolio. (M.B. 2010) 
I.D. reported that Stage 1 proceeded well which assisted in generating a large amount 
of community goodwill for the rest of the redevelopment stages (I.D. 2010). M.B. 
reported that this goodwill included the gifting of land by the TSRA for the Pearl Street 
development in Stage 2. Under probity pressures from the Executive, ATSIH 
retendered the project management services for Stage 2 of TIRP (I.D. 2010). 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of knowledge of local context and project history, the 
Stage 2 building contracts were not run as well as those in Stage 1 and resulted in the 
reinstatement of C&B Group’s services for all subsequent stages of the project. This 
further exemplifies the importance of longevity in participation and the necessity of 
continued corporate knowledge in projects of such scale and complexity. 
Due to the staged approach to the development, there were varying time periods for 
each individual contract, however a review of the project details illustrates that the 
majority of major building contracts were carried out between a six and nine-month 
timeframe. The local building contractor, P.F., won the tender for the smaller housing 
packages, while the larger contracts were tendered to external large-scale companies 
from Cairns. Overall, there were minimal extensions of time given to awarded 
contracts. In relation to cost variations, both I.D. and B.A. reported that these were 
also kept to a minimum with the only issue arising towards the end of the final Pearl 
Street contract whereby the building contractors claimed an additional $2 million in 
contract sum variations on top of the $4 million construction cost (I.D. 2010). The 
project proceeded down the legal route and settled for approximately $100 000, 18 
months after the project had reached final completion. Additionally, there were no 
variations claimed by the local building contractor and the construction contingency 
was not used. (P.F. 2010) 
2.6 Capitals of the TIRP procurement process 
2.6.1 Social and governance 
According to all interviewees, one of the major positives to emerge from the TIRP 
procurement process was the high level of community consultation evident in the 
project. The initial two-tier management system of Steering Committee and 
Community Reference Group was set up to improve stakeholder communication and 
consultation in all layers of the project, from Cabinet whose decision it was to provide 
the funding, to those delivering housing on the ground, and the end occupiers. B.A., 
ATSIH’s regional manager at the time, saw good communication between these 
groups as the key to delivering positive outcomes for the project. (B.A. 2010) 
There were project steering committees on the Island and in government 
which resulted in a good overall process. By engaging people in the 
community in the process, the resultant outcome is improved significantly. The 
community, through the TSRA, donated land to the project which resulted in a 
sense of ownership over the project. (M.B. 2010) 
  35 
As discussed previously, in choosing the various locations for development, the TIRP 
team relied heavily on consultation with community and local government authorities, 
the ICC, the TSRA, TSC and members of the local community through the CRG. The 
fact that there was significant local input into the project, not only at a strategic level 
but also at the level of delivery and design, resulted in a sense of community 
ownership over the project. Organised and administered by Caroline Cloudy, each 
reserve community had its own Residents’ Group, which resulted in further 
dissemination beyond the formal CRG and Steering Committee. The local media 
through the actions of then radio personality, Wayne See Kee, played an important 
role in information dissemination (A.A. & MB 2010). Consequently, the main 
participants in TIRP were regularly interviewed on local radio regarding project-related 
issues and objectives, progress updates were given and the community were 
encouraged to call in with suggestions etc. (A.A. 2010). This engagement was not 
fleeting and continued for the term of the project. Furthermore, this consultation 
exercise was able to draw out a number of important local cultural practices that were 
then incorporated into the design parameters for the project. For example, how people 
lived with activities such as boat storage, places to clean fish etc., were all taken into 
consideration. (A.A. & MB 2010) 
Additionally, this extensive community consultation process had a major positive 
impact on the overall quality and longevity of the project. Not only did it assist with 
ideas, the continual communication was able to raise awareness of potential conflicts 
before they occurred. According to M.B., being one of the earliest stages of the 
redevelopment project, the Aplin Reserve subdivision had more time spent on focused 
community consultation and design master planning which resulted in a very good 
outcome, evident to this day. (M.B. 2010) 
On returning to Thursday Island some ten years after its completion, the author can 
attest that the housing delivered through TIRP, and especially the Aplin Reserve, is 
still of a very high quality when compared to the remainder of the Thursday Island 
housing stock. The only housing parcel from the original redevelopment that appeared 
to be in a current state of moderate disrepair was the Pearl Street townhouses which 
appeared to be suffering from overcrowding. According to local Mayor, Pedro Stephen, 
who was a local Council representative for TIRP, the Pearl Street townhouses were 
originally for old people but as there is no current housing program on the Island, 
young people have moved in with families, so issues with overcrowding and noise 
have risen (P.S. 2010). It was also one of the first project stages and was designed for 
greater density in an attempt to quickly reduce housing stress (A.A. p.c. 2010). The 
authors note that if there had been a continual staged process of housing renewal and 
provision since the completion of TIRP, then Pearl Street may not be in such an 
overcrowded state. One outcome of the Pearl Street project was the adjustment of 
future TIRP stages to include bigger yards and more communal space. (P.S. 2010) 
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Figure 5: Image showing the current layout of the Pearl Street duplex housing in June 
2010 
 
Source: James Davidson (2010). 
Furthermore, one of the most important components of the consultation process was 
the engagement of architect Bruce Clark of Clark and Prince, Cairns, as part of the 
original project consortium. This early involvement of a design professional, in 
consultation with the end-occupiers, resulted in the tailoring of house designs in 
accordance with community needs and values. For Stages 1 and 3, the outcome was 
the design of four standard detached houses for the reserve sub-divisions, each with 
the possibility for slight modifications to suit individual family situations (I.D. 2010). 
Houses were also designed for their site and climatic condition, with single one-room 
width floor plans for cross-ventilation. All duplex houses were built with concrete slab-
on-ground construction for disabled and elderly access while the majority of detached 
houses were two-storey, built on timber posts which could be built-in underneath at a 
future date, if required (I.D. 2010). It eventuated on post-completion of TIRP, that the 
majority of the clearway spaces under the two-storey houses functioned as family 
gathering spaces for singing, dance and religious discussion. (A.A. 2010) 
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Figure 6: Image from June 2010 showing a house in the Quarantine Reserve 
 
Note: two-storey detached housing with space underneath the house for cultural activities to take place. 
Source: James Davidson (2010). 
Figure 7: Image showing both single-storey duplex and double-storey detached housing 
located at Aplin Street taken in June 2010 
 
Note the retention of established trees, a direct request from the local community. 
Source: James Davidson (2010). 
Running in parallel with the early cultural liaison carried out by the C&B Group, the 
architect and the community representative in driving the consultation process were 
the social mapping and household surveys carried out by Gordon Grimwade, the 
consortium’s lead social scientist (A.A. & M.B. 2010). Grimwade’s widespread social 
mapping paid dividends as the project progressed. The redevelopment team were 
able to synthesise Grimwade’s information with the requirements of ATSIH’s Housing 
Allocation Policy which set guidelines for numbers of bedrooms per house in 
accordance with the age and gender of its occupants. (I.D. 2010) 
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2.6.2 Training and employment 
Results of the interview process illustrate that one of the most successful components 
to the entire TIRP program were the training and employment outcomes achieved for 
local Torres Strait Islander people. Official figures show that 383 people were 
employed, and 49 people began their training during the TIRP program, but not all 
were of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander decent. The training program involved a 
range of activities including apprenticeships and vocational certificate courses. The 
training and employment of local Indigenous peoples was called for as part of the 
contract conditions, however, the practicalities of incorporating these terms were left 
up to the individual contractors as employers. It was reported that, at the time of 
original tender, one of the main building contractors originally said that they would 
employ local people, but in fact flew their own people in from Cairns (I.D. 2010). In 
contrast, the local building contractor did employ local labour and had a number of 
apprentices on his two projects; however, due to the short timeframes and 
discontinuity between construction stages, none of the local apprentices completed 
their apprenticeships during the TIRP program (P.F. 2010). Once TIRP had finished, 
the majority had to seek traineeships elsewhere, for instance in QBuild. (P.F. 2010) 
Furthermore, while adherence to contract conditions calling for local training and 
employment was not always assured, the majority of training and employment 
outcomes on TIRP arose in large part due to the formation of a local government-
sponsored training organisation—TRAWQ. As part of their commitment to the training 
outcomes for local people, ATSIH, through QBuild, also ran their own training scheme, 
having seven or eight Aboriginal apprentices working on the TIRP program. According 
to B.A., the majority of CDEP labour was used to clear sites and construct fencing and 
driveways with QBuild providing the materials for the program. On a positive note, B.A. 
reports that some labourers and apprentices gained ongoing employment and 
apprenticeships with QBuild once the project had finished. The training outcomes for 
TIRP took a great deal of time and energy to organise, with an imperative being that 
all key stakeholders were drawn into the process. B.A. estimates that it took over a 
year to organise the training arrangements for the TIRP program (B.A. 2010). He also 
stated that the ongoing success of the training program was due to good 
communication between local, state and federal training authorities. 
In discussing the TIRP project, a number of relevant observations arose regarding the 
viability of training and employment strategies in Indigenous communities. B.A. was 
responsible for ATSIH’s training programs prior to it being disbanded and has since 
been involved in the employment and training of Aboriginal people in the private 
sector. One of B.A.’s main concerns regarding training practices in the construction 
industry related to the current funding scenario for apprenticeships which sees 
government providing financial support for three out of the four years of an 
apprenticeship. B.A. stated that, in his experience, this partial funding stream resulted 
in building contractors accepting the government support and then retrenching those 
young people when the funding ran out after the third year, resulting in many 
Indigenous apprentices not seeing their apprenticeships through. (B.A. 2010)  
According to B.A., in the Queensland context, the previous ATSI Housing Unit had a 
policy to support Indigenous apprentices whereby on completion of their 
apprenticeships, newly qualified carpenters were assisted in finding employment with 
QBuild. ‘ATSIH had an 80 per cent success rate for apprentices seeing their training 
through to completion and registration.’ He also mentioned that some of the previous 
ATSIH apprentices are currently foremen in communities such as Doomadgee and 
serve as role models for local children. B.A. made one further observation in relation 
to the role and value of CDEP in association with training and employment programs 
in remote communities. He stated that if organisations have a desire to implement an 
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apprenticeship program in a given community then it is important to engage with 
young people before they are exposed to CDEP programs as, in his opinion, CDEP 
work programs can result in a poor work ethic due to welfare dependence. ‘Normally, 
kids wanting to do apprenticeships are keen and will not want to be on CDEP’. (B.A. 
2010) 
2.6.3 Health capitals 
There was one aspect of TIRP that almost all interviewees thought could have been 
implemented better and that was the understanding of the social context surrounding 
the under-reporting of disability in the Thursday Island community. Interestingly, there 
was a lot of initial resistance from locals to the single-storey houses due to a lack of 
space for boats and other cultural activities such as feasting, dancing and cleaning 
fish etc. The reason for this was not immediately apparent, and became more so as 
the houses in Stage 1 began construction. For example, due to disabilities being 
under-reported in TI, the redevelopment team had no idea of the extent of disability 
access needed for most of the houses. This became one of the biggest issues as the 
project progressed and resulted in subsequent stages being redesigned and earlier 
stages of the project being retrofitted for disability access. Apparently, the reason for 
not reporting the level of disability in the community was the local fear of being 
deemed ineligible to receive housing due to being disabled. For example, the project 
team reported that they had no idea that 11 out of the 19 families in the Waiben 
reserve had family members with a disability until the project had already begun. (A.A. 
& M.B. 2010) 
According to B.A., TIRP was a seminal project in the establishment and upkeep of the 
ATSIH Construction Minimum Standards document termed a ‘live document’ subject 
to continual refinements as more practical information came to light regarding 
processes and material products. The ATSIH Minimum Standards document was 
designed to offer alternatives for the different areas and climatic regions of 
Queensland. In terms of hierarchy, it took precedence over the Building Code of 
Australia and was specifically developed for Indigenous housing in urban, regional 
and remote communities (B.A. 2010). The ATSIH document eventually became a 
major component of the National Indigenous Housing Guide as members of the 
ATSIH unit were part of the national working group in charge of designing the NIHG. 
(A.A. & M.B. 2010) 
2.7 Recommendations for procuring housing in remote 
Indigenous communities 
In reflecting on the TIRP housing process, a number of key findings arose that are 
relevant to future procurement in remote or specifically very remote townships like 
Thursday Island consisting of substantial Indigenous populations, alongside non-
Indigenous populations. These findings not only hold direct relevance to projects of a 
similar size and scope, but those of smaller scales as well. As stated previously, the 
main emphasis of this investigation was on the positive outcomes and lessons learned 
in best practice scenarios that could be carried forward into future housing 
procurement in remote communities. Thus, the following discussion focuses on the 
positives, and the potential improvements arising from the case study analyses. Due 
to the semi-structured nature of interviews, the following discussion presents points of 
general relevance to housing procurement in remote Indigenous communities, not 
limited to the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project. Furthermore, leaving open the 
possibility for divergence away from the main discussion points, resulted in a much 
more fruitful exchange regarding the general state of housing procurement and how it 
can be improved in remote communities. 
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2.7.1 Major positives arising from TIRP 
When questioned as to the major positives arising from the TIRP process, there were 
a broad range of answers given by interviewees dependent on the level of their scope 
and involvement in the project. Analysis shows that all interviewees saw the deep 
involvement of the community, through consultation, as the major positive in the 
project. The fact that house designs and land selections were tailored to community 
needs generated an important sense of community ownership over the TIRP process. 
From their level of strategic involvement, A.A. and M.B. saw the reduction in public 
waiting lists and the overall increase in quality housing on Thursday Island as another 
major positive. AA also stated that he was particularly happy that overcrowding had 
been reduced by homes of an appropriate size for family needs (A.A. 2010). ‘The 
original aim was to reduce public waiting times to less than four years and hold them; 
we were successful in that.’ (A.A. & M.B. 2010) From his management perspective, 
B.A. saw the training and employment outcomes for the local community as another 
positive arising from the project, and believed that good training management could 
definitely be carried forward into future housing delivery strategies. (B.A. 2010) 
The way to implement it is to sit down with the main local, state and federal 
government stakeholders—DEETA, CDEP, Centrelink and discuss what is 
proposed in order to get everyone on board with the idea. This takes a long 
time. For the TI project it took at least a year to organise. (B.A. 2010) 
B.A. also saw the refinement of the minimum construction standards initially 
developed by ATSIH and eventually leading to its incorporation in the NIHG as 
another positive outcome from TIRP that had specific relevance to future housing 
procurement (B.A. 2010). Furthermore, there was general consensus among all 
interviewees that the main reason that these positives arose during TIRP was 
ultimately through good communication between all stakeholders and participants in 
the process, from the Steering Committee to the involvement of local media through to 
the Community Reference and local Residents’ Groups. An internal review of TIRP by 
ATSIH resulted in two clear recommendations for future projects. The first was the 
adoption of the two-tier organisational structure which they believed clearly 
contributed to the success of the Thursday Island Redevelopment Project, and the 
second was the extent and continuity of community consultation that was an integral 
part of the project. ATSIH itself concluded that consultation with residents should be 
consistent and directly monitored by the Steering Committee (ATSIH Review, p.16). 
As R.P. confirms: 
It may be useful to recognise that there are aspects of the governance and 
funding arrangements in the Torres Strait that made this approach more 
feasible than it might be in other communities. In particular the expertise and 
autonomy of the TSRA were important in allowing a partnership approach and 
coordination of infrastructure. Also the expertise and the authority of the 
ATSIH unit at the time enable us to be fairly influential within State government 
while at the same time understanding the local community issues and being 
able to engage with the community. (R.P. 2010) 
Furthermore, all interviewees reported that the continuation of consultant involvement 
and knowledge of the process was very important to the long-term success of TIRP. 
With regard to project management strategies, I.D. saw the TI process of a two-tiered 
system of management as suited to that form and scale of project, however, he also 
made the point that not all housing procurement in Indigenous communities is of such 
a large scale and therefore would require a different approach to project management. 
In addition, I.D. confirmed that there was a greater economy of scale in building large 
numbers of houses than one-off houses in remote communities as preliminary 
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expenditure (such as establish and set up costs) could be spread across a larger 
number of units (I.D. 2010). I.D. did not agree with drip-feeding housing supply over 
many years. (I.D. 2010) 
In terms of contracting for construction services in remote communities, I.D. stated 
that it was always better to try and let building contracts to local contractors than non-
locals due to their knowledge of local context and history (I.D. 2010). This also 
assisted in raising the capacity of a given place and its people. Furthermore, A.A. and 
M.B. stated that if there was a skills shortage in a given community then the program 
for deployment of housing should take this into consideration. Following a similar 
argument, I.D. stated that one of the main problems he saw in remote communities, 
was that Indigenous people and organisations were asked to do things outside their 
experience levels, and due to a fear of losing funding, or not receiving it in the first 
place, they accepted terms and conditions beyond their capacities (I.D. 2010). 
Similarly, A.A. recommended that if a skills shortage existed in a specific location, it 
may be feasible to stage or scale a project so as to up-skill local people in building 
future capacity. This would be on a community-by-community basis as no two 
communities have the same social, economic or cultural situations (A.A. & M.B. 2010). 
A.A. also thought it was possible to achieve this through an alliance contracting 
methodology whereby either/both government and private building contractors 
entered into a partnership contract with local Indigenous people to achieve a particular 
outcome. (A.A. & M.B. 2010) 
2.7.2 Potential improvements in TIRP 
In relation to potential improvements in the TIRP procurement process there were a 
range of different responses. A.A. and M.B. stated that, in hindsight, there was a lack 
of experienced local building contractors on the Island from which to draw. This led to 
the contracting of an external building company, which brought in their own labourers 
and carpenters from outside the community and did not lead to longer-term capacity 
building for local people (A.A. & M.B. 2010). Future processes would need to evaluate 
the potential skill base in the given community in order to appropriately manage the 
development of local expertise in a meaningful way. Furthermore, as discussed earlier 
in this report, A.A. and M.B. reported that greater understanding and awareness of 
local disability issues, especially the level of potential non-reporting, was necessary 
(A.A. & M.B. 2010). Additionally, they also thought that greater awareness of local 
context and cultural fears existing in communities when dealing with government 
agencies was important to consider for future procurement processes (A.A. & M.B 
2010). I.D. talked about one home where the tenant was so afraid of being moved out 
that he planted the most beautiful rose garden in order to keep his house tidy. He had 
moved back to TI to live because he received a house and didn’t want to lose it. (I.D. 
2010) 
From I.D.’s perspective, an improvement could be made to government procurement 
processes in relation to the timing and urgency of procuring housing within a short 
timeframe. For example, a lot of problems are caused when all design, documentation 
and construction of a given project is required within a given financial year. To explain 
this situation, I.D. used the example of the Pearl Street Stage 2, where ‘in August of 
1997, the government allocated funding for the project and by December that year the 
project had to be designed, documented and tendered, then the 19 houses were 
expected to be built by the new financial year when the funding cycle began again—a 
savage process’ (I.D. 2010). I.D.’s opinion was that more recognition needed to be 
given to the conditions of geographic remoteness and seasonal (climatic) variations in 
such isolated environments (I.D. 2010). It appears that to tie these regions into the 
same funding cycles as mainstream procurement systems in less remote areas 
results in undue stress and strain on those not only procuring the product, but also the 
  42 
quality and standard of the final product when the delivery has been rushed to meet 
funding obligations. 
Furthermore, I.D. thought that a separate site inspector on the ground for each 
stage/package could have resulted in better management during TIRP. His opinion 
was that remotely administering a project (from Cairns in this situation) created 
problems when monitoring the actions of a commercial building contractor on the 
ground in the community. Remote administration resulted in much less awareness of 
potential problems which could easily have been resolved but went unnoticed or 
unreported until the opportunity for rectification had passed. There was also less 
incentive for building contractors to report problems if remote administration is 
occurring. The employment of a separate site inspector would have resulted in greater 
administration costs to the project; however, considering one of the stages during 
TIRP became a legal issue, I.D. thought the money would be well spent to ensure 
greater awareness of areas for potential conflict. (I.D. 2010) 
One further area that I.D. thought could have been better managed was the servicing 
of infrastructure, such as water and sewerage for TIRP. He stated that due to the 
accelerated timeframe necessitated at the strategic level, the provision of services 
had not been decided upon until very late in the process, which caused a number of 
onsite coordination problems. This also resulted in confusion over which entity was 
actually responsible (TSRA or ATSIH) for service provision and eventual ownership. 
(I.D. 2010) 
Moreover, another area of concern for I.D. was government processes of deciding 
building contracts based on tendered prices alone. I.D. felt that the government 
predilection for proceeding with the lowest tenderer in all cases was problematic. He 
proposed that a better option would be to not only evaluate initial tender prices but 
also final contract sums and time overruns from past projects, specifically analysing 
tendered versus final contract sums which accounted for cost variations as well as 
extensions of time claimed (I.D. 2010). This process would result in greater 
awareness of a given contractor’s approach to time and cost management, as well as 
their track record in working with, or against, project administrators and funding 
authorities. 
I.D. also thought that government processes of continually retendering for consultancy 
services can also undo projects given that, as they progress, more knowledge of 
project scope is known by existing consultants with a resultant increase in fees (I.D. 
2010). However, on the flip side, as the project progresses, greater knowledge of 
project scope can lead to potential longer term savings, whereas, the potential 
savings on consultant fees can backfire later in the process, as happened on TIRP 
between Stages 1 and 2. 
P.F., building contractor for three of the nine TIRP construction parcels, agreed with 
I.D.’s assessment, stating that evaluating projects on completion was a good idea so 
that good builders can be picked or given precedence for projects based on final 
prices rather than falsely attempting to win projects based on tender prices and then 
recouping losses through variations during the contract. He made the point that, due 
to his local knowledge and expertise, he did not claim the contingency on the projects 
he built, whereas builders from outside the community presented a $2 million variation 
on a $4 million project. He felt there was no reward for those builders who showed 
expertise in management that directly benefited and enhanced project quality and 
saved money at the same time. He also stated that due to its procurement and 
contracting policies, the government missed out on the potential for value for money 
through developing capacity in remote areas. He stated that there was no incentive for 
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a builder to improve or enhance the quality of a given project if there was no reward 
for successful completion and bettering projected targets. (P.F. 2010) 
P.F. discussed the importance of evaluating projects on completion so that good 
builders can be picked or given precedence for projects based on final prices and their 
good project management (P.F. 2010). In his opinion, government processes of 
constantly tendering for each new project or stage does not take into consideration a 
local builder’s knowledge in such remote environments. In retrospect, I.D. also felt that 
the majority of the building work for TIRP should have been tendered to local building 
contractors rather than external builders, simply due to their better grasp of local 
climate, social conditions and cultural context (I.D. 2010). Although, members of the 
redevelopment team have stated that there was a distinct lack of large-scale building 
capacity on Thursday Island at the time. 
2.7.3 Additional considerations 
While not a specific focus of the TIRP analysis, a general discussion arose during the 
interview process as to inappropriate procurement systems for remote communities. 
One of the main areas for concern related to the apparent over-reliance by 
government agencies on transportable and prefabricated buildings as a solution to 
providing large numbers of houses in remote Indigenous communities within a short 
timeframe. The majority of those interviewed saw advantages in the system regarding 
speed of delivery and subsequent installation; however, a number of Aboriginal 
respondents questioned the cultural appropriateness and long-term construction 
quality in remote contexts. For example, A.A. stated: 
If you were an Indigenous person in a remote community and you were given 
a house which came on the back of a truck and was not tailored to your needs 
or lifestyle (being too small etc.) would you feel respected? Would you find it 
easy to respect that house and what it represented? Transportable buildings 
are not going to work due to lack of consultation in their design and their lack 
of quality construction. (A.A. & M.B. pers. comm. 2010) 
It appears that while transportable housing delivers a quick fix, short-term solution that 
may suit the policy frameworks of certain jurisdictions for the rapid supply of large 
numbers of houses within a short timeframe to Aboriginal communities, they also 
present a possible long-term exacerbation of the unmet demand they are meant to 
alleviate. 
2.7.4 Final statement on the TIRP case study 
Taking the above case study analysis into account, it appears that the positive 
incorporation of Indigenous social and economic capitals into the housing 
procurement process was the direct result of good administrative processes at 
national, state and local government levels. The central role of the ATSIH unit 
throughout the TIRP process cannot be understated and illustrates that while linear 
contractual processes such as lump sum traditional forms of contract were used, they 
did not restrict the incorporation of particular capitals during the housing delivery 
process. This goes to show that contractual processes are simply a reflection of their 
governance processes, therefore, good governance structures at the higher levels in 
TIRP led to excellent outcomes on the ground in the community. Furthermore, best 
practice consultation processes and cultural mapping at the grass-roots level resulted 
in greater awareness at the level of government. The value of the TIRP case study 
illustrates that government systems can produce best practice housing outcomes in 
remote Indigenous communities; however, in saying this, the design of the 
procurement system needs to reflect meaningful strategic management and 
community engagement processes in order to produce such good outcomes. 
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3 CASE STUDY: NORMANTON (QLD) 
3.1 Introduction 
Normanton is a small cattle town on the Norman River in northwest Queensland. The 
town itself was established in 1867–68 as the principal port for the southern Gulf of 
Carpentaria, northwest Queensland and the Barkly Tableland. Its prosperity peaked 
with the Croydon gold rush in the mid-1880s and declined once the railway from 
Townsville was connected no further than Cloncurry to the east; further decline 
occurred in the 1960s with the introduction of cattle-train trucking technology. 
Although it continues as a local pastoral centre, Normanton is no longer a wealthy 
town. Most of its economy is derived from servicing its large Aboriginal population 
which, according to the 2006 census, was 661 people out of a total population of 1100. 
18 The town is the administrative centre for the Carpentaria Shire Council. 
Figure 8: Map showing the location of NAHS housing procured during 1997–98 in the 
township of Normanton 
 
In terms of local Indigenous history, there is evidence of at least three town camps for 
different Aboriginal tribal groups being established on the outskirts of Normanton by 
the turn of the 20th century. This number had expanded to at least six by the 1920s. 
The Kukatj and Kuthant people to the west were dispersed in camps on the southwest 
side of town, while northern groups, such as the Kurtjar, occupied camps to the north 
on the opposite side of the Norman River. The Normanton Reserve was gazetted in 
1948 around a town camp known as the Ridge Camp and a set of compound 
buildings were later constructed there. Humpies also continued to be built and 
occupied on the Normanton Reserve during the 1960s and early 1970s. During this 
period, government houses were constructed in town for the town camp and 
compound residents, with their humpies being removed during the period 1968–75. 
                                               
18
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (25 October 2007). ‘Normanton (Urban Centre/Locality)’. 2006 Census QuickStats. 
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/housing/progserv/affordability/affordablehousing/Pages/NPA Retrieved 1 September 
2010-09-01. 
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3.2 Overview of Bynoe CACS19 
During 1972–74, the Normanton community informally established its own housing 
organisation ‘Bynoe’. This was precipitated by the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs which later transformed into the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, to be eventually incorporated under the current 
banner of FaHCSIA. This department offered housing grants to those Aboriginal 
groups who were prepared to become incorporated under the newly established 
simplified Commonwealth legislation for forming incorporated Aboriginal Associations. 
Nevertheless, the Bynoe Community Advancement Cooperative Society (BCACS) 
Limited was eventually to become registered under the state’s Co-operative and other 
Societies Act 1967–74. In April of 1975 the Aboriginal community of Normanton held a 
General Meeting to elect Bynoe’s first Board of Directors. Consequently, Bynoe CACS 
Ltd. was officially incorporated and purchased an initial stock of two houses. Over the 
last 35 years, the Cooperative has grown steadily to the point where today Bynoe 
CACS Ltd manages a wide range of community development and support programs. 
As stated in their constitution, the main goals of the Bynoe organisation are: 
 To form an organisation which shall unite all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples in working for the betterment of such people in attaining lasting and 
effective economic and social standing within the community in the preservation of 
Aboriginal and Islander culture. 
 To promote and provide a better community family and personal life for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples and others who desire to avail themselves of 
the services offered. 
 To promote knowledge and understanding of the special problems of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples in cultural and social welfare fields. 
 To co-operate with, organise or provide community services for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples to supplement other services. 
 To collect data and conduct research into matters relating to community, family 
and personal issues relating to matters associated with Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander problems. 
 To bring matters affecting social, health, education, culture, recreation, 
employment and welfare of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples before 
the public, and to the attention of appropriate authorities. 
 To provide measures to improve areas of needs identified above. 
 To co-operate with other organisations and persons with a view to assisting 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to obtain social welfare and other 
services. 
 To promote measures in such services to improve relations with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 To conduct training courses for volunteer workers and employees of the society to 
enable them to assist in carrying out the objects of the society. 
Furthermore, in 1990, Bynoe CACS Ltd. became the management body for the local 
Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) to Normanton. Through close 
liaison with the Carpentaria Shire Council and the local private sector, Bynoe has 
undertaken a planned approach to training and employment for a large number of 
                                               
19
 This description has been previously published in ‘From the Curry to the Weal: Aboriginal Town Camps 
and Compounds of the Western Back-Blocks’ in Fabrications, The Journal of the Society of Architectural 
Historians, Australia and New Zealand, Volume 7, 1996. 
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Aboriginal people in Normanton. Currently, Bynoe comprises of a Board of 10 
Directors and is structured into a series of portfolios including: Child Care, Enterprise 
Tourism, Burial/Reserve/Land, Health/APH, Education/TAFE, CDEP, Media, 
Women’s Issues, Youth Recreation, Housing, Training/MIGATE/Employment and 
Social Justice/Legal Issues. Decisions by the Board are communicated via the 
President to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for implementation. Answerable 
directly to the CEO are the Financial Controller (responsible for accounting and office 
staff), Community Development Officer and Project Management Consultant 
(responsible for CDEP and Building Program). In addition to the CDEP program, 
Bynoe CACS Ltd currently administers a wide range of programs including: 
 Management of housing stock and vacant land. 
 Homemaker program. 
 Training and apprenticeships schemes. 
 Aged Persons Hostel (Kukatja Place). 
 Various sport and recreation programs including the annual ‘Gulf Carnival’. 
 Cultural awareness program. 
 Various welfare, health and counselling programs in conjunction with other 
departments. 
 Emergency relief program. 
 School tuckshop catering program. 
 Equipment hire enterprise. 
With regard to housing services, Bynoe aims to have its housing controlled and 
managed solely by Aboriginal people to a consistently high standard of administration 
in also providing low cost housing to Aboriginal people. 
3.3 Overview of NAHS 
The National Aboriginal Health Strategy (NAHS) was developed in 1989 by the 
Federal Government to oversee the delivery of Aboriginal housing and infrastructure 
in Australia. Originally funded together with the Community Housing and Infrastructure 
Program (CHIP) administered by ATSIC, the larger-scaled NAHS program was 
dismantled in September 2006 when CHIP became part of the Commonwealth 
Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). As a 
capital works program, NAHS focuses on improving environmental health conditions 
in indigenous communities across Australia in providing housing, water, sewerage, 
power, drainage, local roads and tip facilities. Since 1996, the consulting engineering 
and project management firm, Arup Ove Arup Pty Ltd (Arup), has been the Program 
Manager overseeing the delivery of the NAHS Environmental Health Program in 
Queensland, the Northern Territory and New South Wales. As the Program Manager, 
Arup’s main responsibility was to oversee the progress of each project while providing 
support to the grantees (community members) as well as monitoring the work of the 
individual Project Managers engaged to administer each project. In administering the 
project, the Project Manager oversees design consultation and superintends 
construction contracts on behalf of the grantee community. History shows that the 
majority of NAHS housing programs were procured using a select tender, lump-sum 
contract methodology, controlled on a community-by-community basis by Indigenous 
Community Housing Organisations (ICHOs). 
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3.4 Project planning strategies 
The Normanton NAHS project was initiated to alleviate environmental health concerns 
relating to overcrowding and the poor standard of some of the Bynoe CACS Ltd 
houses. According to Arup’s Final Completion Report (Q079), Queensland Health had 
raised major health issues concerning ineffective sewerage disposal through the 
existing septic tank and absorption trenches at most dwellings.20 This was particularly 
evident through the wet season when its proximity to the Norman River saw the local 
water table rise resulting in inefficient subsoil percolation. In November 1996, Bynoe 
CACS was offered an NAHS housing grant of $2 420 000 to assist in addressing 
these concerns by constructing ten new houses, in addition to major renovations to a 
further ten existing houses and the connections of 80 properties to the proposed town 
sewer system. The current authors were unable to establish the basis on which these 
numbers were chosen as the completion report states that two additional houses were 
also identified as needing major renovations but were unable to be completed within 
the scope of the NAHS project at the time.21 Due to being the local housing and 
tenancy manager, Bynoe CACS Ltd determined which vacant land was available for 
the siting of new houses and which houses were in the most need of renovation. The 
available land was then leased for 99 years from the Queensland Government with 
the project funds covering the land cost. (G.P. 2010) 
3.5 Project management and staging strategies 
In April 1997, after an initial EOI and then select tender process, ARUP appointed 
JCR Evans Architects based in Cairns as the project manager for the NAHS housing. 
JCR Evans were engaged to design the houses and administer the building contract 
with architect Gayle Plunkett, their representative on the ground in Normanton. Initially, 
the Bynoe Housing Cooperative applied to Arup to build all ten new houses. However, 
after a full skills-register of the community was submitted to the project management 
team, it was decided that Bynoe only had the capacity to build four houses and that 
the remaining five should go to a mainstream building contractor from outside the 
community (F.P. 2010). In addition to the four new houses, Bynoe CACS Ltd was also 
given funding for the refurbishment of six additional houses. As the Bynoe Housing 
Cooperative was not a registered building contractor in its own right, the project 
management team, along with Bynoe, interviewed a series of QBSA registered 
builders who were willing to be directly employed by Bynoe and effectively ‘loan’ the 
Cooperative their building licence. The reason Bynoe were not able to apply for their 
own building licence lay in the society’s constitution whereby all members assumed 
any risks associated with the Cooperative’s activities. The Directors of the Housing 
Cooperative themselves also had to give financial guarantees to the Building Services 
Authority which was deemed too great a risk due to problems associated with building 
activities in remote areas. (G.P. 2010) 
According to G.P., the project management team initially investigated using the Bama 
Ngappi Ngappi Aboriginal Building Company from Yarrabah near Cairns to assist 
Bynoe, however the problem was a lack of experienced staff capacity and the team 
were afraid that Bama Ngappi Ngappi would be stretched too thin on the ground if 
having to also work in Normanton (G.P. 2010). In consultation with the PM team, 
Bynoe then proceeded to interview a number of potential builders, eventually settling 
on Laurie Bowater (L.B.), a registered builder from Townsville (G.P. 2010). Both 
Bynoe and L.B. had hoped that a long-term relationship would develop with ongoing 
                                               
20
 ARUP, Normanton Housing: Final Report, National Aboriginal Health Strategy—Environmental Health 
Program (NAHS–EHP), prepared for FaCS. 
21
 ARUP, Normanton Housing: Final Report, National Aboriginal Health Strategy–Environmental Health 
Program (NAHS–EHP), prepared for FaCS. 
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projects once the initial round of NAHS housing was completed. However, this long-
term relationship did not eventuate and Bynoe today remain without an open building 
licence (F.P. 2010). In addition to the carpentry work, Bynoe also had a joinery 
operation with the capacity to take on the cabinetry subcontracts for the NAHS 
housing. 
Figure 9: A current photograph of the NAHS housing constructed in 1997–98 
 
Source: James Davidson (2010). 
In November 1997, the tender to construct the remaining five non-Bynoe houses was 
won by Tenni and Arbouin (T&A) Pty Ltd of Atherton, north Queensland. According to 
G.P., T&A were a well-organised, hands-on, small building contractor who completed 
the project with minimal fuss (G.P. 2010). T&A’s management of the Normanton 
project saw Arbouin as the site administrator whose role was to set up camp in the 
community and establish early site works, with Tenni the project estimator and 
manager/administrator. T&A subcontracted to local Normanton-based tradespeople 
(plumbers & painters) and hired the heavy equipment necessary for the project from 
Bynoe. L.T. stated that one of the most difficult issues in Normanton was finding 
appropriate accommodation for their building team; they were to eventually hire a two-
bedroom donga and caravan which was set up in one of the local backyards. T&A’s 
team comprised three non-local carpenters for the main house construction, and two 
labourers from Bynoe’s CDEP program. The CDEP labourers assisted with the 
construction of driveways, landscaping, fencing and some joinery. T&A chose not to 
use the CDEP labour for carpentry as they had skilled carpenters on their work crew 
and training was not a direct requirement under their contract (G.P. 2010). In addition 
to the Normanton project, T&A were also building NAHS houses at Doomagee and 
Mornington Island. 
Arup’s Completion Report shows that the Bynoe and T&A houses were all procured 
using the AS2124-1992 traditional lump sum building contract. According to G.P., this 
form of contract was chosen as it suited the small-scale nature of the project (G.P. 
2010) The first package of five houses was awarded to Tenni and Arbouin on 21 
November 1997 and completed (handed over) on 3 August 1998 with the remaining 
four new houses and six refurbishments awarded to Bynoe on 27 February 1998 with 
the work completed on 25 September 1999. The five T&A houses were built 
simultaneously which, according to L.T., was the most efficient sequence. For 
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example, concrete could be poured on the same day across the five houses, and 
materials could be ordered for all houses at the same time. The Bynoe houses were 
also constructed in sequence with the first three built simultaneously and the fourth at 
a later stage (G.P. 2010). The refurbishments were staged prior to the four new builds 
so as to alleviate housing need through minimal disruption to tenants over a shorter 
time frame. There were no cost variations applied for in either contract, and the only 
extension of time occurred on the Bynoe project in response to delays associated with 
training and employment objectives. According to G.P., the builder assisting Bynoe, 
L.B., worked to keep house costs down through an open book process where he 
disclosed all project costs to the Bynoe Board. Bowater did not take any profit from 
the project and worked altruistically towards the project in supporting its desired 
community outcomes (G.P. 2010). Further details on L.B.’s role are presented in a 
later section of this report. 




























$418,000  $69,667  
* Including all civil and building works as well as additional variations to the contract. 
On returning to the community some ten years after the completion of the NAHS 
housing, the authors can report that the majority of homes remain in very good 
condition. Only one house appeared in significant need of repairs. In giving feedback 
on the house designs, Bynoe’s housing manager reported that most tenants would 
have preferred carports to have been constructed as part of the original scheme so as 
to shade vehicles and double as covered outdoor gathering space. Also, another 
problem reported in the house designs was the location of wet areas (laundry & 
bathrooms) near the front entrance. Apparently, tenant complaints have resulted in 
more recent Bynoe housing being designed with carports, and laundries and 
bathrooms at the rear, away from the more public areas of the house. (BHM 2010) 
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Figure 10: A current photograph of the NAHS housing constructed in 1997–98 
 
Source: James Davidson (2010). 
3.6 Capitals of the Normanton NAHS procurement process 
In undertaking an investigation of the capitals incorporated into the Bynoe NAHS 
housing, the current authors were limited by the original work scope of the housing 
program. For example, due to the small-scale nature of the original project, it was only 
possible to identify social, cultural, governance and training and employment capitals 
for discussion and further analysis. In supplementing this lack of broader information 
regarding procurement ‘capitals’, the case study author encouraged interviewees to 
give additional recommendations in relation to delivering housing in remote 
Indigenous communities, which is presented in a subsequent section of this analysis. 
3.6.1 Social and cultural 
In terms of community engagement, house designs were workshopped with the 
Bynoe Board rather than prospective tenants (G.P. 2010). The architect/project 
manager met with the Bynoe Board on three occasions over a period of six weeks 
with meetings comprising the presentation of models, design documentation and visits 
to house locations. Due to their role as tenancy managers, the Bynoe Board acted as 
the community reference group in the decision-making process, meeting on occasions 
with prospective tenants to discuss the configuration of house plans and associated 
needs. Prospective tenants were selected by urgency/need rather than political 
allegiance with Bynoe, although all recipients were members of the Bynoe 
Cooperative (G.P. 2010). Due to the small-scale nature of the project, there were no 
public meetings organised to discuss the project. This consultation process led to 
three standard designs consisting of: 1) a special needs house (for either two families 
living together or groups of young people sharing) with four bedrooms and two 
bathrooms; 2) a second house with three bedrooms where each room could be 
separately locked to assist privacy for extended/nuclear family situations; and 3) two 
additional three bedroom houses for nuclear families. According to G.P., the 
standardisation of house designs was the result of strict budgetary requirements (G.P. 
2010). 
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3.6.2 Governance and leadership 
According to both the project manager and the mainstream builder, the successful 
outcomes of the Normanton housing project owed a lot to the good governance 
structures within the community, specifically the Bynoe CACS organisation and its 
board members. During the interview process, the importance of good quality 
leadership was discussed on a number of occasions, with special mention being 
made to the role of Fred Pascoe (F.P.). During the Normanton NAHS project, F.P. 
was the chairperson of the Bynoe Housing Cooperative and local shire councillor. At 
the time of writing, he held the position of Mayor of Carpentaria Shire Council. G.P. 
reported: 
The Bynoe Board were a switched-on group of people who knew what they 
were lacking and acted accordingly. They had a huge input into the overall 
management of the NAHS project and gave all support when requested. The 
strength of the whole Bynoe project was Fred Pascoe. He was the leader who 
supported the training and employment side of things and implemented the 
skills register of qualified and interested community members. (G.P. 2010) 
In discussions with Fred Pascoe, it was reported that the biggest reason for the 
overall success of the Bynoe NAHS project was due to Bynoe having control of the 
funding for the project. F.P. reported that having control over the funding enabled 
Bynoe to be flexible and strategic with the administration side of the project and gave 
the Cooperative a greater sense of stability in approaching their project management 
in an innovative way that suited their remote context. They were not tied down to a 
particular methodology and way of doing business and could design the procurement 
system to support a number of additional needs and local enterprises. F.P. stated that 
Bynoe employed L.B. on a decent salary and ran the project as a professional building 
contract (F.P. 2010). He was disappointed that the program did not develop into a 
longer term building program for Normanton and reported that if Bynoe were to do the 
NAHS housing again today they would push for a four to five year program to support 
training and capacity building. The longer time frame would also bring financial 
security to the Bynoe organisation. (F.P. 2010) 
Furthermore, F.P. reported that another major disappointment of being an Aboriginal 
organisation in a remote community is missing out on potential work. He stated that 
this had occurred on a number of occasions over the last ten years, with external 
contractors being favoured in lieu of Bynoe. For example, in 2006 Bynoe were 
overlooked for an NAHS kitchen refurbishment project even though they had the 
capacity within their local cabinetmaking enterprise. In lieu of being contracted to 
supply and install the 70 flat-packed kitchens, Bynoe were instead engaged to remove 
the building rubbish on the completion of the project. Furthermore, an additional 
problem with the kitchen project was the disruption it brought to the existing tenants of 
the social housing being refurbished. According to F.P., many families were upset with 
the disruption while the work was being undertaken. He maintained that had Bynoe 
been engaged on the project, they would have better managed the disruption due to 
their understanding of the social context involved in tenancy management services. 
(F.P. 2010) 
3.6.3 Training and employment 
Since the completion of the project in 2000, all post-construction maintenance has 
been controlled by Bynoe through their local CDEP program. It was their management 
of CDEP that led to the direct targeting of training and employment through the NAHS 
process. Contractual clauses pertaining to the training of local community members 
were written into the Bynoe contract but not into the Tenni and Arbouin contract (G.P. 
2010). The reason for this difference lay in the different expectations attached to the 
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procurement process. Bynoe for example, had a definitive desire to see training and 
employment outcomes for local people and informally challenged the legitimacy of 
time restrictions under the contract, whereas T&A abided by their strict time 
requirements to complete their contract. L.T. remarked that ‘it was easier to get the 
job done in the timeframe required by the government than spend the time organising 
training’ (L.T. 2010). He also questioned the value of training in light of short 
contractual timeframes, given that better knowledge transfer occurs over longer 
periods of time, being accumulative and easily forgotten if continuity is disrupted. (L.T. 
2010) 
In some places, the building contract was for six to eight months and we were 
asked to train Aboriginal people, but what happened after we left? There 
needs to be continuity of work to maintain and build a work ethic. We tried to 
bring blokes down to work in Atherton and other Aboriginal communities so as 
to get the continuity, but they didn’t want to leave their home community. It 
takes a significant time investment to incorporate meaningful training into 
projects. (G.P. 2010) 
Bynoe’s commitment to training was no more evident than in the time investment of 
builder, L.B., who not only lent his licence to the Housing Cooperative but also 
organised the TAFE training accreditation for the CDEP labourers (G.P. 2010). Laurie 
personally gained a TAFE training certificate so as to mentor on site, as well as 
oversee the mandatory school-based modules. He also organised a TAFE literacy 
and numeracy module as part of the mandatory requirements for the theory-based 
assessments. According to ARUP’s Completion Report, there were 13 trainees and 
two apprentices working on the project, with the result being that two carpentry 
tradesmen received qualifications, while four others received Construction Level 1 
Certificates and three more attained improved construction skills that would count 
towards future recognition of prior learning (G.P. 2010). This is interesting as the 
project manager reported that only the painting apprentice completed his trade 
certificate as he had already attained three years of prior learning (G.P. 2010). The 
authors were unable to ascertain how and why this discrepancy occurred. 
Furthermore, interviewees reported that on such short timeframes it was difficult for 
trainees to see their apprenticeships through, with most having experienced prior 
learning but were unable to gain enough practical experience over an extended period 
of time for there to be meaningful knowledge transfer. G.P. stated: ‘There is a real 
need for programs that last at least four years so the trainees can see their training 
through and become fully certified carpenters in their own right’ (G.P. 2010). Due to 
this lack of consistent full-time employment on the NAHS program, many of the 
carpentry trainees maintained additional employment: 
Most of the blokes training to become carpenters were also musterers from 
Delta Downs. One of the guys went on to the Century Zinc mine to work, but 
I’m not sure what became of the others. It was really hard to get people into 
long-term apprenticeships as this project only lasted 18 months. As a general 
observation, it’s important to make sure that the guys are doing things 
(construction systems and methods) that they will do again and again. It is also 
important not to experiment too much as it is hard to control, plus people don’t 
generate the appropriate skill level in one particular activity. (G.P. 2010) 
In being the local CDEP manager, Bynoe have been impacted by the Federal 
Government’s changes to CDEP rules. As of 1 July 2009, all CDEP participants now 
register with Centrelink for payment. The negative in this for Bynoe is that previously 
all CDEP participants were managed directly by Bynoe which meant greater 
accountability and management of participants whereas now, participants sign on with 
Centrelink and then attempt to avoid participation in Bynoe work-related activities. 
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This has resulted in a major drop in CDEP participation on Bynoe programs from 120 
to 55 people currently in the program, resulting in a labour shortage at times for many 
of the basic services that Bynoe offers. Bynoe’s operation is run professionally with a 
‘clocking in and clocking out’ system to monitor a given person’s time. Bynoe’s 
housing manager mentioned that some of the CDEP participants have worked with 
their program for more than ten years, so to now register with Centrelink and start the 
interview and training process again would be a difficult undertaking for many long-
term CDEP participants. It is the author’s understanding that Bynoe have been given 
assurance by the Federal Government that all existing CDEP programs will remain 
funded as long as they have registered participants. Furthermore, Bynoe are now not 
permitted to add any further participants to the program, and if any CDEP participant 
chooses to leave in favour of Centrelink then Bynoe lose that individual’s funding. 
(BHM 2010) 
3.7 Recommendations from NAHS Bynoe for housing 
procurement in remote Indigenous communities 
In reflecting on the Bynoe procurement process, a number of key findings arose that 
are relevant to future housing procurement in remote Indigenous communities. These 
findings hold direct relevance to projects of a similar size and scope to the Bynoe 
NAHS housing. Based on their experiences either during the NAHS Normanton 
project or broader remote housing procurement, interviewees were asked what 
perspective they could bring to future housing procurement activities in remote 
Aboriginal communities. Thus, the following conclusions begin with G.P., project 
manager, move through L.T., building contractor, and finish with F.P., ICHO chairman. 
3.7.1 A project manager’s perspective 
According to GP, many of the problems she had seen in remote housing projects 
were the result of a lack of understanding by the funding authorities to the diversity 
and complexities of procuring housing in remote regions. One of the major areas for 
concern was the perception that all remote communities required a ‘one size fits all’ 
scenario and were treated as such through: tight budgetary and contractual time 
constraints; ill-considered training and employment requirements in communities with 
insufficient worker numbers or no existing labour scheme; an over-reliance on 
‘minimum design standards and guidelines’ which are inappropriate to a given cultural 
and environmental setting, among others (G.P. 2010). Additionally, G.P. was also 
critical of an apparent continual experimentation that occurs in remote Indigenous 
settings, including the testing of the latest design and technical solutions when many 
best practice examples already exist in remote communities, having been tested in 
previous generations in similar conditions (G.P. 2010). In terms of project 
management strategies, G.P. stated that for projects of a similar scale to the Bynoe 
NAHS housing, the current method of calling for an expression of interest (EOI) prior 
to a select tender process was the best situation as it assisted administrators in 
thoroughly checking the facts and details, namely referees, previous projects and the 
capacity of those applying to tender. (G.P. 2010) 
According to G.P., one of the most difficult avenues for an ICHO in a remote 
community was first attaining, and then retaining, an open building licence. A lack of 
such would lead to the Bynoe situation whereby the organisation had to rely on an 
individual person, typically from outside the community, to loan their building licence 
for a given project. This situation was not ideal as it resulted in the disempowerment 
of the ICHOs in self-determination and increased risks related to potential conflicts as 
the project proceeded. GP stated that even when the builder lending the licence, such 
as L.B. on the Bynoe NAHS housing, approached the project from an altruistic 
position of working to benefit the community, there were increased risks related to the 
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physical and emotional burn-out of that individual given the amount of time and 
energy needed to procure a complex project. For instance, G.P. reported: 
Towards the end of the project, Laurie the Bynoe builder got burnt out as he 
was doing everything for the Co-op. He also got bogged down in the 
paperwork for the project which resulted in a falling out with the Bynoe Co-op 
and Board. He should have had help with the administration side of things but 
was unable to receive this as there were no systems set up to assist with this. 
(G.P 2010) 
The discussion above raises another avenue for consideration; that of mentoring 
Indigenous organisations in order to capacity build staff skill levels and knowledge 
within that organisation. Mentoring would play an important role in mitigating the 
effects of organisations in remote communities being asked or required to take on 
responsibilities outside their existing skill set. 
The best situation for procurement is if you can get a good local builder on the 
ground in the community to team up with an Aboriginal builder in a mentor role 
and also have the capacity for training to feed into that. (G.P. 2010) 
Furthermore, an additional area for concern related to CDEP labour being used on 
government build projects. G.P. believed that in order to generate a better work ethic 
and build capacity in remote communities, CDEP labourers should be paid at 
commensurate levels as per the apprenticeship rules and not less. She also stated 
that CDEP was good when properly organised. In her experience, Bynoe was one of 
those organisations she believed to be a professional organisation when it came to 
running its CDEP programs whereas in other communities (not named), a lack of 
organisation had led to problems. G.P. stated: 
In Indigenous communities, a strong foreman on projects is really important, 
someone who is willing to see the project through at any cost. For example, 
driving around the community making sure the labourers turn up to work. If 
he’s Aboriginal himself then that’s the best situation, someone they respect. 
(G.P. 2010) 
3.7.2 A building contractor’s perspective 
Les Tenni (L.T.) of Tenni and Arbouin Pty Ltd has over 20 years experience working 
in Aboriginal communities. He retired from Aboriginal work in 2007, preferring to build 
in his home community of Atherton in North Queensland (L.T. 2010). In working in 
remote communities, L.T. and his team would travel from Central Queensland to the 
Torres Strait Islands and into the Northern Territory. They chose to work in remote 
communities for the lifestyle and connection to the bush. In Aboriginal communities, 
T&A had the following rules for their work crew: 1) could drink beer but not spirits; 2) 
never give alcohol away; 3) never fraternise with local women; 4) no marijuana; and 5) 
no fighting. Apparently, the more remote the work, the easier it was to control these 
rules. Workflow was typically six weeks on the job and one week off, working 10 hours 
a day, six days a week. As L.T. stated, ‘If you’re going to work in the bush you have to 
be a hands-on person, otherwise it’s never going to work’. (L.T. 2010) 
In order to work efficiently in remote communities, T&A had their own concrete 
batching plant, backhoe, bobcat, tip-truck and semi-trailer. Their aim was to be 
completely self-sufficient. L.T. reports T&A knew which communities were easier to 
work in than others, and such was their experience, they could price refurbishment 
projects without having to enter the house. For example, in Mornington, T&A knew to 
cart their own brick material from Atherton whereas to work in Doomadgee during the 
wet season, they had to truck supplies to Gregory Downs and then fly the rest of their 
gear into Doomadgee. For this purpose, T&A had their own plane for wet season work 
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when the roads were flooded, which according to L.T. was a huge advantage over 
other building contractors who had to rely solely on road transport, which meant it was 
important to have all materials into communities before the rains began. T&A’s policy 
was to continue to work through the wet season and use their plane if needed. (L.T. 
2010) 
L.T. reported that the government funding cycle made organisation very difficult for 
building contractors as funds would be delivered in September of a given year with the 
result that the project had to be designed, tendered and initiated before the wet 
season began in December. The typical completion timeframe for projects was a 
financial year, so work begun in December one year was required to be completed by 
June the following year. L.T. reported that this process placed a great deal of stress 
on all participants, from the program/project managers through to the designers, 
builders and subcontractors. He stated that the short contractual timeframes gave no 
incentive for mainstream contractors to include training and employment capitals in 
their overall work agendas. Furthermore, in discussing training capitals, L.T. advised: 
In relation to training and employment, the government should consider that 
instead of, say, building 1000 houses, they should build 700 and use the 
difference to employ local labour and develop skills in Aboriginal 
communities—and do not put time limits on contracts. If the government wants 
to improve the training and employment of Aboriginal people in remote 
communities, then they should not put time limits on builders in building 
contracts. The builders should be given an opportunity to state a timeframe 
which takes into consideration the time needed to employ local Aboriginal 
people and implement training programs. (L.T. 2010) 
Furthermore, in his experience in remote communities, L.T. reported that the majority 
of government start-up meetings had called for the use of local labour as much as 
possible; however, this was typically not enforced or audited during the construction 
period. L.T. stated that if building contracts did call for the use of local Aboriginal 
labour, he would typically add a contingency of $50 000 to the contract to cover time 
delays associated with organising training. In addition, L.T. reported that if the local 
employment component was not being checked against contract conditions, then a lot 
of builders could easily take advantage of this situation and increase profits by not 
actually employing local Aboriginal people, even though they had costed this into their 
tender. He stated that, in some communities, the builder’s contingency could be less if 
local people had a good work ethic, resulting in less risk for the building contractor 
and economic savings for the project’s proprietor. (L.T. 2010) 
In discussing the work ethic, L.T. underscored the importance of developing role 
models in remote communities in order to incrementally improve the work ethic. He 
stated: ‘if children don’t see their parents working then why or how are they going to 
develop a work ethic? It is imperative to build a work ethic, but you can’t do that if 
there is no work?’ (L.T. 2010) L.T. gave further insight into remote community work: 
Building in Aboriginal communities is not the same as building in mainstream 
white communities. Time is typically not an issue for Aborigines who have 
spent a long time on welfare payments so overcoming that is quite hard. For 
remote communities it is important to facilitate traditional customary 
behaviours and have a good work ethic as well, otherwise these communities 
are not going to catch up. (L.T. 2010) 
In a reflection of the discussion with G.P. presented earlier, another area that L.T. 
thought important to discuss was preventing employee burn-out. ‘A new bloke comes 
in and everything is 100 mile an hour, all the gear gets brought in and then they get 
burnt out and leave’. He stated that the long-term solution to this problem was to find 
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good people from within the community themselves who are committed and skilled, 
underscoring the importance of education and capacity-building programs in remote 
communities. Les also thought it was good to have architects and project managers 
involved in coordinating projects so as to take that responsibility away from the builder. 
(L.T. 2010) 
3.7.3 An ICHO perspective 
At the time, Fred Pascoe was the chairperson of the Bynoe Housing Cooperative and 
current Mayor of Carpentaria Shire Council. He had a number of specific views related 
to broader procurement issues that fell outside the NAHS specific housing case study. 
The authors thought this discussion was important to include in providing an important 
local (and ICHO) perspective on housing procurement processes in remote 
communities. In discussing tenancy management, F.P. reported that the Bynoe 
Housing Cooperative are flexible in working with tenants when they fall behind in 
payments, resulting in a 92–96 per cent rental collection standard. Bynoe also have a 
policy of managing any housing maintenance issues within 24 hours and immediately 
in emergency cases. Wilful damage is also charged back to the tenants. According to 
FP, Bynoe’s good tenancy management processes have resulted in requests from 
some non-Bynoe public housing tenants in Normanton to move across to Bynoe 
housing (F.P. 2010). ‘It’s better to work with people versus coming down heavy on 
them and they leave and you don’t see any of the money you’re owed’. F.P. reports 
that this situation is much better than state housing for example, which, if the tenants 
are behind in repayments by two to four weeks, they can face potential legal action 
and eventual removal from housing (F.P. 2010). For all ongoing social housing repairs 
and maintenance work, Bynoe uses CDEP labour. 
In terms of future building work in the region, Bynoe wanted more involvement in 
refurbishment projects. According to F.P., refurbishment timeframes tend to be more 
flexible due to the difficulty of their scope of work. This flexibility in timeframe would 
give greater opportunity for the incorporation of training capitals into the procurement 
process. Also, given their history of R&M and their CDEP management, Bynoe as an 
organisation are better set up for refurbishment work. The cooperative has a desire to 
once again employ a registered builder and start apprenticeships. Furthermore, 
according to F.P., the future for Bynoe lies in private and joint venture development 
projects. The J.V. process would assist in capacity-building and enable the Bynoe 
organisation to build skills in moving to eventual ownership of the original J.V. 
company (F.P. 2010). F.P. cited the example of Myuma Pty Ltd from Camooweal in 
northwest Queensland as a precedent.22 Bynoe also hopes to play a major role in the 
formation of a regional Aboriginal building company to service the Gulf of Carpentaria. 
(F.P. 2010) 
As a final note with regard to Aboriginal housing in remote communities, F.P. stated 
that ‘although government actions appear to suggest otherwise, one size does not fit 
all in remote Indigenous communities; there are however core principles and concepts 
underlying Indigenous communities that can be used in different contexts’ (FP 2010). 
This suggests the importance of facilitating capacity building in remote communities 
over a long period of time and with real projects. F.P. reported that Bynoe were not 
interested in new build projects if they were required to construct inappropriately 
designed houses (being too small and not culturally sensitive) or they were asked to 
install one of the transportable houses currently being delivered by government in 
many remote Indigenous Queensland communities. In reflecting a similar position to 
A.A. in the previous TIRP case study (see Section 2.7.3), F.P.’s concern was that 
                                               
22
 Myuma Pty Ltd leveraged up from a joint venture project with the QLD Department of Main Roads. 
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transportable houses were not culturally appropriate and lacked quality construction, 
which only exacerbated social problems in remote situations. (FP 2010) 
3.8 Final statement on the Normanton case study 
Taking the above case study analysis into account, there appears no difference in the 
quality of housing procured by Bynoe as the local Aboriginal ICHO or Tenni and 
Arbouin as the external mainstream contractor. The only difference in project outcome 
was the length of time to construct the individual dwellings, with T&A taking 
significantly less time in reaching practical completion compared to Bynoe CACS, who 
maintained a definitive commitment to training and employment capitals throughout; 
thus, necessitating time extensions under the contract. However, case study analysis 
illustrates that, in terms of long-term community benefit, the Bynoe approach is 
superior given the training outcomes which have facilitated employment for some 
community members in Bynoe’s ongoing repairs and maintenance program. 
Furthermore, the case study above has shown that for a remote ICHO to be 
sustainable, a diversity of economic activities and good governance structures need to 
be in place. Housing procurement is just one element in the overall picture. 
This case study has illustrated the situation at the grass-roots level of an ICHO 
struggling to maintain meaningful involvement in the procurement process, and 
showed that, with good support, the professionalism of the ICHO came to the fore 
regarding an understanding of local context re cultural appropriate, skills basis of 
community and tenancy management. 
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4 CASE STUDY: KOONIBBA (SA) 
4.1 Introduction 
Koonibba Aboriginal community is a discrete very remote settlement with a varying 
population of 210–250 residents. It is located 43 kilometres northwest of Ceduna and 
800 kilometres northwest of Adelaide in South Australia. 2324 It was established in 
1899 as the Koonibba Aboriginal Mission by the South Australia Synod of the 
Ecumenical Lutheran Church of Australia on land leased from the South Australian 
Government (George 2005, Section 5:2–5:3). At this time it became the South 
Australian west coast depot for the distribution of government rations. Indigenous 
people who had pre-existing attachments to Koonibba occupied a traditional camp 
that coexisted with the Mission settlement until the 1940s25 (DEHSA 2010;26 Mattingly 
& Hampton 1992, p.203). 
Figure 11: Location of Koonibba near Ceduna, South Australia 
 
Source: Adapted from Mattingly and Hampton (1992, p.ii) ‘South Australia’ from 1836. 
By the 1950s, Koonibba Mission was ‘home’ to one of Australia’s largest Lutheran 
congregations, comprising about 600 Aboriginal Christians scattered over Eyre 
Peninsula27. In 1963, the South Australian Government acquired the Mission through 
the Aboriginal Lands Trust, with the goal of equipping its residents for assimilation into 
                                               
23
 ABS (2003, p.21) Remoteness Areas, ASGC 2001 edition. 
24
Web: http://www.wangkawilurrara.com/koonibba/default.htm Access date: 03 September 2010  
25
Web: http://www.auspostalhistory.com/articles/963.shtml  
26
 DEHSA (2010) Showcasing SA Heritage Places. [Web: 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/heritage/pdfs/koonibba.pdf Access date: 29 June 2010] 
27
 Web: http://www.auspostalhistory.com/articles/963.shtml Access date: 20 September 2010 
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the broader community (Mattingly & Hampton 1992, p.209). From 1972, management 
of Koonibba was taken over by the elected Council of Koonibba residents.28 
In 1988, the site was purchased through the Aboriginal Lands Trust and land title was 
formally transferred to the Koonibba Aboriginal Community (Laundy 2007, p.10) The 
Koonibba land parcel has remained relatively intact with the settlement site 
surrounded by approximately 7000 acres of land. State-owned and managed housing 
is interspersed with administration buildings, school, childcare centre, hall, health 
clinic, workshop and the old Mission Church of the Redeemer. Approximately 4000 
acres are used for farming purposes and are leased to a local farmer with a 
percentage of the profits coming back into the community with the remaining land 
retained as native vegetation. (Housing SA 2009, p.6). 
The Koonibba Council Incorporated (KACCI) was established in 1989 with the stated 
vision to establish, promote, operate and coordinate services and facilities for the 
advancement and welfare of the residents of Koonibba through social, educational, 
recreational, cultural and sporting activities (Laundy 2007, p.10). In 2008, the 
management of the Community Council consisted of nine elected members.29 Long-
term residents of Koonibba are descendants of Wirangu (alt sp. Wiringu), Gugatha (alt. 
sp. Kokatha, Kokata, Gugada), Mirning (alternate term Yirgala), Pitjantjatjara and 
other wider regional language groupings.30 From its language group make-up the 
community has social networks that extend throughout the Lake Eyre Peninsula, west 
across the Nullarbor Plain and north into the APY lands. 
This case study centres on the activity of the Koonibba Building Pty Ltd and its 
relatively low volume of building activity over the last decade. The region’s 
procurement program consists of parcels of work, mainly small repairs and 
maintenance, new and replacement housing, and is funded solely from state and 
Commonwealth governments. A small portion of this funding is captured by a small 
building enterprise operated from Koonibba. This research has used a combination of 
desktop references along with semi-structured interviews with key individuals in 
government, including the current director of the Koonibba Building Pty Ltd. 
This case study has also provided an opportunity to examine, in addition to 
procurement activity, the related procurement context in greater detail and how this 
impacts on employment, training and enterprise outcomes for discrete very remote 
communities in similar circumstances. A closer examination of macro and micro 
measurements of housing need has assisted in gaining a clear understanding of 
where gaps in meeting unmet need have occurred. These gaps in service delivery 
have a bearing on generating social and economic capitals, and if these gaps are 
significant, as indicated at Koonibba, then vulnerabilities increase. A central question 
that will arise in this case study is whether sufficient social capital exists in the 
Koonibba community’s existing social networks to secure enterprise contracts in the 
other Aboriginal communities of the region and hence reduce its economic 
vulnerability. 
4.2 Measuring housing need in SA 
Indigenous enterprise development at Koonibba is strongly related to the social 
housing market operating in the region and related nearby regions. In order to 
understand the relationship between economic and social capitals generated from 
                                               
28
 DEHSA (2010) ‘Showcasing SA Heritage Places’. [Web: 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/heritage/pdfs/koonibba.pdf Access date: 29/06/2010] 
29 
Web: http://www.wangkawilurrara.com/koonibba/default.htm Access date: 03/09/2010 
30
 J.T. 02/09/2010, Mattingly & Hampton 1992, p.203, [Web: 
http://www.wangkawilurrara.com/koonibba/default.htm Access date: 03/09/2010] 
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procurement, this study has included measurements of housing need against these 
different procurement outcomes. The national macro measurement of Indigenous 
housing need is collated in ‘Indigenous Housing Needs, A multi-measure needs 
model’ (AIHW 2009a). Based on 2006 Census data using multi-measurement 
methods through the quantification of five criteria, the AIHW reports on 36 National 
Reporting Framework (NRF) housing performance indicators for Indigenous housing 
and provides projections of estimated Indigenous housing need to inform resource 
allocation. The five broad measures used to qualify this estimate are: (i) extent of 
homelessness, (ii) extent of overcrowding, (iii) level of affordability, (iv) current 
dwelling condition, and (v) connections to essential services (power, water and 
sewerage) (AIHW 2009a:ix). All these measures impact on Indigenous livelihoods. 
Commencing at the state level, and extracting the comparative overcrowding measure 
across states and territories, the South Australian rate is 11.7 per cent as a proportion 
of total Indigenous households by tenure type, compared with the highest rate of 38.5 
per cent for the Northern Territory (AIHW 2009a, p.14). By further comparison, the 
proportion of moderately overcrowded Indigenous households measured by 
remoteness is 11 per cent in remote regions, and 33 per cent in very remote regions 
as a proportion of Indigenous population by region classification (AIHW 2009a, p.15). 
Within the state of South Australia there are regional differences in how funding is 
distributed; it is comprised of broad geographic and administrative regions with the 
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) lands identified as a distinct region. This 
administrative separation of the APY Lands from other regions and remote centres is 
a consequence of its establishment as an independent statutory authority under the 
APY Land Rights Act 1981. By way of example, a significant funding injection was 
announced in 2008–09, where the South Australia Housing Trust secured an 
agreement with the APY Council under the National Partnership Agreements between 
the Commonwealth and states/territories, to meet priority needs of supply and quantity 
across the APY Lands and key regional centres through a negotiated lease 
agreement with the SAHT (DFCSA 2009b, p.9, p.35). The new agreement for a major 
housing program valued at $25 million31 commenced with the planning of a total of 33 
new dwellings, comprised of 17 in Amata and 16 in Mimili with Programd construction 
anticipated to commence in late July 2009 (DFCSA 2009b, p.9, p.36, p.87). This 
funding injection is by far the largest amount for new Aboriginal housing in any part of 
South Australia and the authors would argue that any Aboriginal building company 
who was unable to participate in the APY Program would be at an economic 
disadvantage. We shall return to this point when we consider the Koonibba case study 
in more depth. (DFCSA 2009b, p.9, p.35) 
Housing SA is meeting accommodation needs across the remainder of the state 
through a range of programs, some of which are culturally specific. In contrast with the 
allocated APY budget above, the total Indigenous Community Housing Program in 
2009 for the remainder of the state was $9.912 million. However, this figure excludes 
allocations for SOMIH. Although a detailed examination of these other programs is 
outside the scope of this report, in brief, some programs appear to innovatively tackle 
related housing issues in a range of ways. One such program, titled ‘Mobility 
Assistance’ aims to lead to policy outcomes through AHURI sponsored research. 
Others include transitional accommodation centres at Ceduna and Coober Pedy, 
among other smaller related housing programs responding to family violence. Finally, 
there are provisions for Anangu visitors who are either rough sleeping or cross border 
visitors at the reserve in the City of Charles Sturt Council, Adelaide (DFCSA 2009b, 
p.36, pp.38-40, p.87). 
                                               
31 Web: http://www.papertracker.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=155&Itemid=83 
Access date: 14 September 2010. 
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Further details of replacement and new housing unit production are contained within 
the SA Housing, Statistical Supplement, Housing in Focus 2007–08. The Supplement 
reports in Appendix 1 that new housing units are recorded under broad geographic 
categories of ‘country’ and ‘metro’. The Appendix table includes a long-range record 
of output spanning from 1938 to 2008, and noting in 2007 a total of 26 detached 
houses where, in 2008, ten detached houses were delivered in the ‘Country’ region. 
This reference to ‘Country’ could possibly be interpreted to include some new builds 
for Indigenous people in remote and very remote discrete communities. A footnote 
reference on the 2007–08 Newbuild Program, notes that Aboriginal housing properties 
were included in this count, but were not quantified separately for reasons not stated 
(DFCSA 2009a, pp.80-81). The Supplement reports in Table 44, titled ‘Public, 
Aboriginal and community housing construction’, ranging over financial years from 
1998–99 to 2007–08, notes new housing for 2007–08 was not available for Aboriginal 
clientele (DFCSA 2009a, pp.54-55). 
The SAHT Annual Report (2009) contains data on crowded households at 30 June, 
2009, noting the need for a total of 672 new housing units across all tenures in South 
Australia. Also, given that this projection is based on nuclear household models, some 
adjustment of this figure would need to occur on closer examination of the 
circumstances of individual communities. However, in the case of Koonibba this figure 
needs to be significantly adjusted upwards to tackle its unmet need. A key 
qualification of the State measurement of need are the specifics of existing housing 
stock, including (i) age of the housing stock; (ii) overall condition of housing stock, and 
(iii) house connection to services (DFCSA 2009b, p.41). 
The Report (DFCSA 2009b) further identifies production of new housing units, as 
distinguished from SOMIH new unit production for Indigenous Community Housing 
Organisations (ICHOs) under the Indigenous Community Housing Program (ICHP), 
with capital funding received for two new builds and 17 upgrades (1 July–31 
December 2008). A further seven new builds and five replacement houses were to be 
completed by 30 June, 2009. Reference was made to 11 additional housing outcomes 
for Aboriginal housing stock which were not replacement houses (DFCSA 2009b, 
p.37). This output is considerably small in comparison to the measured unmet need, 
and appears to be consistent with low volume housing outputs across the state over 
several financial years preceding the 2009 APY agreement. It is difficult to conclude 
whether this deficiency in overall delivery is due to the Housing SA policy of 
decreasing state managed properties (reduced by 23% in 2009) with a simultaneous 
increase in Aboriginal community housing stock by 60 per cent or if this is due to a 
gap in meeting demand delivery (DFCSA 2009b, p.46). 
4.3 Measuring housing need at Koonibba 
By comparison, and moving to the specific housing information available on Koonibba, 
a greater need is revealed than that reflected in the State average reported in macro-
measurement overview by AIHW (2009a, p.14). There are currently 45 community 
housing allotments at Koonibba. Two allotments are vacant with houses on 43 
allotments. Five houses out of the total housing stock are derelict and unoccupied with 
housing stock averaging 21.4 years. A further eight houses were undergoing major 
upgrades and unable to be occupied at the time of this study, leaving a total of 30 
functioning houses distributed among 210–250 residents. The following summary 
shows the construction timeframes in which the existing 43 houses were built: 
 Twelve houses built in 1980, of which four were derelict buildings. 
 Six houses built in the 1980s, one of which was derelict, but two marked for 
demolition. 
  62 
 Twenty houses built in the 1990s. 
 Five houses built in 200632 (Housing SA 2009, p.16). 
In order to examine the age and condition of housing stock at Koonibba, a brief 
government overview across the state of South Australia notes that 30.8 per cent of 
overall housing stock was built before 1968 and deemed first generation. Where 
second generation stock constructed between 1968 and 1988 comprises 44.3 per 
cent, and ‘third generation’ stock built after 1988 is 23.9 per cent (DFCSA 2009a, 
p.48). At Koonibba, second generation housing stock constitutes 42 per cent of the 
total housing stock, numbering 18 houses with the remainder being third generation 
stock at 58 per cent, totalling 25 houses. 
Figure 12: Community housing site plan 2007, Koonibba, South Australia 
 
Source: Department for Communities and Families (2007). 
It was also notable that six occupied houses of the total housing stock had no toilets 
installed. Three of the houses built within the 1980s were transportable and, of these, 
two contained asbestos and were marked for demolition (Housing SA 2009, p.16). A 
table noting the total number of bedrooms available at the time of the study is 
provided below. 
                                               
32
 A.M., DFC, 15/07/2010. 
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Table 4: Housing with listings of numbers of bedrooms, Koonibba, SA* 






Total: 43 houses Total: 19 bedrooms 
*One-bedroom house type not specified. Source: Housing SA (2009). 
There was a significant under-supply of housing in Koonibba at the time of research 
with nine of the available 36 houses demonstrating crowding. Seventeen families 
occupied these nine houses and Housing SA has calculated the average crowding 
rate to be 27.3 per cent, and indicated that 25 per cent of the houses required one or 
more additional bedrooms. Adding to this need, there were three bush camps at 
Koonibba where people had been sleeping rough. It was estimated that the 
community required an additional eight houses to alleviate crowding and three more 
houses to address homelessness (Housing SA 2009, p.14). It is notable that if 
bedroom occupancy alone is used to calculate crowding rates, of the available total of 
19 bedrooms, there would be an occupancy rate between eleven to 13 persons per 
bedroom based on the current population estimate of 210–250 persons. Thereby the 
calculation of occupancy crowding measured appears inaccurate. 
In addition to the five new houses allocated in 2006, there were eight major upgrades 
with practical completion anticipated in early July, 2010.33 It is worth noting that the 
houses delivered under the Community Housing Program in 2006 were not additional 
houses to the existing stock, but houses replacing existing derelict or uninhabitable 
stock. Possibly, due to the remoteness of the community, the five houses for 
Koonibba were bundled together from smaller annual allocations across three 
financial years 2003–0634 in order to make the tender viable for the contractor. The 
perennial problem of attracting quality and reputable contractors to remote regions for 
small parcels of work has undermined the viability of remote housing over several 
decades. Similarly such small allocations also greatly affect the viability of any 
Aboriginal building enterprise. 
The contractual method used for the 2006 houses was documented design traditional 
lump sum through a select tender process35 . The ‘construct only’ process in the 
Koonibba case study involved the proprietor, Housing SA, preparing the project intent, 
designs, and scope of work documents in-house. The building contract was awarded 
to ‘Chris Vorstenbosch and Sons’ on the basis of a tender submission that included a 
provisional sum at two per cent of the contract sum for Aboriginal training and 
employment. Two apprentice carpenters were employed on the project,36 but they 
were members of the contractor’s team and not local apprentices. According to a 
community informant, local apprentice labour employed was limited to low-skilled 
tasks. 37  According to the publication, Employment Extra produced by DEWR, it 
appears that the builder, Chris Vorstenbosch had as a part of his work team in 2005, 
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 R.T., DFC, 27/09/2010. 
34
 A.M., DFC 15/07/2010. 
35
 A.M., DFC 15/07/2010. 
36
 A.M., DFC 15/07/2010. 
37
 J.T., KBPL 02/09/2010. 
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two Aboriginal carpentry apprentices in the final year of their four-year apprenticeship 
and a first-year Aboriginal carpentry apprentice from Ceduna (DEWR 2005, p.6).38 
Figure 13: Locally trained tradesperson working on new housing construction at 
Koonibba 2007 
 
Source: Housing SA Photograph (2007). 
Another related and ongoing procurement initiative forming part of Housing SA’s 
maintenance program across select communities is Health Habitat’s program, Fixing 
Housing for Better Health (FHBH). The FHBH program is funded as a distinct 
Australian Government grant, but it is not clear if the allocation is calculated as an 
additional sum to the State Owned Managed Indigenous Housing (SOMIH) 
maintenance programs, totalling $6.4 million (DFCSA 2009a, pp.49–55; DFCSA 
2009b, p.89). 
4.4 Koonibba housing procurement and related initiatives 
In terms of repair and maintenance expenditures in South Australia, the Fixing 
Housing for Better Health (FHBH) program has provided a modest budget input in the 
last decade. A summary of the FHBH program in the state, including survey results 
from Koonibba, follows. 
4.4.1 Fixing Housing for Better Health (FHBH) 
The ‘Fixing Housing for Better Health’ initiative has been delivered to Aboriginal 
communities across South Australia through a contractual arrangement between the 
firm ‘Health Habitat’, the Australian Government’s Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and Housing SA (Housing SA 
2009). The FHBH technical surveys focus on health and safety related measures by 
carrying out a program of maintenance critical to hardware function. There are three 
stages to each FHBH project: (i) preliminary survey and repair immediate items, (ii) 
first fix and secondary survey, and (iii) final fix works completed by licensed 
tradespersons (DFCSA 2008, p.29, p.30). The program provides employment 
opportunities for local community members to participate in conducting household 
surveys and who are trained to undertake minor repairs and maintenance not 
requiring qualified trades (FACSIA 2006, p.xii). 
                                               
38
 DEWR, Employment Extra, Issue 15, March 2005. [Web: 
www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/CE5541B0.../EE_march_2005.pdf Access date: 31 August 2010] 
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In a review of the FHBH national program, FACSIA engaged SGS Economics and 
Planning to assess FHBH surveys completed over four years from 2001 to 2005, 
receiving a total funding allocation of $9 million. The relevance of referring to this 
report is that it included two South Australian centres and it also assessed the skill 
outcomes derived from FHBH programs. Summarising the training outcomes across 
four exemplar diverse state and territory locations it was noted that there was as an 
excellent skill transfer of simple fix techniques, data entry and survey check processes. 
However, it was concluded that long-term program uptake in skill transfer was limited 
by community capacity and ability to independently use skills gained in the survey 
process (FACSIA 2006, p.xii, p.1, p.25, pp.76–77). 
Koonibba formed part of the FHBH project rollout in 2004 and its results are presented 
in Tables 5, 6 and Figure 14 below: 
Table 5: Results survey & fix 1, August 2004—Koonibba 
Safety: Power, water and waste connected 65 
Safety: Electrical System 2 
Safety: Gas System 100 
Safety: Structure and Access to House 7 
Safety: Fire Egress 0 
Washing People: Shower Working 33 
Washing Children: Young People basin, bath or tub 42 
Washing Clothes and Bedding: Laundry services 
with or without a washing machine 
30 
Removing waste safely: Flush toilet working 44 
Removing waste from all other areas: All drains 
working 
21 
Ability to store, prepare and cook food 14 
Total Houses 43 
Note 1: Numerical data indicates percentage of houses performing to the eleven performance criteria 
Note 2: Total houses vary from survey 1: 43 to survey 2: 38. 
Source: Unpublished data provided by HealthHabitat (2004). 
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Table 6: Results survey & fix 2, November 2004—Koonibba 
Safety: Power, water and waste connected 100 
Safety: Electrical System  84 
Safety: Gas System 100 
Safety: Structure and Access to House 55 
Safety: Fire Egress 3 
Washing People: Shower Working 87 
Washing Children: basin, bath or tub 77 
Washing Clothes and Bedding: Laundry services 
with or without a washing machine 
87 
Removing waste safely: Flush toilet working 92 
Removing waste from all other areas: All drains 
working 
82 
Ability to store, prepare and cook food 28 
Total Houses 38 
Note 1: Numerical data indicates percentage of houses performing to the eleven performance criteria 
Note 2: Total houses vary from survey 1: 43 to survey 2: 38. 
Source: Unpublished data provided by HealthHabitat (2004). 
The comparative survey results represented in Figure 14 indicate that a substantial 
percentage increase in functionality was achieved by comparing the results of total 
houses surveyed in two different survey timeframes. However, the total houses differ 
between Survey 1 and 2, as reflected in Table 5 and Table 6 above, and therefore are 
not as lineally comparable as that implied in Figure 14 below.39 
Figure 14: Comparison of survey 1 vs. survey 2, Koonibba, 2004 
 
Note: Item 03 Safety: Gas System not included in Figure 14 above. 
Source: Unpublished data provided by HealthHabitat (2004). 
                                               
39
 See Statistical analysis of FHBH Data Cubes at [Web: 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/indigenous/datacubes/fhbh.cfm. Access date: 31 August 2010] 
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Specifically in SA In 2007–08, FHBH projects included 84 stage 1–3 surveys on 
houses in Port Lincoln, Oak Valley, Ceduna and surrounding areas. Further Stage 1 
surveys were completed on 121 houses across five communities in the APY lands 
(DFCSA 2008, p.29, p.30).40 Later 2008–09 FHBH projects completed a total survey 
of 222 houses, in nine remote centres in the APY lands, and other centres in South 
Australia, totalling $1.8 million with an average cost of $8108 per house (DFCSA 
2009b, p.37). The FHBH Initiative has been downsized in subsequent programs 
proposed for South Australia for the 2010–11 financial year to 105 surveys and the 
program will cease in 2012. Housing SA will then oversee a program of repairs and 
maintenance.41 
The Housing SA Maintenance Program constitutes a major component of the 
investment in Indigenous housing as reported in the Statistical Supplement, Housing 
in Focus, 2007–2008. The maintenance program budget totals $6.6 million on 
tenantable Aboriginal housing stock numbering 1256. Of this sum, $4.6 million was 
provided for responsive maintenance, $1.1 million for program maintenance and $0.9 
million for capital maintenance that included 40 Aboriginal housing property upgrades 
(DFCSA 2009a, pp.50–52, p.76). Notably, for Community Housing sector properties, 
Housing SA does not have program maintenance, which is deemed the responsibility 
of the individual community housing organisation funded from individual submission of 
an eight-year forward maintenance plan to Housing SA (DFCSA 2009a, p.52). Of 
State Owned and Managed Indigenous Housing (SOMIH) properties, a total of 1018 
property condition audits were conducted as part of a two-year rolling assessment 
between 2007–09 found that 216 (21%) properties required major maintenance 
attention (DFCSA 2009b, p.38). 
Housing SA maintenance program targeting SOMIH properties has provided an 
opportunity for some remote Indigenous centres to engage in small-scale training and 
employment as a means of generating meaningful outcomes. Related to such 
maintenance programs is the former West Coast Building Training (WCBT) an 
accredited training initiative in the building industry by Aboriginal participants at 
Ceduna and Koonibba. The WCBT was led by the since disbanded, South Australian 
Aboriginal Housing Authority (SAAHA) (now incorporated under Housing SA (HSA)), 
which provided the forerunner for engagement of a handful of Koonibba and Ceduna 
residents in the building industry, eventually leading to the development of a small 
building enterprise, called the Koonibba Building Pty Ltd (KBPL). A brief overview of 
KBPL follows the summary of the WCBT Initiative below. 
4.4.2 The West Coast Building Training Initiative (2000–2006)42 
The WCBT Initiative required multi-agency involvement of three key state bodies; (i) 
the SAAHA, (ii) the Department of Education, Training and Employment—Office of 
Employment and Youth (DETE-OEY), and (iii) Department of Employment Workplace 
Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB), as well as Ceduna CDEP Tjutjunaku 
Worka Tjuta (TWT) and Koonibba Community and Homelands Representatives, 
(SAAHA (2000a, p.3). After conducting a skills audit and fielding interest in the 
scheme, a high degree of interest was expressed by people attending a briefing 
session held in mid-2000 and an assessment of 28 people from ten communities were 
identified as having potential for traineeships (SAAHA 2000b, p.2). 
Emerging outcomes from the WCBT Initiative were reported in the period from 2001–
05, noting six Indigenous apprentices completed Certificate III in General Construction 
                                               
40
 FHBH project number was not identified in the report. 
41 C.R., 09/07/2010. 
42 See Appendix 8 for a more detailed overview of the West Coast Building Training Initiative. 
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as a result of continued support by key agencies; the SA Aboriginal Housing Authority 
(SAAHA), Tjutjunaku Worka Tjuta (TWT) Ceduna CDEP, Career Employment Group 
and TAFE SA, Ceduna.43 It is believed that three of the six participants continued to 
work at Koonibba and completed their carpentry apprenticeships. Two Aboriginal 
carpentry apprentices who worked for the Ceduna builder, Chris Vorstenbosch, were 
near completion of their apprenticeship by March, 2005. Another Aboriginal carpentry 
apprentice may be the sixth person referred to as a part of the cohort of completed 
apprenticeships, but it appears that a separate DEWR program was operational at this 
time, offered by the emerging entity, the New Apprenticeship Centre, Career 
Employment Group (DEWR 2005:6).44 This modest outcome after a decade was a 
long way from the original interest expressed in the WCBT Initiative by 28 potential 
trainees. 
A number of challenges to the WCBT were (i) insufficient supply of housing to sustain 
larger training numbers, (ii) structural problems within the SAAHA funding program to 
allow flexibility to allow time for training within the construction program, (iii) reluctance 
of the workforce to work outside Koonibba and Ceduna (see Appendix 7). The 
outcomes in terms of completed apprenticeships matched what was economically 
sustainable from the limited social housing and capital works budget derived from the 
Ceduna region in particular, minor works contracts from government-funded capital 
works programs undertaken by Aboriginal building enterprises. As a consequence, 
community build teams employing apprentice labour under an intermittent delivery 
system have limited opportunity to obtain a diverse skill base and management 
capacity. These small building enterprises operating either locally or regionally rely 
upon a skill base consisting of low education achievement, which in turn limits the 
labour capability and enterprise capacity. Limited capacity adversely affects the ability 
to competitively operate in a broader regional building context. The small output from 
the WCBT initiative economically reflected what was achievable within the region, and 
in hindsight may have prematurely raised community expectations of government-
funded building programs. Programs based on small capital investment in social 
welfare housing are simply not capable of producing large employment gains and 
cannot solve the deficits of skilled trades in remote centres. 
It is the authors’ view that in order to reduce economic vulnerability bounded by 
dependency upon the state, and to increase sustainability, Indigenous access to the 
broader housing procurement economy through training initiatives must ensure that 
proposals are inter-connected to the regional economy. If this is not achievable, 
Indigenous training and employment will continue to have limited outcomes and 
opportunities, for both long-term viability and expansion. This is no more self-evident, 
than from the examination of the struggling Koonibba Building Pty Ltd and its attempts 
to engage in enterprise activity. 
4.4.3 Koonibba Building Pty Ltd 
The Koonibba Aboriginal community saw involvement in housing as an opportunity to 
provide employment, training and economic activities for community members. A 
separate building company synthesised out of the WCBT Initiative was formed with 
the objective to undertake repairs, maintenance and capital works projects using local 
labour. In the initial operation of establishing a building enterprise, KACCI was the 
vehicle for undertaking building construction works under ‘Koonibba Constructions’. 
This was achieved by changing the community’s constitution to ensure that a non-
Indigenous employee of the Association who held a current builder’s licence was 
                                               
43 Source: http://www.ceduna.net/site/page.cfm?u=506#westcaost. 
44 DEWR, Employment Extra, Issue 15, March, 2005 [Web: 
www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/CE5541B0.../EE_march_2005.pdf - Access Date: 31 August 2010]. 
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eligible to become a member of the council and its nominated building supervisor 
(Laundy 2007, p.4). This arrangement continued until early 2010 when the registered 
builder left to pursue other interests.45 
The KACCI was then deemed to be the holder of a building licence and Koonibba 
Constructions successfully tendered for housing repairs, maintenance and upgrades 
funded by SAAHA, including the construction of the transitional facility at Ceduna, the 
Wanka Wilurara Accommodation Centre.46 The formation of a separate body occurred 
after a KACCI audit report noted that the building activities had to be carried out under 
a separate entity. The KACCI then embarked on setting up a separate body, the 
‘Koonibba Building Association’ (KBA) and then intended to apply for a builder’s 
licence. However, subsequent advice from an accountant suggested that obtaining an 
incorporated body licence would be a difficult exercise (Laundy 2007, p.4). 
Consequently, an accountant was then engaged to establish a new company, the 
Koonibba Building Pty Ltd (KBPL) as a trustee of the Koonibba Building Association. 
This discretionary trust’s beneficiaries were the Koonibba Aboriginal Community 
Council Inc. and its members. Subsequently, 20 000 shares valued at $1.00 each 
were issued in the company with those shares being paid to the extent of 0.01 
cent/per share (totalling $200) with the uncalled capital being $19 800. The Building 
Licensing Authority (SA) advised that, based on this financial information, the 
company would be limited to contracts not exceeding $100 000, so the ordinary share 
issue was increased to 40 000. This ensured that the building company was licensed 
to engage in building contracts restricted to $200 000 with liability to the Koonibba 
Aboriginal Community Council to the level of the uncalled capital amount (Laundy 
2007, p.5). The licence restriction is a standard requirement when a company does 
not hold sufficient balance sheet assets above $100 000. In order to obtain an open 
building licence, the company has to have a building supervisor who is registered to 
construct residential buildings up to three storeys and have total assets holdings 
above $100 000.47 
For reasons not immediately clear, while Koonibba Building Pty Ltd was operating, 
two additional bodies were formed in 2008 to undertake training, employment and 
develop economic initiatives through building works. The Koonibba Enterprises 
Aboriginal Corporation (KEAC) was registered in 2008, listed with eight non-liable 
directors to undertake primary activities of training and employment in 2009 (KEAC 
2008a, b). The Koonibba Building Aboriginal Corporation was also formed in 2008 
(KBAC 2008a, b). There were compliance issues in setting up these two Aboriginal 
corporations with eight directors due to the requirements for directors and committee 
members under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985. These issues were largely 
due to the over representation of local Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system 
which renders many if convicted of an offence, ineligible to serve as directors, office 
bearers or to manage Aboriginal companies. 
This circumstance, including operational inactivity, caused the dissolution of these 
newly-formed entities, with both KEAC and KBAC reporting no employees, income or 
expenditure in 2009 resulting in deregistration on 21 June 2010 by the Registrar of the 
Office of Indigenous Corporations.48 Similar issues beset Koonibba Building Pty Ltd 
(KBPL) resulting in a reduction of the initial number of directors. The KBPL was 
restructured to have only one director; with KACCI retaining 100 per cent ownership of 
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 J.T., KBPL 02/09/ 2010. 
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 T.S. 30/07/2010. 
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 P.C.: Representative from the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs, Adelaide, SA 22/09/2010. 
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 Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations [Web: 
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all shares. The company is also registered as a charitable organisation in order to 
benefit from the provisions that status provides (Laundy 2007, p.6). 
Early in 2010, KBPL engaged another licensed builder on probation, but this 
arrangement was soon discontinued due to KBPL’s inability to maintain ongoing credit 
arrangements with local suppliers due to their association with this builder. The 
withdrawal by local suppliers was not due to financial impropriety on KBPL’s part.49 
This situation highlights two aspects of vulnerability experienced by small remote 
building enterprises, (i) they often do not have the capacity to obtain a stand-alone 
building licence, and (ii) due to remoteness they have only a limited pool of reputable 
staff to draw upon. Such arrangements make these small building enterprises fragile 
operations, increasing vulnerability and limiting economic sustainability. 
At the time of writing, KBPL was responsible for all repairs and maintenance work on 
130 Housing SA houses in Ceduna and surrounding areas valued at $200 000, and 
was undertaking other small-project contracting work through using their connections 
to other Aboriginal organisations. The company has completed housing upgrade 
contracts using the Minor Works Contract (Principal Administered) AS4906–2002 and 
AS4949–2006 Works Order and successfully tendered another contract with the 
Yalata Women’s Centre to the value of $114 000. KBPL have also undertaken 
additional work at the Ceduna CDEP Tjutjunaku Worka Tjuta (TWT), building a small 
office to the value of $70 000. 
Figure 15: Community house undergoing upgrade, 2007, Koonibba, SA 
 
Source: Housing SA (2009). 
In 2010, KBPL was awarded a contract for eight major upgrades of houses at 
Koonibba, achieving practical completion in early July and completed defects liability 
in October.50 The work for the upgrades was not able to be completed within the 
designated 13 week contractual period, due to difficulties in maintaining credit 
arrangements with local suppliers as noted previously. This caused a delay to the 
commencement of works that was exacerbated by KBPL also not possessing surplus 
operational funds to purchase materials. This has somewhat affected the perception 
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of its capacity by its client, Housing SA,51 requiring considerable forbearance of the 
company’s shifting capability. KBPL’s reliance upon others for a building licence to 
operate their company clearly threatens the viability of their enterprise. Furthermore, 
in order for KBPL to continue to develop as a building company, it needs to overcome 
(i) cash flow problems, (ii) limited ability to pay for statutory warranties, as well as (iii) 
management inadequacies and equipment deficiencies. In order to tackle their 
financial problems they currently had made a special loans application for capital 
assistance.52 
At the time of writing, KBPL employed five people including the Works Manager and 
the Director with Indigenous staff wages partly subsidised through CDEP. The 
company aspired to take on more non-government contracts and become a 
competitive player in the building industry and has expressed an interest in relocating 
its offices to the Ceduna township. They were planning to tender for a number of 
medium-size projects on other homelands and communities in the near future, but 
were limited to contracts under $200 000.53 
4.5 Challenges to building socio-economic capitals at 
Koonibba 
The South Australian Indigenous community housing sector has a considerable unmet 
need that is partly being addressed under the new National Partnership Agreement 
with the Australian Government. Housing SA has applied standardised housing 
models to the limited number of new housing units delivered there and an appropriate 
and flexible Indigenous social housing model does not appear to be explored or 
generated. A community representative at Koonibba noted that greater emphasis 
needed to be placed on achieving a diversity of housing stock and they felt that 
various housing models would increase a range of social outcomes in the community. 
The current procurement process limits community choice to standardised housing 
types, cosmetic choices, and specialised fittings and fixtures.54 
Due to the low volume of new and replacement housing units funded over the last 
decade by Housing SA, the contractual method used in procuring these houses may 
have limited relevance to procurement methods overall. However, it was noted that 
the use of the documented design on new and replacement builds as part of the 
method of procurement process at Koonibba was seen to have a number of benefits 
that largely minimise risk for the client, Housing SA. Principally, Housing SA has 
control over all aspects of the housing procurement system in order to reasonably 
contain costs and quality from program release to the awarding of building contracts 
through to its participation as principal of the contract. SA Housing uses standardised 
mainstream house designs that meet programs’ constraints of budget, at the risk of 
maintaining a social housing model unsuited to varied social and cultural needs. A 
challenge for South Australia is how an Indigenous social housing model(s), 
conforming to budget constraints, can be developed and improved in terms of socio-
economic capitals generated. 
It has been presented that small program releases of housing have been identified as 
a reason for increased building costs due to the low volume of housing units, that in 
turn lead to high oncosts for piecemeal contracts that do not generate value for money 
(Connell Wagner 2007, pp.13–14). Other economic factors pertaining to APY lands in 
Fien et al. (2008, p.55) noted during their study for housing delivery at Mimili were 
                                               
51
 R.T. DFC 27/09/2010 
52
 J.T. 02/09/2010. 
53
 J.T. 02/09/2010. 
54
 J.T. 06/05/2010. 
  72 
increased labour costs, few experienced builders, trades shortages and high fuel 
prices. Additionally, standardised three-bedroom houses supplied at Mimili are being 
delivered for households requiring smaller or larger house types, such as those 
required by elderly or larger extended families. It appears from Fien et al.’s study that 
the housing needs of many households have not been met by the government’s 
procurement strategy. (Fien et al. 2008, p.55). 
Under the current procurement system of the Aboriginal housing program, cost 
overruns and cost savings are borne by Housing SA, eliminating financial risk to the 
recipient community housing organisation. Technical and housing procurement 
expertise per se is centralised, reducing the community’s need to separately obtain 
administrative and technical staff. Accounting and audits are also conducted by 
Housing SA further reducing costs, with the argument positioned that this permits 
more funding to go towards actual building projects.55 Given the low volume of output 
of new houses and replacement houses, it is difficult to discern if remote and very 
remote Aboriginal centres are benefiting from this rationale. The major housing 
outputs recorded by Housing SA are the allocation of $9.912 million for ICHO 
operational and new build programs (DFCSA 2009b, p.87). The other major funding 
program, reported in Housing SA Statistical Supplement 2007–08 appeared to be a 
small investment totalling $6.6 million for the maintenance program on tenantable 
Aboriginal housing stock numbering 1256. Of this sum, $4.6 million was provided for 
responsive maintenance, $1.1 million for program maintenance and $0.9 million for 
capital maintenance that also included 40 Aboriginal housing property upgrades 
(2009a, pp.50–52, p.76). 
A key benefit of administrative centralisation has been that Housing SA has ensured 
compliance assessment of licences and registrations of community build teams and 
building enterprises. The building company at Koonibba has been required to comply 
and complete necessary licensing and registration in order to tender for Housing SA 
contracts, enabling the company to continue operating in the building industry.56 
4.6 Capitals of the Koonibba procurement process 
4.6.1 Economic capitals—Koonibba Building Pty Ltd entrepreneurship 
The WCBT initially provided an opportunity for the development of the Koonibba 
Building Pty Ltd through contracts from the former South Australian Aboriginal 
Housing Authority. Currently, Housing SA have assessed that KBPL have capacity, 
albeit limited by fundamental operational and financial requirements. Three people at 
Koonibba have successfully completed carpentry apprenticeships as a consequence 
of the WCBT Initiative, yet there appear to be considerable limitations to this skills set 
with notable dependence upon an external registered building supervisor. At the time 
of writing, KBPL was waiting upon an Indigenous person from Ceduna to obtain a 
building licence in order to continue its operation as a building company. Those 
involved in the company recognised that some work needed to be done in terms of 
building business skills and to develop the company into a stronger financial 
situation.57 These challenges are not insignificant. 
The Koonibba Building Pty Ltd is perhaps typical of the forces working against 
Indigenous operated enterprises levered off a small income and limited skill base, 
demonstrating that considerable mentoring and assistance is needed to gradually 
stabilise its operation. Without assistance, KBPL has insufficient resources in all 
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necessary areas to operate a viable construction company. Specifically, the 
requirements are business management, income generation, surplus capital, and 
equipment. In particular, it lacks access to bridging social networks to industry 
partners who could potentially mentor or train them in operational competency and 
competitiveness. It seems apparent that the Koonibba Building Pty Ltd economic 
enterprise seems to closely follow a pre-existing, albeit limited social capital network 
of what Hunter (2004, p.8) aptly described as a negative consequence of social 
capital. This occurs when one’s social capital cannot lever economically beyond the 
limitations of its own social network because its ownership is largely comprised of the 
unemployed who are not engaged in operating businesses and therefore cannot 
assist competitiveness through drawing on a broader socio-economic context. 
Pearson and Helms (2010, p.3) are of the view that social capital has the ability to 
either ‘enhance or retard entrepreneurial activity’. 
The limitations of Koonibba Building Pty Ltd entrepreneurial operations are significant 
and do not appear readily resolvable. The inability to obtain an open building licence 
restricts current operations, and this vulnerability is further increased by reduced cash 
flow insufficient to employ someone with the necessary accreditation. Long-term 
aspirations may not be viable without significant assistance, business and operational 
mentoring. Overall KBPL lacks a sizable cash flow, a diversely skilled work force, as 
well as conformity to workplace health and safety requirements; 58  all essential 
elements for an effective competitive building operation to take advantages of wider 
building contracts in the region (e.g. in the APY Lands). Additionally, they are largely 
restricted by not holding sufficient assets needed to obtain an open licence 
registration under the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs, SA. It would appear 
quite difficult for a building company without an ability to fulfil these basic operational 
requirements to secure the necessary finances to either maintain or expand its 
operation. The limitations of Koonibba’s enterprise appear to be a skewed 
disadvantage of social and economic isolation as a consequence of not only 
geography, but also due to its dependence upon a limited regional economy and the 
welfare state. 
4.6.2 Social capital and governance 
The KBPL is reliant upon limited social capital and economic networks to achieve 
sustained operation. The KBPL has emerged from and closely follows network 
patterns based on pre-existing social capital networks. Hence, Hunter’s (2004, p.8) 
insight on the negative impacts of social capital where people have minimal skills is 
clearly borne out at Koonibba where their enterprise structure has developed following 
their limited social capital network resulting in negligible ability to expand on bridging 
social capital. Bridging capital defined by Hunter (2004, p.3) is the ability to effectively 
engage with overlapping networks that could make resources accessible across a 
number of networks. The limited ability to overcome barriers to bridging capital was 
observed by researchers, Brough et al. (2006, pp.401–408) as a tension between the 
two capitals operating in varied contexts. These contexts were defined as (i) inter-
cultural, that is between Indigenous and non-Indigenous and (ii) intra-cultural, that is 
among Indigenous people. KBPL fragility of at least four years of operation has 
achieved only limited and vulnerable capacity. Yet this achievement can easily 
crumble and dissolve because it does not have access to bridging social capital. This 
vulnerability is made more acute if one single key element is withdrawn, such as the 
single supplier or the registered builder. Social capital, although emphasised as a 
potential element to lever bridging capital and hence increase economic capital in 
mainstream economies, in this remote context it has prohibitive and negative impacts. 
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Meeting the requirements of procurement under Housing SA has led to some 
perceived disadvantages to building social and economic capitals with Koonibba. 
Those involved in the building company at Koonibba felt that preferred status should 
be given to Aboriginal companies tendering for Aboriginal housing projects.59 Yet, it 
could be argued that preferred status may not necessarily increase the pressing skills 
deficit in management and may catalyse a collapse of KBPL due to inadequate 
management capacity if a large-scale contract were awarded. Rather, competency 
and capacity needs to be built through either joint venturing or a flexible strategic 
contract and project management system in order to achieve an improvement in 
business, management and technical skills to increase viability and competitiveness. 
Yet this strategy has to be clearly targeted at those Indigenous people at Koonibba 
with the capacity and willingness to increase their skill. The current tender evaluation 
matrix used by Housing SA ranks training of Aboriginal people as one matrix element, 
but does not sufficiently weight this parameter to prioritise training outcomes. However, 
weighting training must equally assess management and operational capacity of the 
contractor to execute the training with checks to measure this objective. 
In this circumstance, remote Indigenous social capital and governance capacity does 
not have sufficient adaptive qualities and skill sets to lever into alternate and 
productive building markets. The powerful top-down governance structure that 
operates over remote Indigenous housing at Koonibba and Ceduna is largely 
dependent upon a single supplier, Housing SA. The source of a major component of 
Koonibba’s income is in the form of minor capital works contracts. This supply is 
variable, with the core value of their staple work on SOMIH repairs and maintenance 
contracts valued at $200 000. 
4.6.3 Training and employment 
The preceding case study demonstrates the broader housing procurement context 
faced by remote and very remote discrete Aboriginal centres in not only obtaining 
tenantable housing, managing a struggling building operation, but also achieving 
accredited training outcomes, all of which are limited by their dependency upon the 
state and its program of local and regional allocations. Under the superseded SAAHA, 
there was some emphasis on the minor works procurement projects being linked to 
training and employment opportunities. The emphasis on addressing the considerable 
under-employment in remote centres allowed Koonibba to lever up from community 
housing construction to achieve modest training outcomes. This, in turn, led to the 
genesis of the small enterprise Koonibba Building Pty Ltd. 
Training outcomes for those employed with a non-Indigenous contractor were 
reported upon in published media giving the perception of attaining outcomes sooner. 
Yet apprentices employed by Koonibba Building Pty Ltd also achieved accreditation, 
but this occurred over a marginally longer-term, through limited access to the 
productive building market, largely confined to Ceduna and Koonibba. Lack of 
accessibility to other markets, either by choice or lack of capacity, has in turn limited 
financial capital to carry the higher project costs of wages and materials. 
This body of work, comprised largely of minor works contracts under Housing SA’s 
maintenance program requires a relatively less sophisticated construction operational 
skill set which may be sufficient for KBPL’s current capacity, but which presents 
significant barriers to achieving long-term aspirations. The adherence to timelines 
under the design construct and minor works contractual system, as noted elsewhere, 
can indirectly discriminate against the incorporation of Indigenous training having a 
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flow-on effect against not only incentives to include training, but also in achieving 
accredited training outcomes.60 
However, the continued operation of the KBPL must in part be attributed to the 
tolerance by Housing SA of its shifting capabilities. The housing contracts currently 
tendered by Housing SA are small minor works contracts and well-suited to a small 
building company or localised community building teams. While this has been a useful 
way of providing limited training and employment opportunities in the community, the 
lack of economies of scale has reduced opportunities and incentives for 
entrepreneurship.61 
4.7 Final statement on the Koonibba Case Study 
In reviewing the above case study, KBPL has made a concerted effort to maximise 
economic access to procurement opportunities within the region. Demonstrating that 
despite considerable obstacles, it continues to struggle forwards, due to a 
commitment to maintaining employment opportunities for its construction workforce 
who would otherwise be limited to community building programs at Koonibba. It has 
effectively used its social capital networks in Ceduna, but there are limits to these 
networks, and they prevent KBPL from stabilising its operation causing a number of 
flow-on effects. Although, it has performed well under minor works contracts for 
Housing SA, its small capital flow has affected timely delivery of these contracts. 
Whether or not KBPL can lever into the more lucrative building opportunities that exist 
in the APY Lands is uncertain. But without capacity building assistance, it will not be 
able to overcome its operational limitations. In order to effectively do this, it needs to 
be engaged within a flexible procurement system and thereby gain access to much 
needed building supervision and mentoring to increase on-the-ground, as well as 
administrative, skills. It could then, if opportunity were provided, slowly develop 
capacity over a period of time. 
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5 CASE STUDY: SIHIP (NT) 
5.1 Introduction 
The Strategic Intervention Housing Program (SIHP) of the Northern Territory was first 
conceptualised during 2005–06, and then planned and tendered during 2007–08. The 
program, in full, commenced in late 2008 and was renamed the Strategic Indigenous 
Housing and Infrastructure Program (SIHIP). 
SIHIP is part of the arrangement in the Northern Territory under the National 
Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing agreed at the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) in November 2008. Under the National 
Partnership the Australian Government became the major funder of remote 
Indigenous housing, with States and the Northern Territory responsible for 
delivery. (A.G. & NTG 2009, p.5) 
In mid-2009, the SIHIP program underwent a Government Review (A.G. & NTG 2009) 
resulting in some substantial modifications. We shall refer to the pre-Review phase as 
‘SIHIP Stage 1’ and the post-Review period as ‘SIHIP Stage 2’. 
It should be noted that this program did not fulfil the selection criteria for our case 
studies, in that it was incomplete and was still in a relatively early stage of its life at the 
time of writing up this report. However, the AHURI User Group for our project specially 
sought to have it included due to its unique nature and topical interest to policy-
makers. Data collection for this case study was ceased in June 2010. At this time, the 
trajectory of the program continued to be relatively controversial in the media and its 
future progress and outcomes were in certain ways unpredictable. Because of the 
program’s ongoing currency, all interviewees for this case study have been given 
pseudonyms and, in addition, the pseudonyms for the three senior public servants 
administering the program who were interviewed have been merged to a single set of 
initials (P.S.). 
It is not possible to consider all of the complex pre-planning and program planning for 
SIHIP in this overview, and we must therefore confine ourselves to a summary of the 
main principles and features that are relevant to the current analysis. 
5.2 Early planning history and procurement design of SIHIP 
During 2005–06, the Northern Territory (NT) Minister for Housing, Elliott McAdam, 
was frustrated by the massive escalation in the cost of houses in remote communities 
at that time. Building industry personnel were reported as advising him to program 
larger projects and larger contracts over longer periods of time.62 Even one of the 
strongest critics of SIHIP, NTG Member of Parliament, F.J., has agreed that in remote 
Australia, a housing program must, for ultimate success in terms of capacity-building 
benefits for communities, run on a scale of around 10 years—otherwise little will 
change overall.63  The NT Minister for Housing approached his counterpart in the 
Australian Government to amalgamate funds for a large-scale housing program. By 
February 2007, the funding ‘seed' of SIHIP had been established at about $193 
million. Around March 2007, the first master planning of SIHIP occurred, but it was 
only for housing, not infrastructure, and only four communities were in the program at 
this time.64 
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In June/July 2007, the Little Children are Sacred Report was completed by the NTG 
Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, and had 
a major policy impact in the NT, adding to the argument that child abuse was partly a 
result of household overcrowding. The report catalysed the ‘NT Intervention’ of the 
Howard Government which included more funding for SIHIP. Other catalysing 
dimensions of the program driven by political policy shifts were (i) land tenure reform 
in order to facilitate home-ownership, and (ii) a move to a public housing model for 
remote Aboriginal communities by the NTG (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.14). A bi-lateral 
MOU of late 2007 led to an extra $400+ million to be added to the program, and just 
prior to the national election in late 2007, the program moved from addressing four to 
20 communities. Then, in March 2008, when the new Labor Government was installed, 
the program expanded from 20 communities to 73 communities, or more accurately to 
16 communities for new houses and 57 communities for refurbishments. The final 
SIHIP budget was set at $672 million.65 
In mid-2007, the consulting firm of Connell Wagner was contracted to prepare a 
planning document on the ‘Strategic Intervention Housing Program (SIHP), Program 
Delivery Strategy’ for the NT Government’s (NTG) Territory Housing (T.H.) and the 
Australian Government’s (A.G.) Department of Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). This document (Connell Wagner 2007b) shaped the 
procurement method for the SIHIP housing Program.66 
Connell Wagner generated a clear problem statement (2007b, p.13, p.14) explaining 
why current procurement approaches in remote areas were inefficient due to high 
oncosts and insufficient critical mass in the piecemeal contracts to yield value for 
money which, in turn, resulted in a lack of continued workflow and unsustainable 
employment and training outcomes. Further issues were minimal consideration for 
whole-of-life costing; inappropriate designs and failure of housing management 
regimes; all compounded by an increasing backlog of houses to address the need, 
with subsequent overcrowding of existing stock, resulting in turn, in further 
degradation of existing and new stock. The SIHIP Program aimed to address these 
problems and develop a new best practice approach. The Program objectives were 
stated by Connell Wagner (2007b, p.24) as follows: 
 Housing outcomes. 
The Program provides housing that meets the residents’ needs and effectively 
reduces overcrowding in selected communities. 
 Quality. 
New and existing houses are constructed and refurbished to current NT Public 
Housing and the National Indigenous Housing Guide standards. 
 Time. 
The Commonwealth funded component of the Program is completed by 2013 
and the Northern Territory component of the Program is completed by 2013. 
 Cost. 
The whole-of-life cost of delivering and managing houses is reduced from 
those delivered during 2005–06, through innovation in design and construction 
of housing. 
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 Social and economic outcomes. 
The Program provides opportunities for training and employment of Indigenous 
people to achieve a sustainable workforce in each community for the ongoing 
construction, maintenance and management of housing. 
 Management best practices. 
To implement a stepped chang67 improvement in the delivery of major housing 
programs in the NT and use this as a basis for the delivery of a range of future 
housing programs and schemes. 
 Relationships. 
The achievement of tangible benefits for all parties, including the communities, 
involved in the delivery of the Program through the fostering of positive 
interrelationships. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.24.) 
Connell Wagner evaluated all of the principal procurement methods used in the 
building industry68 (generating a similar list of contract types to that outlined in the 
current authors’ Positioning Paper, see Davidson et al. 2010, Chapter 2). Connell 
Wagner surveyed 24 large project management firms on their use of contracting 
methods for work of this type using a multi-criteria analysis, after which it became 
obvious that all seven of these goals could not be achieved with traditional lump sum 
contracting. Connell Wagner narrowed down the final choice of procurement type to 
‘Managing Contractor’ and ‘Alliance Partnering’. 
In depth consideration of the Construction Management procurement 
approach was had by the Working Group. The concerns of this approach are 
to do with the contracting of trade contractors as subcontractors to the 
Construction Manager. This arrangement makes no incentive for the 
subcontractor to, bring prices down, engage with the community and enter into 
arrangements for a long-term maintenance agreement. Based on these 
matters, the Working Group agreed to discount the Construction Manager from 
further consideration and reduce the ongoing detailed analysis to two options 
being; Managing Contractor and Alliance Partnering. (Connell Wagner 2007b, 
p.18) 
Connell Wagner and their Working Group evaluated these two remaining contracting 
methodologies against their detailed weighted criteria list, which included: 
Integrated teams/services, transparency (open-book), appropriate risk transfer, 
whole of life costing, stakeholder consultation, flexibility for variations, 
continuous improvement, KPI’s (key performance indicators), time—optimised 
programs, appropriate quality, Indigenous E&T (employment and training) 
opportunities. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.18) 
Alliance Partnering scored higher69 than Managing Contractor, and Connell Wagner 
concluded that alliance contracting was the most appropriate method to use for their 
program given the range of ambitious objectives for the program (see above) and the 
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complexity of delivery variables (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.18). This was the first time 
alliance contracting was to be used in Indigenous housing in Australia.70 
Within the analysis of procurement types, a distinction was made between ‘Project 
Alliancing’ and ‘Strategic Alliancing’. ‘Strategic Alliancing’ was chosen and defined as 
follows: 
This is quite simply a series or Program of project alliances and has proved to 
be even more successful than straightforward project alliancing, especially in 
the UK, because the private sector partners are incentivised to perform well 
through the prospect of more work from the Program. However, to achieve this, 
competition is required within the Program between a number of Alliance 
Partners. Therefore, the Program must be big enough (multiple projects) and 
long enough (duration) to provide enough successive project work for three or 
more private sector Alliance Partners. Also, in order to keep competition in the 
process, it is essential to regularly monitor the performance of the Alliance 
Partners through assessment against Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and 
benchmarking between the different partners. All partners sit at a strategic 
level on a ‘panel’ that shares best practice such that any that do fall behind the 
KPIs and benchmarks are able to share best practice with the other partners to 
give them a better chance at improving performance. (Connell Wagner 2007b, 
p.34) 
A final recommendation came from Connell Wagner (2007b, p.18) that a panel with a 
minimum of three ‘one-stop-shop’ Alliance Partners, creating a Strategic Alliance was 
to be adopted. The following Table 7 addresses procurement key criteria indicating 
how Strategic Alliancing was determined to be the most suitable procurement 
approach. 
Table 7: Features of Strategic Alliancing 
Key criteria Strategic Alliance features 
Integrated teams Alliance Partnering allows the engagement of consortia with all the 
skills to deliver the program early in the design process 
Transparency The Alliance Partnering methodology allows the client to see the 
true cost of the works 
Risk transfer The Alliance Partnering brings together the full team to assess and 
mitigate risks 
Whole of Life Costing The Alliance Partnering methodology provides a seamless link to 




Alliance Partnering promotes integrated teams which allows for 
realistic community involvement at an early stage 
Flexibility for variations
71
 As the Alliance Partnering methodology is based on open book 
costs, variations can be easily progressed without tension 
Benchmarking and 
continuous improvement 
The Alliance Partnering methodology allows for continuous 
improvement, and as costs are better understood, methods to 
reduce cost or get better outcomes can be developed 
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Time The Alliance Partnering methodology provides for incentive to beat 
the target cost and hence an incentive to deliver more efficiently 
Quality Appropriate quality can be defined early in the process 
Indigenous employment 
and training 
The early involvement of the community-based business will 
provide realistic business, employment and training opportunities 
Source: Adapted from Connell Wagner (2007b, p.29, p.30). 
Table 8 below indicates how Connell Wagner aligned the program objectives with the 
strategic capacities of the ‘Strategic Alliancing’ procurement method. 
Table 8: Outline of the SIHIP objectives 
Program objectives Procurement strategy 
Housing outcomes Integrated teams to deliver turn-key service, including land 
development and house construction 
Quality Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) involving specialist 
designers, subcontractors and suppliers 
Time Panels of consortia with capacity to deliver 50–100 houses per 
year each 
Cost Achieves ‘Value for Money’ through open-book arrangement in 
development of budgets with separate profit and overheads 
Social & Economic 
outcomes 
Long-term facilities maintenance commitment using local 
Indigenous labour 
Management best practices Non-adversarial framework involving loyal long-term 
partnerships focused on common program outcomes 
Relationships Integrated teams comprising community representatives in a 
collaborative approach 
Source: Adapted from Connell Wagner (2007b:28,29). 
5.3 Economic principles of alliancing in SIHIP 
Connell Wagner wrote of the advantage of alliancing for accurately analysing and 
apportioning costs and profits in procurement: 
‘Value for Money’ shall be ascertained by the Management Team and 
Specialist Consultants through an ‘open-book’ approach with the Alliance 
Partners to set a ‘target cost’ for a project. In this approach direct costs are 
disclosed with pre-agreed profit and overhead rates added. Identified high 
costs can be interrogated to obtain an understanding of the breakdown and a 
collective investigation into means for alternative arrangements to reduce 
costs discussed. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.33) 
This advantage was outlined to the author by the senior public servants in the 
program. Alliancing is in contrast with a lump sum contract, which typically has a 10 
per cent contingency added—the result being that one cannot clearly see where the 
dollars have all gone on the project. In alliancing, all team members can see every 
price and every dollar; an advantage that ultimately provides trust, openness and 
transparency. There is a need to achieve a shared understanding of where margins 
are put in the elemental and sub-contract breakdowns.72 
Despite the logic of the alliancing procurement method in achieving these advantages, 
much effort has nevertheless occurred in the SIHIP to change the conventional culture 
of contract practice, i.e. in persuading all to disclose hidden profit margins, especially 
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among sub-contractors and suppliers at the lower rung of the contract chain. This also 
extends to Aboriginal enterprise groups. A constant task during the program 
administration has been to ascertain where all parties are building in their mark-ups 
and multipliers, and whether or not they should be there in terms of the economic 
rules of alliancing. This role ultimately falls to ‘the commercial manager’ who must 
have visibility.73 
At the outset, an independent auditing firm undertook an Establishment Audit of each 
commercial participant, which calculated the average profit for each successful 
Alliance Partner over the last four years, and this became fixed as a maximum profit 
margin for the SIHIP program. The commercial framework allows for gainshare and 
painshare based on the alliance performance. Good performance is rewarded by a 
share of the savings realised, whereas poor performance will result in a reduction of 
the Alliance Partner fee. However, painshare is capped at the maximum value of the 
fee. In addition, high achievement in relation to non-cost KPIs (key performance 
indicators) can obtain more return from the project.74 
SIHIP Stage 1 included four broad Key Result Areas (KRAs), each of which was in 
turn broken down into a generic list of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and which 
were to be used in calculating the pain and gain bonuses under the alliancing 
agreements. The four KRAs were adapted and individualised to some degree in each 
Alliance Partner’s contract. For example, the author observed (17 June 2009) an 
interesting digital ‘Value-for-money’ assessment exercise for the Wadeye contract 
package by one Alliance team, whereby the options of using existing housing lots and 
carrying out upgrades of existing houses were compared with the option of building 
new houses on new estates, using all of the following KPIs on a computer 
spreadsheet with weighted scores: 
 Housing and settlement outcomes: 
– improve cultural and social fit 
– respond to climate 
– provide safety and security 
– support healthy living practice 
– provide accessibility. 
 Achieve community acceptance. 
 Life performance. 
– improve economic sustainability 
– improve environment sustainability. 
 EWD (employment workforce development): 
– improve Indigenous employment 
– provide career development. 
 Enable cross program cooperation. 
 Reduce overcrowding. 
 Reduce time of delivery. 
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It can be seen how the various capitals which form the various goals, can be all 
assessed and weighted in such a calculation. 75 
One aspect of the financial management of SIHIP was to break the overall program 
into a series of about 12 contract packages of work, ranging in value from about $10–
$70 million dollars. These were to be awarded successively to each alliance, 
dependent on their degree of success in executing the previous package and in 
relation to the performance of the other two competing alliances. Figure 16 below 
shows an early configuration of how these packages may have been awarded (this 
has since changed). 
                                               
75 Note that this VFM spreadsheet has not been used since the SIHIP Review and not on any packages 
since September 2009. 
  83 
Figure 16: Strategic Indigenous Housing Infrastructure Program for Aboriginal 
Communities during SIHIP Stage 1 (early 2009) when there were three Alliance Partners, 
identified here as Nos. 1, 2 and 3 
 
Note the number of alliances and their distribution of packages have since changed. 
Source: Adapted from map by Parsons Brinkenhoff. 
In understanding the cost and value of individual SIHIP houses, the following principal 
break-down elements need to be borne in mind: 
 The alliance management cost—the overheads of the alliances which are spread 
across all project packages. 
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 The project package costs—these are the management costs of a package and 
are called the ‘indirect costs’. 
 The actual costs of work performed on a house, called ‘direct costs’.76 
When average house costs are cited by SIHIP personnel (e.g. $450 000), all three of 
these components make up the cost. In addition, it includes GST and anticipated 
escalation costs over the life of the project, which may be twelve to 18 months. 
At the time of researching this case study, the question had been asked why there 
were differences in cost between the SIHIP and IBA houses that were being built side 
by side at Nguiu on Bathurst Island. The answer was that an IBA house project did not 
share all of the cost features of an SIHIP project house, including the employment 
workforce development (EWD) component, Federal Safety Commissioner (FSC) 
requirements (the 30-year house longevity goal, the forward town-planning costs, the 
community engagement (C.E.) process and miscellaneous administration and auditing 
costs. Similarly, cited costs of NAHS and IHANT project houses did not include many 
of these components either.77 78 
In reflecting on the value of SIHIP houses, the senior Architect of the No. 1 Alliance 
Partner made the following comparative comments about the relative costs of SIHIP 
and NAHS houses. He said that SIHIP houses have this escalation estimate fixed, 
unlike other projects where the funding cycle builds into the additional costs as 
escalation occurs. The impact of the Federal Safety requirements has also increased 
the SIHIP costs; this did not exist under the NAHS Program (its top objectives are 
safety and health). The Alliance on-costs can be a relatively high part of the overall 
budget, but all of the costs are clearly identifiable (including freight, travel, 
construction camps, etc.), and justifiable (whereas many are hidden in a government 
program based on Program Management and lump sum contracts). The base house 
cost under SIHIP is less than it was in the NT in 2007. And although the SIHIP houses 
are including a lot more program and overhead costs in their calculation, they still cost 
less per house than houses built under NAHS at that time. Standardisation and 
economies of scale thus do contribute to the lower cost.79 (See later on other cost 
drivers in SIHIP 2) 
5.4 Program and project governance 
Two levels of program governance were originally designed by Connell Wagner 
(2007b, pp.46–52). The first was that of the ‘Strategic Alliance Leadership Team’ 
(SALT) to administer the program at an executive level which included one 
representative from each Alliance Partner as well as Program Directors and Managers 
etc. It is at this level that the team members write annual reports for their respective 
organisations and are responsible for spreading profit and bearing loss. 80  81  The 
second level was that of a ‘Project Alliance Management Team’ (PAMT) to administer 
each contract package of work involving a specific sum of money for housing in one or 
several specific communities. The first SIHIP call of tender for professional services 
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 Alliance No. 2, 20/05/2010. 
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 GST was claimable under NAHS and IHANT as they were Grant systems and not the provision of non-
creditable supplies, rental housing. 
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 P.S. 28/04/2010. 
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 R.N. Alliance No. 1, 29/04/2010. 
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 P.S. 27/04/2010. 
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within the IPT was in July 2007 for a Program Manager, which was awarded to a 
prominent consulting engineering firm in November of same year.82 
5.4.1 Design coordination 
Connell Wagner identified the need to appoint a Design Coordinator (DC) for the 
program who was to be employed by the Program Director (the Government). The 
primary function of the SIHIP Design Coordinator was to help ensure achievement of 
quality standards in the design of housing solutions for each community. This role 
included liaising with statutory authorities to assist with gaining design documentation 
approvals; monitoring and reporting on Alliance performance with regard to quality 
outcomes (KPIs & benchmarking), and disseminating design best practice as it 
developed internally from the program or from external sources. (Connell Wagner 
2007b, p.49) This role was ongoing at the time of writing. One job of the Design 
Coordinator was to draft the Design Guidelines for the Program (Wigley 2008) which 
built upon a range of base documents including the Building Code of Australia (BCA), 
the National Indigenous Housing Guide (third edition) (FaHCSIA 2007a) and the 
Environmental Health Standards for Remote Communities in the NT (Northern 
Territory Government, Environmental Task Group 2001). 
The SIHIP Design Guidelines contain seven key design objectives (Wigley 2008, p.12) 
which also reflect the influence of the other program objectives, e.g. Employment and 
Workforce Development (EWD), Community Engagement (C.E.) and cost-time 
considerations: 
 Cultural and social fit. 
Culturally distinctive aspect of everyday domestic behaviour. 
 Safety and security. 
Against situations of violence and antisocial behaviour—a sense of ownership 
and personal control. 
 Response to climate 
Regional variations and micro-climatic conditions. 
 Support for healthy living 
Support healthy living practices. 
 Accessibility 
Must achieve visitability in line with Classification C, in AS 4299–1995 
Adaptable Housing. 
 Economically sustainable 
Long-term durability, aim for 30 years life span. 
 Environmentally sustainable 
Communities able to manage housing and its services. 
The Guidelines make reference either implicitly or explicitly to a number of social 
capitals. Implicit references to strengthening cultural identity are embedded in the 
Design Objective titled ‘Cultural and Social Fit’ which emphasised the need to design 
domiciliary environments that are supportive of traditional behaviours and lifestyles 
(Wigley 2008, pp.13–19). Design Objective 4, ‘Support Healthy Living Practices’ 
(Wigley 2008, pp.28–29) outlines precepts based on the well-known research of 
Nganampa et al. (1987) and Pholeros et al. (1993). The Design Objective No. 6, 
‘Economic Sustainability’ contains explicit reference to ‘Employment and skills 
development’. 
                                               
82 P.S. 27/04/2010. 
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The Guidelines also include a complete section on ‘Settlement Planning’, which 
includes both implicit and explicit reference to the planning of housing layouts to suit 
socio-spatial clustering of kinship groups (Wigley 2008, p.41, p.42), a planning 
technique that also generates social capital and cultural identity maintenance. In the 
Design Guidelines there is also a passing reference to ‘cluster housing’ as a possible 
housing outcome for an extended family. This option has also been taken up by the 
Alliance Partners (see later). 
The senior architect of the No. 1 Alliance Partner was to later state that the Design 
Coordinator’s SIHIP Design Guidelines ‘is a very good document—an improvement 
on the NAHS guidelines which appeared to have been based on the NT 
Environmental Health Standards’. 83  This was also confirmed by a professional 
counterpart in No. 2 Alliance Partner.84 
5.4.2 Reducing crowding 
Reducing overcrowding 85 in Aboriginal communities was one of the main drivers of 
the SIHIP program, as prescribed by SIHIP objective No. 1 (see earlier). In SIHIP 
Stage 1, a variety of design techniques were identified by the Design Coordinator and 
the Values Manager to alleviate crowding and were being adapted for measuring the 
reduction of crowding achieved by the Alliance Partners, including assessments of 
private space, social spaces, wet areas and neighbourhood spaces.86 In SIHIP Stage 
1, the reduction of overcrowding was to be an alliance KPI. 
5.4.3 Planned local community involvement 
The generation of community capitals from the procurement process was clearly 
embedded in the alliancing plan. In their report, Connell Wagner explained how 
community-based outcomes were to be spread across a number of the SIHIP goals. 
[Program] objective four recognises that for whole of life costs to be achieved, 
communities need to be engaged in the long-term maintenance of housing 
stock. This infers objective five must also be achieved and refers directly to the 
development of sustainable employment and training outcomes in building a 
maintenance labour pool. Objective six commits to a step change process 
involving active engagement of the community fitting within this Program 
Delivery Strategy as a best practise model. Objective seven aims to develop 
long-term relationships with the communities to achieve tangible benefits for all 
parties. A real commitment that will involve Community Engagement 
specialists to foster cross-cultural relationships in addition to construction 
delivery services is required in order for these Program Objectives to be 
realised. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.62) 
The senior public servants on the project have described how the community was to 
have some ownership over the contract packages, e.g. in design, tenancy, housing 
mix, employment, training, and how the Alliance Partners must deal with local 
community governance, Shires, local contractors, and sub-contractors. There was to 
be use of Local Industry Participation Plans (LIPPs), and a goal to incorporate 
regional and local NT tenderers for sub-contracts; it was government policy to engage 
local firms, particularly Indigenous ones.87 
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Education and training were to be foundation elements of the program, to ensure 
ongoing opportunities for local Aboriginal workers to engage in the SIHIP program, as 
Connell Wagner prescribed: 
Education and Training is a major objective at all levels of the Program. At the 
Project Director level the CRC [Community Relations Coordinator] in close 
consultation with the Education and Training Coordinator (E.T.C.) (Australian 
Government Rep.) will identify and access [government] funds to develop and 
support long-term training in the communities to CERT III in Building and 
Construction and Business Administration as a minimum. Where possible 
other trade certificates will be encouraged if the right candidates and support 
networks are available. This will require a continuity of work in line with the 
training program. The proposal to maintain the Alliance Partner in the 
community for at least a period of two years will facilitate completion of 
education and training programs and maximise usage of available community 
resources … (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.65) 
The issue concerning the ongoing repairs and maintenance (R&M) of houses in 
communities after SIHIP was flagged by Connell Wagner, together with the 
prospective growth of an Aboriginal R&M industry: 
It is proposed that an agreement is reached with the Alliance Partners in which 
either they stay in the community to assume a long-term maintenance role for 
a two [to] five year period or they facilitate handover to local SME [small to 
medium enterprises]. A local SME could be “incubated” through the 
management structure of the alliance members (and assistance from the SIHP 
Management Team) developed for this purpose. (Connell Wagner 2007b, 
p.34)88 
The program also thus identified the need to support small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) in the targeted communities. 
The community market sounding activities undertaken indicated a diverse level 
of capacity to participate at the labour market level, SME involvement level, 
and management capacity level within local communities. It was apparent that 
for communities to achieve the social and economic outcomes desired there 
would need to be a range of innovative engagement and support initiatives 
developed at the community level. The Australian Government and the 
Northern Territory Government have a range of programs designed to assist 
with this but ultimate responsibility for the success of local community 
involvement will fall to the [program and project management] teams. It is for 
this reason that both teams contain Community Relationship Consultants. 
(Connell Wagner 2007b, p.62) 
Connell Wagner also identified the issues surrounding ‘life after SIHIP’, namely if 
capacity was built in Indigenous communities in terms of skills and enterprises, how 
could it be sustained in the long-term after the program ceases? 
A core objective of the Program … is to achieve long-term sustainable training 
and employment opportunities for local Indigenous communities. Alliance 
Partners will be expected to train and employ a local workforce in each 
community but this workforce will not have ongoing employment after the 
completion of the refurbishment works of three years duration, unless a 
maintenance budget is allocated to this Program … It should also be noted 
that the market sounding included … maintenance organisations who are very 
                                               
88
 The subsequent policy framework set out in the National Partnership Agreement was to later address 
this issue. 
  88 
keen to be involved in this Program. They would likely team up with NT based 
builders but would have limited opportunity to do so unless there is a medium 
to long-term commitment to maintenance funding for these communities. 
(Connell Wagner 2007b, p.9) 
Connell Wagner foresaw the desirability of the two governments (A.G. & NTG) to pre-
plan further contracting opportunities in the post-SIHIP period. ‘The alliance panel 
should be flexible enough to allow future community projects not in the current 
Program to be added …’ (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.38). The failure to incorporate 
such additional contracts was a point of contention for some parties at the time of 
writing. 
Connell Wagner (2007b, p.45) also recommended that where there was geographical 
proximity of communities and a possibility for Aboriginal workers to operate across 
these communities, that the work in such communities be clustered into contract 
‘packages’ to achieve a suitable scale of work for an Alliance Partner. This was to be 
reflected in the plan for the Alliance teams. 
It is to be noted that some of these objectives set out by Connell Wagner on improving 
community capitals through housing procurement were later incorporated into the 
‘National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing’ of the Council of 
Australian Governments that was released in early 2009 (COAG, 2009). 
5.4.4 Engaging the Alliance Partners/or teams 
A rationale was presented by Connell Wagner to contract and create three ‘one-stop-
shop’ Alliance Partners or teams (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.33). Twenty-four EOIs 
from proposed alliance teams were thus reduced to a shortlist of five and then, in late 
2008, three of them were invited to participate in Alliance Partner contracts, in keeping 
with Connell Wagner’s original recommendation. However, competition was to be 
engendered between the three Alliance Partners in the way these contract ‘packages’ 
were to be awarded. 
The Management Team was to award each Alliance Partner with one community in 
the first year and then subsequent contract packages each year of the program based 
on regular monitoring of performance. Should one partner perform poorly during the 
duration of the program, having three panel members gave the option to remove this 
partner from the program and still retain competition between the two remaining 
partners. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.38). This caveat proved appropriate as in March 
2010 one of the Alliance Partners was removed from the program by government. 
5.4.5 Risk identification and allocation 
Connell Wagner identified some of the program risks as well as the alliancing principle 
of collective (owner/contractor) management of risk as follows: 
This Program has a large number of stakeholders, a complex approvals 
process and involves remote areas with high-risk logistical and weather issues. 
This is one of the key reasons that the alliancing procurement approach was 
selected as the preferred procurement methodology for this Program. 
Alliancing allows for collective management of these unpredictable risks during 
the ECI (Early Contractor Involvement) design development stage. The 
“design-freeze” point only occurs when the PAMT (Project Alliance 
Management Team) believe that sufficient risk has been mitigated and agree 
that they are happy with the proposals for risk allocation from that point 
forward. At this point in time, immediately before the target cost is agreed, the 
risk allocation should be sensible … (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.74). 
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Risk mapping and mitigation was commenced in the Connell Wagner Report (see 
Table 9 below)—a process repeated many times during the contract period using a 
Risk Register. Achieving the program’s social capitals, which are clearly embedded in 
its goals, constitutes a major component of the risk ‘map’. 
Table 9: Initial risk assessment and control measures as reported at the outset of SIHIP 
Objectives Possible risk in relation to objective Mitigation/control 
Housing 
outcomes 
Does not meet needs of community 
and reduce overcrowding 
Engage community in all aspects of 
planning—Community Relation 
Coordinator (CRC) to be key 
support to Project Manager (PM). 
Quality  Standards are not achieved Alliance contractual arrangement 
would penalise poor 
workmanship/defects. 
 Design documentation is not followed Onsite Construction. 
Superintendent provided by Project 
Director (PD). 
Time Decisions are not made in timely 
manner 
Appointed PD will have appropriate 
delegation powers and authority. 
 Program delivery does not occur to 
schedule 
Appointed PM will have sufficient 
skills and resources to drive 
program to targets. 
Cost Whole of life is not achieved Maintenance arrangement included 
in alliance partnership. 
 Design innovation and construction is 
not implemented 
Alliance procurement methodology 




Overall participation of Indigenous 
people in housing programs does not 
improve 
Community engagement specialists 
are part of all management teams 
to support existing capacity and 
develop new approaches. 
 Indigenous people’s residual capacity 
to participate in ongoing programs 
does not improve 
Inclusion of both an employment & 
training (E&T) representative at PD 




Delivery of housing is not improved Procurement delivery strategy must 
be developed using current 
international best practice. 
 Program structure is not transferable 
across communities 
Communication and engagement 
frameworks have been developed 
and will be continually evaluated. 
Relationships Tangible benefits are not achieved for 
all parties: 
a) Government 
b) Alliance Partners 
c) Communities. 
(a) Alliance risk sharing model is 
best for Program Objectives, (b) 
Open book, pain/gain and long-term 
work fosters non-adversarial 
relations, (c) Active participation is 
fundamental to Program 
performance (KPIs). 
 Develop negative relations/feelings of 
exclusion 
Community engagement has been 
built into all processes and 
management structures. 
Source: Adopted from Connell Wagner (2007b, pp.74–75). 
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5.5 The Alliance Partners 
Note that the identities of the final two Alliance Partners who were engaged in SIHIP 
at the time of the analysis, have been kept anonymous in this analysis and they are 
simply referred to as the No. 1 and No. 2 Alliances. 
The No.1 Alliance Partner was appointed on 26 October 2008 to deliver its first 
package for the Tiwi Islands ‘Originally we were a very small team and it took six 
months to build a large team’; it took virtually one year’s work (2009) to develop the 
c.$38 million package. This intense preparation period was metaphorically described 
as building a ship by the Project Team Leader as follows: ‘… have to build the oil 
carrier, get it to port, fill it, get it out of port and under steam—this has taken one 
year’.89 
This Alliance Partner was anchored in a long-standing relation between two 
construction firms who already had a track record of targeting selected projects of 
significance as joint ventures. All specialist consultants such as architects, engineers, 
project managers and community management personnel were then engaged into the 
Alliance Partnership. At the time of interview, there were about 60 staff in the Darwin 
office of No. 1 Alliance Partner, led by a senior architect (R.N.) who had a lifetime 
career in Aboriginal housing work. The Alliance Partner Manager reflected thus on his 
team: 
We had a strong work relation with [the other engineering firm] from past 
experience—the same workplace values—this flows through the other entities 
we put in the Alliance. Need a couple of very strong personalities—otherwise 
will get fluffy and not achieve. Selection of an Alliance Partner is incredibly 
difficult. You need to hand pick what sort of people are in the team. [Then] to 
get people to actually fit—we made two mistakes—choosing people/entities 
with the wrong philosophy—they were [soon] moved out … In our Alliance we 
have still got everyone we started with—this is our strength … ”90 
Housing evaluation research suggests masonry provides the most durable shell for 
Aboriginal housing longevity. The Ritek masonry wall system was chosen by the No. 1 
Alliance Partner for both longevity and to maximise Aboriginal employment. The Ritek 
system involves a frame of PVC/aluminium ‘joists’ with 6mm (f.c.) sheeting as insitu 
form work. Vertical and horizontal bars are inserted and then concrete is poured into 
the cavities. The Ritek system has the advantages of a prefabricated kit system and is 
easy to erect without resorting to complex fixtures. Although a lack of literacy and 
numeracy may preclude many Aboriginal workers from carrying out the initial set-out 
on the concrete slab, nevertheless some Aboriginal workers in the Alliance have 
gained these skills.91 The ‘Ritek’ masonry building system, because of its relative 
simplicity and ease of use, has been evaluated and promoted as an SIHIP asset to 
community enterprise development. 
The No. 2 Alliance was led by a large Australian construction firm that had 60 per cent 
control, with the smaller partners including an engineering firm and a company from 
Western Australia that was partly Aboriginal-owned having some 250 Indigenous 
employees. This Alliance Partner was awarded its first packages in Tennant Creek, 
Central Australia and at Wadeye.92 Wadeye was one of the largest discrete remote 
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Aboriginal settlements in Australia and, at the time, had a range of social problems, 
with one of the highest overcrowding rates in Australia. 
The following Table 10 shows the various approved and proposed contract packages 
and the prescribed distribution of new houses, rebuild houses and refurbished houses 
in the SIHIP program as of early 2009 (extracted from working document, subject to 
revision; read in conjunction with map in Figure 16). 
Table 10: SIHIP planning data in early 2009 
Package nos. New Rebuilds Refurbs Sub-totals 
Approved packages: 
1. Tiwi Islands (stage 1) 29 88 127 244 
2. Tennant Creek Town Camps 2 78 - 80 
4. Groote Eylandt (stage 1) 26 50 25 101 
4. Groote Eylandt (stage 2) 54 - - 54 
5. Maningrida 109 16 79 204 
5. Minjilang - - 31 31 
5. Warruwi - - 47 47 
8. Galiwinku 90 22 83 195 
Packages under development: 
1. Tiwi Islands (stage 2) 61 - - 61 
12. Alice Springs Town Camps 85 50 100 235 
6. Wadeye 105 28 77 210 
6. Nganmarriyanga - - 26 26 
6. Peppimenarti - - 23 23 
6. Nauiya - - 43 43 
7. Gunbalanya 62 10 50 122 
7. Acacia Larrakia, Belyuen - - 37 37 
3A. Southern Region 
Refurbishments 
- - 757 757 
Note that several other Packages were also developed later in 2009, including P10, Ngukurr and 
surrounds, and P11, Lajamanu and surrounds. It should also be noted that some of these figures have 
changed as the program has evolved. 
5.6 The early package scoping and its issues 
In terms of developing community briefs for contract packages, Connell Wagner 
simply stipulated that: 
Individual programs will depend on the amount and type of work required in 
each community and the Alliance Partner shall have the capacity to undertake 
design and construction of works such as infrastructure and land development. 
(Connell Wagner 2007b, p.33) 
For package brief development, the Program Owner (A.G. & NTG) first issued a 
Package Scoping Proposal (PSP), i.e. a request to the Alliance Partner to submit a 
Package Return Brief (PRB). The Alliance teams then had to submit a PRB that 
demonstrated how they would do the work. Then, if the government accepted the 
PRB, the team proceeded to prepare the Package Development Report (PDR).93 The 
Alliance Partners then submitted the PDR, similar to a feasibility study and outlining 
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the proposed extent of work in the Package and the various housing product 
outcomes as well as other outcomes and KPIs, such as employment and training, all 
conforming to the design guidelines prepared by the Design Coordinator.94 
In SIHIP Stage 1, the scoping of the extent of work in each community was thus not 
initially prescribed by the Owner (A.G. & NTG) but left up to each Alliance Partner to 
determine, being guided by the SIHIP goals and through a process of intense 
community engagement. 
This engineer explained how the team members of Alliance Partner No. 2 ‘ … spent 
time to do necessary assessment at a whole community/town level; [we] did a full 
demographic study—social mapping had not been done before; even mapped where 
the gangs are. [We] managed to get 22 family groups to make joint decisions (nobody 
had done that before) … What we did at Wadeye was very good. A value for money 
matrix done initially—using software. Various options compared. $70 million of 
infrastructure now going in’.95 
The Manager of the No. 1 Alliance described their experience as follows: 
We certainly did not understand [the scope] at first. We assumed government 
knew the scope. But we had to develop up the numbers. This was new to us. 
The whole thing was a moving target a lot of uninformed stakeholders entering 
through the process. But [Alliance No. 1] had a better database at the time of 
developing the first PDR than the T.H. (Territory Housing); we could tell them 
who was living in each house—e.g. if it would split into two residences or 
would it stay as one, together as a single group (extended family)? We 
achieved an in-depth understanding of community needs. And of products: 
fittings, fixtures, materials—a big effort was made. Without the alliancing 
model, you cannot do that; you won’t get a quality outcome … If a consultant 
did this, they would remain disconnected; but with the Alliance approach, the 
designers, constructors and the owner are making joint decisions to get the 
best results.96 
The No. 1 Alliance senior architect also commented later on infrastructure planning 
and design as a hidden risk factor in the program that was only revealed in the early 
stages of Alliance engagement and briefing. 
… We started identifying that the infrastructure was in such poor condition in 
many communities—we had to do infrastructure planning by default—e.g. 
headworks for water. For example, at Maningrida, Nguiu, Galiwin’ku, 
headworks, ponds, bores etc. are needed. Separate additional funding is only 
just arriving now for this. The scoping of such works is done in all the 
communities where we are working.97 
One of the advantages of the large-scale contract packages was the flexibility and 
capacity to incorporate holistic planning and design that encompassed everything 
from settlement infrastructure on the one hand to targeted socio-economic capitals on 
the other. 
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5.7 Identification and engagement of socio-economic 
capitals 
The identification of Aboriginal socio-economic capitals began early in the SIHIP 
program. The front end of the program went beyond the process of preparing in-depth 
design briefs, to one of extended Community Engagement (C.E.) as originally 
stipulated by Connell Wagner: 
Community consultation needs to commence at the front end of the Program 
to maximise the community participation rates. This requires the Management 
Team to determine the willingness of each community and their capacity to 
participate in the Program. This engagement should identify whether a labour 
pool is available as a minimum level of participation or if an SME [small to 
medium enterprise] exists which could subcontract with the Alliance 
Partners … Prior to the commencement of construction, the Management 
Team accompanied by the Alliance Partners will consult the community to 
develop participation frameworks with the goal of developing a sustainable 
workforce through the new build works. This workforce can then remain in the 
community and undertake refurbishment works with a link to long-term 
maintenance arrangements. (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.39) 
The No. 2 Alliance’s Community Engagement and Employment Workforce 
Development Manager described how her team used a wide range of best practice 
C.E. techniques … ‘a whole set of tools including Cultural Protocol Handbook for each 
community, newsletters, before and after photo boards, and a cross-cultural training 
course; also community meetings and bus tours (people love them) of new works and 
a barbecue to look at finished works before handover’. 98 The No. 1 Alliance’s good 
practice in Community Engagement Strategy was outlined as follows: 
1. Background research on the people, before any community visits (various team 
members already had strong links to communities). 
2. When visiting, listen to all issues; establish relationships with stakeholders; 
become recognised as a face and an organisation—use of the Alliance uniform 
and logo. 
3. Introduce ourselves and our methodology: ‘We shall be honest and open with you. 
If impacts occur on the program, we will let you know. We might have to say there 
may be “things you don’t like”, because government has imposed rules, but we 
advise them “you can challenge government if you don’t agree. We shall try to fit 
your expectations to our package brief’. 
4. Plans, models, and house walk-throughs were the best-practice techniques 
utilised for design consultation and development. 
5. Post occupancy evaluations (POEs) are carried out recording both positive and 
negative comments; but noting that all idiosyncratic preferences cannot be 
addressed.99 
6. Feedback on progress to community. Maximum community engagement occurs to 
get up to the Package Development Report (PDR) stage, then there is a gap 
between the PDR approval and the construction camp establishment; this can be 
several months at least whilst waiting for approvals, but there is a need to 
maintain feedback in that period. So regular Housing Reference Group (HRG) 
meetings are held (the HRG is primarily a Housing Management reference entity 
set-up by Territory Housing as part of its rental policy management policy). A story 
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book is used to detail the house construction process, which each HRG member 
takes back to their families. 
The senior architect of Alliance Partner No. 1 gave the view that many observers 
‘think consultation is at the beginning, but it is an ongoing process—often there is little 
recognition of the value that local people contribute to the process, e.g. at Nguiu there 
have been about 20 meetings of its HRG. These meetings have a positive impact on 
housing knowledge—members of the HRG develop a critical analytical capacity’ (R.N. 
29 April 2010). This knowledge is gained and exercised around decision-making, 
trade-offs, briefings and design translation by the community’s consultative housing 
group (HRG). This is an important governance capacity generated by the process, 
leaving behind a type of housing governance group in the community. 
5.7.1 Employment capital in SIHIP 
Generating Indigenous employment was an overall SIHIP goal, as well as being 
embedded in the Design Guidelines. 
In addition to construction and housing management employment 
opportunities there are a range of semi-skilled and part time employment 
opportunities that should be considered by consultants, [e.g.] the local 
manufacture of building components such as: internal storage units; basic 
household furniture; external storage containers; raised decking platforms for 
outdoors; and curtains or blinds. (Wigley 2008, p.34) 
The Design Coordinator also made a passing reference in the Program Design 
Guidelines to the fact that Alliances are to report on ‘the ease of assembly’ of houses, 
the inference being whether the construction approach is achievable within future 
Aboriginal construction practice. Part of the SIHIP program has addressed this latter 
criterion.100 
At the time of writing, both Alliance Partners had generated strong economic capital 
for the targeted communities in their contract packages with respect to employment, 
which was identified as EWD (employment workforce development) in the SIHIP 
language. DEEWR not only provided funding but allowed one of their senior staff to be 
seconded into the SIHIP Program Management Team to assist with EWD outcomes. 
Table 11 below indicates the official FaHCSIA Indigenous employment figures in mid-
May 2010, for both Alliances in total. 
Table 11: Summary of SIHIP’s Aboriginal Employment and Workforce Development (as 
at 11 May 2010) 
EMPLOYMENT AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT 
 Current Indigenous 
employment 
Indigenous Full-time Equivalent since 
commencement (per cent of total workforce) 
Total 213  
Average Total  37% 
Source: P.C. from Kristi Stinson and Bianca Birdsall, FaHCSIA, 21/5/10). 
In attempting to assess the SIHIP employment outcomes in quantitative terms, efforts 
were made to identify Indigenous employment figures on other housing projects, but it 
seems that employment has never been well tracked nor systematically recorded for 
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comparison in the Indigenous housing sector. It is hypothesised that SIHIP will 
generate more Aboriginal employment than any previous Indigenous housing program, 
but this is only conjectural and depends on how terms such as ‘program’ and 
‘employment’ are defined and interpreted. 
The Manager of the No. 1 Alliance Partner noted that EWD in their Tiwi package 
resulted in higher than 50 per cent Aboriginal employment in the package contract 
workforce.  
The drivers are not in conventional tendering to do this [high sustained 
Indigenous employment] and there is a lack of understanding how to do it as 
an ongoing interactive process. There are many small steps to learn: e.g. pick 
the workers up; in the morning meals including breakfast; create a critical 
mass who want to come to work, then more want to join; engage mentors in 
the community (works well); use local Indigenous employment brokers and 
support that employer broker with capacity building systems … etc. These are 
all the ingredients we need—package it all together to make it work.101 
The Senior Architect of No. 1 reported that ‘at Nguiu, in April 2010, some 62 to 64 
were Tiwi Aboriginal people. The Construction Camp contained 60-odd Tiwi people, 
and sometimes as high as 80 people. This was the whole workforce including cooks, 
drivers, cleaners, safety officers. Most Aboriginal staff are local Tiwi. At the start 
everyone in the Tiwi communities said Tiwi people do not want to work, but this has 
been proved wrong’.102 The Senior Architect explained further aspects: 
The Project Manager and Site Manager meet with workers’ families to uncover 
any recurring Aboriginal employee absenteeism issues: issues such as cultural 
avoidance, peer group pressure (shame), having other priorities (e.g. court, 
community service hours), whereby they typically have not told anyone. We 
use Aboriginal mentors to find out what’s going on. Then the Manager visits 
the family, and sorts out the issue and makes allowance for it. For example, an 
individual keeps their working pay and does an extra two hours a day to do 
community service in the construction camp. This was an absolute first in my 
experience.103 
5.7.2 Generating enterprise capital in SIHIP 
In their original design of the SIHIP program, Connell Wagner (2007b, pp.50–51) 
identified the possible inclusion of Aboriginal enterprises in the Project Alliance 
Management Teams (PAMTs), having the potential status of a ‘community SME’ 
(small to medium enterprise). The early SIHIP call for EOIs, addressed Indigenous 
enterprise groups and sought out sound Indigenous leadership in such registrations of 
interest. At the time of writing this report, the following Indigenous enterprises were 
being identified by the Alliance Partners as gaining a good track record within the 
SIHIP program. 
 Tiwi Enterprises 
The No. 1 Alliance partner had engaged with ‘Tiwi Enterprises’ who provided the 
employment and labour hire service, not only in the Tiwi Islands but also for 
separate imminent packages at other communities because there was no 
equivalent employment broker there. Tiwi Enterprise was to run the employees’ 
payroll for Galiwin’ku and Maningrida. 
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 GEBIE Civil and Construction (GCC) 
The Anindilyakwa Land Council had formed ‘GEBIE Civil and Construction’ under 
a Sub-Alliance to Alliance Partner No 1. It was to undertake all housing 
refurbishment and rebuild activity on Groote Eylandt and Bickerton Island and the 
construction of the Umbakumba subdivision. 
 Bathurst Island Housing Association (BIHA) 
Alliance No. 1 have given a number of Stage 2 houses to BIHA to build using the 
Ritek building system—four or five by the end of 2010, together with advice.104 
The benefits of the Ritek system—it is one of the greatest Alliance 
benefits—a community [who learns to use it] should not need a contractor 
to build a house again. It is a simple basic system; a modular solution—
and robust. In addition to the walls, pre-cut timber truss components are 
brought from Darwin. A mobile plant is taken to the community. Local 
labour is used to cut the timber and press plates. Every house has the 
same standard truss. These skills are left behind. This part of the process 
is undersold. Block houses take a higher skill level [than Ritek].105 
 Ingerreke Aboriginal Corporation 
In Alice Springs—were contracted by the No. 1 Alliance to do the first four 
renovations. This organisation wanted to build capacity and obtain a lion’s share of 
the SIHIP work. They formerly did a lot of the Community Clean-up contracts.106 At 
the time of writing, Ingerreke was also employed by No 2 Alliance as a sub-
contractor on Package 3a, the Southern Region refurbishments.107  
 Tangentyere Council 
The No. 1 Alliance Partner engaged Tangentyere Design as an architectural sub-
consultant for the Alice Springs Town Camps, as well as Tangentyere 
Employment Services. At the time of writing, this employment agency had 24 
people in pre-employment start—which involved six weeks of training. 
 Thamurrur Aboriginal Corporation 
No. 2 Alliance Partner was also generating partnerships with Aboriginal entities 
and endeavouring to create offshoot Aboriginal businesses, with its biggest 
success story (at the time of writing) emerging at Wadeye. At the commencement 
of SIHIP, Thamurrur at Wadeye were developing a pre-fab tilt-up concrete panel 
house. SIHIP will allow Thamurrur to gross up to $30 million in two years. In April 
2010, Thamurrur had employed an additional 20 men on top of their base staff. No. 
2 Alliance had placed some of their own personnel in the Thamurrur team to 
increase their capacity. At the time of writing, they were being offered a production 
engineer. Thamurrur provided other services besides panel manufacture, e.g. 
plant machinery hire and general construction labour force.108 
 Julalikari Council 
Julalikari Council had been engaged by No. 2 Alliance for contracts for R&M for 
town camps and outstations in and around in Tennant Creek—but were in need of 
improved systems and permanent staff. At the time of writing, No. 2 Alliance was 
making attempts to provide them with capacity-building personnel.109 
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 Trades sub-contractors 
The Alliance Partners have engaged some Indigenous tradesmen in one-off 
businesses as well as encouraging non-Indigenous tradesmen to employ 
Aboriginal apprentices (e.g. the 50% plus Indigenous employment on Bathurst 
Island includes sub-contracts). 
In general, it was found that a number of the above enterprises made an initial self-
assessment that was over-confident of their capacities; it was found in many cases 
that they had a lack of industry standards (including in some cases safety standards), 
management systems, and/or professionalism in contracting. 110  Once these 
shortcomings had been identified, the Alliance Partners worked to provide capacity-
building services, including embedding their own staff for a period with particular 
enterprises. 
Another category of spin-off asset/enterprise combination from SIHIP which was being 
negotiated at the time of writing, was the possible provision of the Alliance Partners’ 
construction camps to community-based organisations after SIHIP, to be recycled for 
alternate uses e.g. for a tourist resort in one case.111 
The author (P.M.) inquired as to whether an Indigenous enterprise group may 
generally rise to become a full alliance partner with work on several packages and 
come to sit on the ALT (Alliance Leadership Team which is the alliance’s Board of 
Directors). The senior architect of Alliance No. 1 commented that the Land Council on 
Groote Eylandt had been talking about being at least a sub-Alliance partner. This 
Council had catering and construction arms or enterprises, and was in a short-term 
agreement to be a sub-contractor. But they did need a capacity-building model that 
would allow them to scale up gradually.112 At the time of finalising this case study 
(August 2010), and as noted above, the Aboriginal Land Council had formed a Sub-
Alliance to deliver refurbishments,113 through a business entity named GEBIE114 Civil 
and Construction (GCC) which was engaged in taking on project risk as well as 
Federal Safety Commissioner requirements. GEBIE refers to the Groote Eylandt and 
Bickerton Island Enterprises. 
5.7.3 SIHIP health capitals 
In the SIHIP Design Guidelines (Wigley 2008, pp.28–29), under Design Objective 4, 
‘Support Healthy Living Practices’, the Design Coordinator outlined environmental 
health design criteria based on the well-known research of Nganampa et al. (1987) 
and Pholeros et al. (1993), as well as the National Indigenous Housing Guide 
(FaHCSIA 2007a). A key intellectual and practice leader in this specialised field of 
environmental health, architect Paul Pholeros (P.P.), was selected by the program to 
act as an independent auditor of the Alliance design documents to ensure that the 
many criteria of supporting healthy living practices were adhered to. 
At the time of writing, the SIHIP program was not sufficiently advanced to comment 
very much on specific human health outcomes. House health hardware components 
were being carefully reviewed in the design process. Some environmental health 
features of yard design were being curtailed by new budget restrictions imposed after 
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the SIHIP Review. 115  Although many houses were of slab construction on earth 
platforms, there was little shaping of sites and minimal yard landscaping to provide 
controlled surface-water run-off from houses in heavy rainfall.116 This was supported 
by Paul Pholeros who stated that the loss of external features such as verandah 
space, house edge details and yard furnishings were expected to ultimately have an 
adverse impact on capacity to reduce overcrowding.117 
However, it will only be at the end of the program that an objective evaluation will be 
possible concerning the overall health outcomes and the associated impacts of any 
shifts of priority in the program. 
5.8 The SIHIP Review 
In mid-2009 a review was commissioned by the Australian and NT Governments to 
assess how to improve the Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program 
(SIHIP). The review analysed the performance of the program, particularly in 
response to Australian Government and public concerns that: 
The program [had] been slow to deliver housing (timing); the governance of 
the program [was] overly bureaucratic (governance); and the program [was] 
too costly (total cost), including that the costs of houses under the program 
(unit cost) and program administration (administrative cost) [were] too high. 
(A.G. & NTG 2009, p.5) 
In relation to program timing, some of the review’s critical findings were: 
 There had been a three month delay against original timeframes in commencing 
work in the first three nominated locations, Groote Eylandt, the Tiwi Islands and 
Tennant Creek; and that this delay was largely due to underestimates by the 
Integrated Program Team of the time required to develop the initial packages of 
works. 
 SIHIP lead times for construction were less than those under the most recent 
large scale Australian Government remote Indigenous housing program, the 
National Aboriginal Health Strategy 2 (NAHS 2), which commenced in 2001. 
 That there would always be a lead time between project initiation and 
commencement of construction in any given location, but that this period would be 
minimised now that the program was fully established. 
 That from 2010 for each year of the Program, SIHIP would build more than double 
the number of houses built on average over the last five years. (A.G. & NTG 2009, 
p.6) 
The reviewers determined that the overall program design was sound, and argued 
that while certain high-level aspects of the program had to be modified, these flaws 
had been identified early enough to ensure that the program could still meet its 
objectives within the original timeframe. Specific reference was made to the SIHIP 
program targets of 750 houses, 230 rebuilds and 2500 refurbishments. (A.G. & NTG 
2009, p.5) 
The reviewers asserted that an imbalance had emerged between program objectives, 
whereby design and community engagement were elevated to the detriment of the 
unit cost required to achieve program targets, thereby skewing program outcomes 
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(A.G. & NTG 2009, p.5, p.6). Within this review the issue of large houses for extended 
families emerged. One contract administrator commented that in SIHIP Stage 1, due 
to the open nature of the brief, community consultation resulted in many requests for 
large houses for extended families and large households with high costs per unit.118 
The review gave a direction to reduce unit costs in future contract packages while still 
ensuring that all houses complied with the Building Code of Australia and the National 
Indigenous Housing Guide. A revised average unit cost of $450 000 per new house 
was agreed between the Owner and the Alliances. By making all of these 
modifications it was asserted that program management costs would be reduced from 
11.4 per cent to 8 per cent of the program budget over the life of the program. (A.G. & 
NTG 2009, p.7, p.8) As well as fixing the final average new house cost at $450 000, 
an additional sum for yard works (fences, carport, etc.) was allocated. The new 
targets are set out in Table 12 below. 
Table 12: Revised numerical house targets and average unit costs for the SIHIP 
program, following the SIHIP Review of mid-2009 










Source: P.S. 27/4/10. 
The Stage 1 open-ended briefs (but nevertheless, set within economic parameters) 
with the mix of new houses, rebuilds and refurbishments, as well as the size and 
design of houses decided on a local needs assessment, were thus replaced by a 
numerically prescribed brief (Table 12), to be achieved with a limited albeit still 
adequate portfolio of designs. It was asserted that by meeting these targets and 
building more houses suited to different family types (albeit a more limited range of 
family types), crowding reduction would be achieved. 
Nevertheless, despite these changes, the original baseline house established in SIHIP 
Stage 1 stayed much the same. It had been originally prescribed as having an 
enclosed area of 80 square metres and a combined set of open-roofed and semi-
enclosed spaces of 90 square metres (total 170 square metres), with the enclosed 
space containing a minimum of two multi-functional spaces (e.g. bedrooms of 17.5 
square metres), and two bathrooms and a laundry. At the time of SIHIP Stage 1, this 
house had less floor area than the equivalent costed IHANT (c.2007) design of 
between 180 to 200 square metres. However the SIHIP Review removed the extent of 
open-roofed and semi-enclosed spaces, while the enclosed area stayed much the 
same. The SIHIP Stage 2 portfolio baseline house design became about 100 square 
metres plus 25 to 30 square metres of verandah space with a minimum of three 
bedrooms and two bathrooms, living space and laundry. A key positive noted by one 
Public Servant was that the SIHIP program retained a mix of housing types and was 
not just confined to a three-bedroom house.119 
In the post-review stage of SIHIP, the approved design portfolios of the Alliances thus 
contained one, two and three-bedroom houses, duplexes (also with a range of 
number of bedrooms), and single men’s flats. At least 50 per cent of houses were to 
be three-bedroom houses. This shift in briefing was arguably a response to the 
intense media scrutiny that SIHIP came under, and suggested that media 
accountability was a dictating determinant, both in terms of the conservativeness and 
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reasonableness of average house costs and the numbers and size of houses 
provided under the Program. Negligible recognition was given by the media to SIHIP’s 
broader goals at the time and to the socio-economic capitals that were being 
generated. The technical interpretation, operationalisation and prioritisation of this 
shift in briefing policy required considerable revision and re-conceptualisation within 
the SALT and PAMTs over several months.120 121 
The ‘cluster housing’ concept was an innovative town planning design response that 
had been developed in SIHIP Stage 1 but continued and was consolidated into SIHIP 
Stage 2 because it fitted into the new parameters following the review, whereby three 
or four houses were provided for an extended family (or clan group) in a common 
precinct with a sense of inter-related communication and visitation, and even a shared 
central facility for socialisation and domestic work, but with separable tenured lots and 
service connections enabling a future reversion into single lot separable tenancies if 
the original social structure deconstructed for whatever reason (e.g. deaths, 
demographic decline, migration). This social housing concept received Housing 
Reference Group support across a number of communities, 122  e.g. Maningrida, 
Galiwin’ku. 
Our original EOI had cluster housing. This survived the Review. Now we have 
cluster sites in various locations—one three-bedroom house and two two-
bedroom houses for total of 14 people. Also we can combine a cluster site with 
an adjacent three-bedroom house to make a capacity for 20 people in an 
extended family. This is a big win … The term ‘Green Title’ applies. Each 
dwelling gets its own area of land to get separate services and meters and lot 
identification number. It is not ‘strata title’ where the cluster has a body 
corporate and only one point of servicing. But an Aboriginal governance 
equivalent of a Body Corporate is possible through a clan head with his clan 
on such a cluster site.123 
Other planning innovations included large lots and lot frontages (30 to 35 metres) in 
various new estates, as well as internal bush buffer (or green space) zones within 
such estates to improve residential privacy and facilitate socio-spatial separations 
(E.F., No. 1, 20 May 2010). At the time of writing, some seven new estates, 
integrating subdivision design and housing design were in development progress 
(Gunbalanya: 2, Wadeye: 2, Nguiu: 1, Galwin’ku: 1, Milingimbi: 1).124 
5.8.1 Conclusions on the SIHIP Review 
In the current author’s view, the KPI of reducing crowding through a range of planning 
and design mechanisms in SIHIP 1 was narrowed in SIHIP Stage 2. The emphasis 
shifted to achieving crowding reduction by increasing numerical targets of numbers of 
housing units to be provided and repaired (see Table 12 below). The more holistic 
approach to addressing crowding that was being developed in SIHIP Stage 1, 
addressing crowding through strategies for different spaces (private, social, meeting, 
yard and neighbourhood spaces) was truncated by the new parameters. 
The various impacts of the review on design and planning policies necessitated a 
revision to the SIHIP Design Guidelines by the Design Coordinator (NT, DHLGRS 
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2010). The shift in policy approach for SIHIP Stage 2, away from the Alliance-led 
open-ended scoping of SIHIP Stage 1, frustrated the Alliance Partners’ senior 
personnel, given all of the intense work effort that had been conscientiously 
undertaken. However, one of the Alliance Partner Managers reflected on the success 
of the alliancing procurement method to accommodate this major shift. 
 … the staff morale of the highly motivated people in the Alliance [No. 1] 
dropped. I had led a tight team who got to a solution which all were 
comfortable with, including the owner, and the community. The Review then 
resulted in uncertainty, change … all were demoralised. But once the results of 
the Review were out and the way forward worked out, everyone bounced back 
fairly quickly (e.g. R.N. was on the verge of “spitting the dummy”). Now have 
best result for price. Everyone needs to understand the Owner has a right to 
change their mind. If everyone thought it was 100 per cent right at the start, 
you would not need Alliancing. (E.F., No. 1, 20 May 2010) 
One of the senior public servants also positively noted that the alliance contracting 
method was inherently flexible to allow such major policy shifts mid-stream in the 
program. ‘At each of the defining points when the program grew and/or changed, the 
Alliancing structure allowed us to make such changes without going to court. We are 
[therefore] very happy still with alliancing’.125 
5.9 The Alliance Partners’ experience of managing risk 
A key rationale of adopting the Alliance procurement method was to manage the 
many risks involved in the remote Aboriginal housing sector. Connell Wagner had 
originally specified that: ‘There will be a culture for Alliance Partners to collectively 
share risks, and adoption of a ‘no blame’ culture through a partnering/alliancing 
relationship’ (Connell Wagner 2007b, p.33). One of the Alliance partner managers 
(from No. 2 Alliance) defined two categories of risk as follows.  
”Up risk” is the risk of project destabilisation from above the Alliance Team (by 
politicians, the media scrutiny, political responses, major economic shifts, 
changes of government etc.), whereas “down risk” is destabilisation risk from 
the project site involving local community and weather factors. 
He commented that the Risk Register is quite lengthy at the start, as the Alliance 
commences early contact with the communities, but that the list gradually reduces into 
these two categories as (1) list of risk for the Alliance Partners; and (2) list of risk for 
the job. This manager was of the view that his main role was to manage all of the ‘Up 
risk’ which was composed of political events impacting on the continuity and stability 
of the program and involving senior bureaucrats, politicians and the media. 126 
The Manager of the No. 1 Alliance Partner gave an identical response to his 
counterpart.127 He said that the nature of the risks have significantly changed during 
the procurement process. ‘We could put aside the political risks and not take them into 
account, but political risk is the biggest risk for this project at present.’ This manager 
commented that 99.9 per cent of his time was managing risk up. He said the package 
teams manage risk down. He then gave four examples of ‘down risk’. 
When you start the process, especially refurbs, you do not know till you pull a 
house apart about the extent of damage in it. We do not want the Owners to 
take the cost of this approach—too big a risk—there is a very inflated tender 
price normally. To de-risk that, the effort involved in managing the cost 
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recording is quite high—but need to do it to manage that risk; with a fixed price 
tender, you could waste money at the end, or lose money, or fall short of the 
target. It’s very difficult risk to manage and there is a constant flow of 
information to cost recorders here—it’s the same with underground services … 
knowing what’s there, another area of risk. 
There is a significant risk in not managing community expectations. Some real 
examples have occurred since the review. 
In Alliancing, if you are part-way along the procurement path and a big issue 
arises, there is no contractual ‘argy bargy’ e.g. at Maningrida—it does not have 
a cemetery—a lot of people are buried in back yards. But a tenant will soon tell 
you where you cannot extend a house. There are a whole lot of infill lots there 
to build on—but human remains are on some—we have to stay away from 
those lots. If we had a hard dollar [lump sum] contract, there would be argy 
bargy—the cost implications of changing building sites would be enormous. 
In the Alice Springs Town Camps the infrastructure is poor, and needs to be 
upgraded e.g. stormwater, sewerage, power; this needs to happen whilst the 
community is still living in the area; it creates a whole set of environmental 
changes/transitions. For example, there are a very large number of children in 
Trucking Yards [Town Camp]—educating children/people to be aware of the 
risks of construction—is a big issue. No. 1 has produced a ‘Construction 
Safety Induction—Trucking Yards’ document (will do this in every Town Camp). 
We also equip community leaders with site keys to security gates to rescue 
children if they climb into the construction site.128 
At the time of writing, an imminent ‘Uprisk’ factor was the forthcoming federal election 
with increased attention from federal and state opposition and media.129 One of the 
interviewees confirmed that ‘the effect of the media attention is significant’ which was 
something of an understatement. In hindsight, the risk endured by the program could 
have been managed better if a baseline set of data had been compiled on which to 
assess program goals, including those relating to the targeted social capitals. 
5.10 Positive outcomes emerging from the SIHIP alliancing 
process 
What are the major positive outcomes arising from, or appearing to arise from the 
SIHIP alliancing procurement process? This analysis has clearly demonstrated that 
there are sizable, albeit variable capitals being generated within the SIHIP program, 
particularly (i) economic capitals gained through training, employment and enterprise 
development, (ii) health capitals gained through adherence to healthy-living 
environmental and house design practices, and (iii) cultural capitals achieved through 
town planning, house design and the use of Housing Reference Groups (HRGs). 
While there is some public controversy about program costs, there are strong 
arguments that value for money is being gained across these other capitals in addition 
to the actual houses. 
None of those interviewed were negative about the advantages of alliance contracting, 
with the exception of the NT Parliamentarian who was interviewed (F.J.). Those senior 
professional members of the alliances who were interviewed, i.e. senior public 
servants, Alliance Partner managers, architects and engineers, were all generally 
positive about the advantages being gained in the SIHIP program. Some of the 
advantages that were identified and uniformly commented upon were as follows: 
                                               
128
 E.F. Alliance No. 1, 20/05/2010. 
129
 P.S. 28/04/2010. 
  103 
1. The socio-economic capitals gained, in addition to the actual houses. 
‘A lot of people are over-simplifying SIHIP by saying it’s just about new houses. 
It is not really a housing program—housing is the by-product—development of 
traction [for a range of community capitals] is what it’s about. Without SIHIP 
you would just have houses on the ground.’130 
2. The added capacity to match the product and process with community needs. 
Alliancing gives more flexibility to do what’s required in the community.131 
3. The capacity to manage the complex ‘down risks’ in remote Aboriginal housing. 
There are too many unknowns in communities due to the neglect of the 
housing stock over the last 40 years. If we had used a lump sum tender, it 
would have failed. For example, at Wadeye, the water/sewerage 
infrastructure … 90 per cent of 170 houses are hooked on a daisy chain 
system—have to turn off the whole lot if you want to work on any one of 
the houses; there are hidden problems.132 
The ‘killer’ for any other contract type [other than alliancing] is the 
‘Employment Workforce Development’ (EWD) of Aboriginal people. For the 
lump sum contract that says ‘thou shalt have X hours of Aboriginal 
labour...,’ the inevitable result is a large variation because of the unreliable 
labour outcome and the escalated labour/time blowouts, i.e. a high-risk 
component.133 
4. The advantages of collective and integrated teamwork that the alliancing structure 
facilitates. 
[A good practice of SIHIP] is the way design and construction personnel 
have worked together in the alliances, [and] recognition of the combined 
skill sets necessary to deliver.134 
The Alliance strength is the collective of brains—we push for innovation all 
the time.135 
There is a coordinated design perspective [between architect, engineer, 
builder] in SIHIP.136 
5. The holistic design of the SIHIP program in addressing a broad range of diverse 
objectives and capitals. 
The process has coupled the design guidelines and town planning and 
community engagement in the design process and into the construction 
through to POE [post-occupancy evaluation]. The program took in all main 
components initially, e.g. enterprise development, employment and training, 
design, and was funding them. The Design Management Plan provided a 
path for design through the whole project—a structure there to say what to 
do (including full archaeological site check and employment management 
plans which did not occur under NAHS).137 
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6. The economies of scale gained. 
‘[I] thought it was the right way, real economies of scale, at the outset. 
SIHIP is positive—it provides resources for proper planning—due to its 
larger scale. Our SIHIP professional costs were much less, half than under 
NAHS because the SIHIP program is big, can do planning for next 20 
years for communities. Big enough scale for this.’ 138 
5.11 Possible negatives of the SIHIP procurement process 
Are there any major negatives arising, or appearing to arise, from the SIHIP 
procurement process in relation to achieving social capitals as outputs? A number of 
negative issues appeared to be arising within SIHIP at the time of the author’s case 
study analysis. However, because SIHIP was likely to continue for some years, it is 
premature to be definitive about these issues. The alliancing procurement method has 
the capacity to self-correct and it is possible that a number of these issues will be 
positively addressed in due course. Nevertheless, they are listed here for 
consideration in the overall analysis. 
1. The issue of continuity of employment of trained workers and enterprise 
engagement after SIHIP. A recurring question that was raised during the author’s 
research was: What is ‘life after SIHIP?’ What continuities will be handed over and 
to whom, so that employment, training, and construction continues? It should be 
noted of course that this is not a problem unique to alliance contracting, but is one 
relevant to any procurement method. Nevertheless, with the excellent outcomes 
being achieved within SIHIP for employment and training, it is a pertinent 
question. The SIHIP Review recommended that: ‘Governments direct appropriate 
resources to transitioning Indigenous employees under SIHIP into ongoing 
employment’ (A.G. & NTG 2009, p.8). However, various interviewees critically 
challenged the prospects of ongoing work after SIHIP to stabilise the Indigenous 
workforce and the enterprises generated under SIHIP. Critical comment was 
made about the governments’ capacities to coordinate such work, despite 
constant parallel building contracts recurring in communities let by all arms of 
government (local, state, federal). Is it possible for government to coordinate 
future works to ensure some continuity for Indigenous enterprises and 
employment? One view was that such contracts could start to be fed into the 
newly expanded market prior to the completion of SIHIP.139 On the other hand, 
government tendering policies and the market rights of non-Indigenous building 
firms and suppliers were clearly influential political factors in such considerations. 
One view was that there has been a contracting industry ‘pushback’ to prevent 
additional government work going into the alliance contracts. Associated other 
issues were the roles of training organisations and of gaining an understanding of 
the human resources in an Aboriginal region, as well as the limited capacity of the 
workforce to be mobile in seeking work opportunities. 
‘A positive result is the 65 Aboriginal people employed on the program at Bathurst 
Island—but what will they do afterwards; many are not mobile and will not simply 
move elsewhere to chase work’.140 
2. The issue of developing Housing Management capacities in/for communities. A 
related set of questions revolved around the implementation of housing 
management in communities both in terms of employing trained workers on the 
repairs and maintenance of housing stock and of equipping tenants with skills and 
                                               
138
 L.R. Alliance Partner No. 2, 28/04/2010. 
139
 P.K. and L.R. Alliance Partner No. 2, 27/04/2010. 
140
 E.F. Alliance Partner No. 1, 20/05/2010. 
  105 
values to look after their new housing. The SIHIP Review recommended that: 
‘Governments direct appropriate resources to ensuring robust and effective 
property and tenancy management to underpin the investment and achieve 
sustainable housing outcomes for Indigenous people’ (A.G. & NTG 2009, p.8). 
There were clearly big challenges to achieve this goal. One public servant 
observed that whereas the public housing model operated reasonably effectively 
in Darwin—facilitated through a high amenity level and a reliable R&M service 
facilitated through a call centre; the amenity level in remote housing is very low by 
comparison and it is challenging to bring it up to metropolitan standards.141 One 
interviewee was of the view that the entire housing management including the 
R&M should be opened for contract to an R&M Facility Manager using a ten-year 
contract. 
One of the Alliance Partner Managers was of the view that a significant failing 
could be the lack of a strong focus on life skills training for residents, which in turn 
could lead to early failure of some houses; a lack of care and understanding to 
manage properties. He noted that three rotations of tenants occurred through 
transitional houses constructed at Melville Island while these tenants’ houses were 
being built or upgraded. He suggested that life skills training could be occurring in 
such transitional accommodation—‘it is the ideal classroom for the two or three 
weeks [while they are there]’.142 
It would seem then that it would be possible to generate additional housing 
management capital in this manner, although this opportunity would be available 
irrespective of what procurement method was used. 
3. The issue of failure to embed Aboriginal governance entities and enterprise more 
effectively into the alliance structure. The point was made previously about the 
lack of progress to date of including any Aboriginal enterprise groups as junior 
partners in alliance. The one exception at the time of writing was GEBIE Civil and 
Construction on Groote Eylandt. (By contrast, this was achieved by the 
Queensland Main Roads Department with its Aboriginal partner Myuma Pty Ltd 
who rose through a series of alliancing contracts to be a full alliance partner—see 
Memmott 2010). 
It could be argued that the opportunities to do this within SIHIP, up to the time of 
writing, had been limited due to poor structures and capacity issues in certain 
Indigenous enterprises, but it was clear that some enterprises were performing 
reasonably well. It remains to be seen what eventuates in the remainder of the 
program. 
4. The issue of reduction of landscaping and yard design elements in SIHIP Stage 2. 
The reduced budget for yard and landscape elements has had to be applied more 
rigorously in SIHIP Stage 2, as compared to SIHIP Stage 1, yet remote Aboriginal 
housing research clearly emphasises the health and cultural importance of well-
designed yard environments, particularly for the accommodation of visitor groups 
and in the reduction of crowding (Long et al. 2007, Section 5.3.5). The potential 
health capital outcomes could therefore be limited in this way. However, it could 
be argued that this outcome is not a limitation of the procurement method per se, 
but of the re-shaping of the budget as a result of the SIHIP Review. 
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5.12 Recommendations for the future use of alliancing across 
jurisdictions 
Of those senior professional members of the alliances who were interviewed, all were 
positive about using alliancing procurement in future, large-scale, Aboriginal housing 
programs, whether it be in other state jurisdictions or continuing in the Northern 
Territory, albeit with varying advice about fine-tuning the principles of the application 
of alliancing procurement, based on the learnings of SIHIP. 
If asked again whether I would use Alliance again for Aboriginal housing; most 
definitely I would use it again, but I have a different mindset now [re the 
problems and issues involved].143 
One senior engineer from Alliance Partner No. 2 commented on selecting the contract 
approach: ‘If the government wants to build 100 houses cheaply, get the Army—but 
there will be many quality problems. If government wants to do everything right [and 
achieve multiple capitals], use alliancing, but there is an expense.’144 However this 
interviewee argued that ‘either contract approach [alliancing or lump sum tender] is 
fine; success is dependent upon using the right people to run it, the best human 
resources, especially in planning/consultation/design, but not so much contractors’; 
nevertheless he also conceded that it is problematic to achieve employment workforce 
development (EWD) goals using procurement methods other than alliancing.145 One 
of the Alliance Partner Managers, went so far as to make a plea for a bi-lateral 
government approach to approving the use of alliancing in Aboriginal housing at the 
federal level, so as to ensure that alliancing continues as a procurement method in 
other jurisdictions.146 
Several public servants were of the view, in hindsight, that ‘Relationship MC’ also 
known as the ‘forced marriages’ approach, may have been a preferable procurement 
variant, to open tender alliancing. This procurement approach involves first seeking 
EOIs, then negotiating a ‘forced fit’ between identified preferred partners, either by 
using existing teams and asking them to merge certain members together; or by 
making a separate call for proponents, contractors, professionals, etc., then selecting 
and asking them to join together. The other principles of alliancing would then apply. 
However, the need was stressed to have a designer from the early stages to develop 
the concept plan.147 
Choosing the numbers of alliance partners was seen as a critical design aspect of the 
procurement method. One critic pointed out the high administrative costs of alliances 
as a limiting factor: ‘Do not have too many alliances—they are each expensive—each 
with an Auditor … the more Alliances there are, the more costly for government. The 
number of Alliances must be also proportional to how much capacity the government 
has—e.g. numbers of professional staff to sit on Alliance Boards.’148 However, the 
earlier discussion is also relevant to consider viz needing a minimum of two alliances 
for competition and possibly a third alliance to allow for one of the three failing, or 
having limited longevity due to poor performance. 
A second critical design aspect of the procurement method was said to be choosing 
the regions for contract packages in relation to community proximity and scope of 
works. One interviewee emphasised the need to rationally look at servicing from a 
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geographic perspective; and to build packages around natural cultural regions and 
transport routes.149 Such a strategy has potential for sharing Aboriginal labour teams 
throughout a region. 
Finding the optimum balance between open-ended scoping and a prescribed 
approach to formatting project briefs, was another critical aspect of procurement 
design that required comment. The author questioned various program participants 
about the optimum balance between the flexibility of SIHIP Stage 1 brief development, 
as opposed to the prescribed scope of SIHIP Stage 2. The Manager of No. 1 Alliance 
Partner was of the view that the Alliance should take the briefing process through from 
start to finish, saying: ‘the amount of effort to get the result is incredible—but you do 
get a quality result. If driven by numbers of houses per year, then go down the 
conventional tendering path. In other jurisdictions they would use flat packs, but their 
houses would not be as robust as we’re constructing, nor the same level of attention 
to cultural aspects’. 150 
The No. 2 Alliance Manager prescribed a balanced approach to brief development 
lying between these two extreme approaches. He suggested: ‘At the start of the 
Alliance to first come up with a realistic price—adapted between the community ideal 
[high cost possibly] and the public housing models, and meet the design needs in the 
middle; [and thereby] employ real economic science on the delivering of houses in 
remote areas. Do the scoping during the alliance too … put all parts of the process in 
the Alliance—that is what it is for, otherwise you might as well do conventional 
tendering.’151 When one of the senior public servants was asked this question, he was 
of the view that the owner should not have withheld packages and withheld numbers 
[as occurred in SIHIP Stage 1]—but should have given the numbers as a benchmark 
in advance. Note that he only goes so far as to suggest a ‘benchmark’, not a 
constrained target. Another public servant warned that one can limit the potential 
innovation capacities in the alliancing approach, if the initial brief is too inflexible.152 
There were thus a variety of views from the senior most expert personnel in the 
Alliances on what the optimum balance was between an open-ended scoping or a 
prescribed approach to formatting project briefs. The bottom-line is that this is an 
issue that needs to be carefully addressed at the commencement of selecting or 
designing a procurement method. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS: A MODEL FOR PROCUREMENT? 
A recurrent challenge in the Aboriginal housing sector since its development in the 
mid-20th century, has been the logistics of delivering houses to the many remote 
parts of the continent where transportation and infrastructure are basic and regularly 
disrupted by extremes of climate and location, where tradesmen and product 
suppliers are few and far between, and where maintenance regimes have been poor 
to non-existent over many decades. The quality of remote housing procurement has 
been repeatedly undermined by low standards of workmanship and quality control, 
inferior materials and lack of effective contract administration. 
In drawing out some good practice exemplars for housing procurement in remote 
Indigenous communities, the following discussion seeks to comparatively analyse the 
major findings from the four case studies, and focuses on how social, economic and 
the other types of capitals can be generated or enhanced in Indigenous communities. 
In presenting how each case study faired in relation to the five main ‘capitals’, (i) 
social/economic; (ii) cultural/ethical; (iii) governance; (iv) training/employment; and (v) 
health, the authors lead into an examination of the complexities and barriers of 
achieving enduring capitals in remote Indigenous housing. 
6.1 Issues of case study scale 
The spectrum of case study scales rendered varied analysis of capitals. The two 
smaller-scale case studies, Koonibba and Normanton, appear to be less significant at 
a program level, they provided opportunity to scrutinise capital outputs with greater 
depth, generating findings that can inform procurement programs of all scales. In 
contrast, the two large-scale case studies, TIRP and SIHIP, offered greater social and 
economic capital outputs due in part to higher economic capital investment and larger 
program size. Hence, on the basis of these four case studies, increases in program 
funding produced definitive increases in outcomes across different program packages 
or stages. 
Furthermore, SIHIP’s alliance procurement was based on a clear problem statement 
(Connell Wagner 2007b, p.13, p.14) explaining why conventional procurement 
approaches in remote areas were inefficient due to high oncosts and insufficient 
critical mass to yield value for money which in turn resulted in a lack of continued 
workflow and unsustainable employment and training outcomes. Additional issues 
were an over emphasis on rapid deployment of housing resulting in minimal 
consideration for whole-of-life costing; inappropriate designs and failure of housing 
management regimes. This was compounded by an increasing backlog of houses to 
address unmet need, with subsequent overcrowding, resulting in further degradation 
of both existing and new stock. Thus the program was required to be large enough 
with multiple packages and of long enough duration to provide successive project 
work for at least three private sector consortia. 
6.2 Social and economic capitals 
6.2.1 Enhancing social capitals 
Social capitals in remote Indigenous contexts were described earlier as networks non-
separable from natural capitals that are all-important in everyday life and often outstrip 
economic capitals. In terms of procurement and its relationship to social capitals, the 
better a given community’s social capitals are understood and respected, the better 
any potential housing procurement system will be. Manifestation of social capitals 
across the case studies has varied, partly dependant on the extent of purposeful 
intention to engage such. It can also be expected that different communities will 
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exhibit potentially varying extents of social capitals dependent on a multitude of given 
circumstances including, but not limited to, remoteness, local levels of leadership, 
social organisation, skill capability, adherence to local custom and cultural traditions 
among others. 
In the two larger-scale case studies (SIHIP, TIRP) there were clearly, strong attempts 
to engage with local social capital. For example, within the TIRP, good consultation 
across government agencies, as well as between consultants and resident reference 
groups generated social capital through knowledge transfer and participation. The 
resident consultation process was led by ATSIH under a consultation framework using 
local reference group representatives liaising with future residents and consultants. 
Residents were also involved in architectural and planning decisions within strict 
social welfare housing budget parameters. This led to a sense of participatory 
ownership, as well as perceptions that resident contributions were valued and cultural 
values respected with high levels of satisfaction reported. 
In SIHIP, there was evidence of Alliances attempting to understand how informal 
Aboriginal networks might contribute to housing procurement. For example, the socio-
spatial mapping at Wadeye aimed to generate residential separation of clans and a 
reduction of gang conflicts, which were exacerbated by neighbourhood crowding. The 
case study author found the use of Aboriginal social capital underlying the structure of 
the SIHIP labour force. One Alliance reported that, in communities where large 
program packages were being undertaken, sizeable Aboriginal labour pools were 
established under an Alliance Workplace Coordinator who was an Aboriginal person 
and who therefore had an understanding of Aboriginal life-ways. These pools broke 
down into work gangs of about four people whose membership was largely decided 
by themselves, invariably resulting in teams with strong kinship ties, and whose gang 
leader was, again, nominated by themselves, using Aboriginal cultural values of 
appropriate status and leadership. In general, the result was relatively cohesive work 
groups.153 
At Koonibba, social capital was confined to Aboriginal networks that terminated at 
Ceduna and although the construction company aspired to work beyond these and 
gain greater access to building contracts in the APY region, they had not expanded 
upon them. However, this may possibly occur at some future date, when current 
building license restrictions are overcome. Yet, there are other limitations in 
developing greater social capitals such as Indigenous politics, protocols and the 
inclusive and exclusive nature of identity. An Indigenous building company has to 
straddle not only the requirements of economic management, but the Aboriginal 
protocols governing permission to move into other remote centres. If social networks 
do not extend into these regions they may require some developing in order to lever 
into economic development. As such, KBPL demonstrated a clear link between social 
networks and their contribution to economic gain, such that they were not conceived 
separately from the objectives of economic capital (Onyx 2005, p.3, Hunter 2004, p.3). 
At Koonibba, limited social capital networks showed an interdependence with confined 
socio-economic networks that did not have the ability to expand upon any significant 
available bridging or linking capitals. ‘Bridging capital’ consists of overlapping 
networks that may make other networks accessible; and linking capital comprised of 
social networks that can connect with persons in authority or positions of power 
(Hunter 2004, p.3). Nevertheless, enterprises based on restricted social capital may 
generate sufficient activity or be a matter of limited choice in some remote centres, if 
based upon the objective to operate a small business, supporting only a few locally 
based construction labourers. 
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In the mainstream market context, social capital has the potential to develop into 
leveraged economic action, but in many instances social capital networks are not 
required or expected to develop and expand economically. By contrast, Indigenous 
social capital investment appears to yield only limited economic gain and does not 
usually manifest as capitalistic economic development, largely due to the nature of 
what Moran (2009, np) describes as the unique political economy of discrete remote 
Indigenous settlements. He argues that ‘the political economy of settlement has led to 
an unusual asset base and resource use, in which internal asset transformations were 
more important than inputs and outputs’. The driving force of remote Indigenous social 
capital generates the culturally destined ‘economically rational strategy’ of ‘pooling 
limited cash’ that both sustains and perpetuates high Indigenous mobility, where 
customary capital outstrips physical capital and other livelihood options (Moran 2009, 
np). 
6.2.2 Generating economic capitals 
Turning to the generation of economic capitals, the SIHIP alliance structure provided 
sufficient contractual size and flexibility to explore the potential for the enhancement of 
local small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) that were ‘incubated’ through the 
management structure of the alliance members in benefiting from the economic scale 
of the available budgets for the duration of the program. Emerging examples largely 
centred on a range of pre-existing Aboriginal enterprises with notably a capacity and 
specialisation in different economic activities related to the construction industry. For 
example, in the Tiwi Islands, an employment and labour hire service run by Tiwi 
Enterprises was engaged and at Bathurst Island, BIHA, gradually levered up to 
construct houses in the program. On Groote Eylandt, GEBIE Civil and Construction 
has been formed as a Sub-Alliance which will undertake all housing refurbishments 
and rebuilds for that package. In Alice Springs, Ingerreke Aboriginal Corporation were 
initially engaged in clean-up contracts which positioned them to obtain a significant 
portion of the SIHIP regional allocation for carrying out renovations. Tangentyere 
Council, who have a long history of running enterprises, provided an employment 
service in conjunction with Tangentyere Design, an architectural enterprise that has 
operated inter-culturally over a period of 30 years. Tangentyere Design employs a 
largely non-Indigenous architectural workforce with profits generated assisting other 
social welfare activities. At Tennant Creek, Julalikari Council were also engaged on 
R&M contracts. Perhaps, the most significant positioning of an enterprise was 
Thamurrur Aboriginal Corporation at Wadeye who developed a tilt-up panel house 
and were able to successfully lever into a $30 million turn-over in two years partly 
through mentoring by Alliance staff. 
In general, it was found that a number of the enterprises discussed made an initial 
self-assessment that was over-confident of their capacities and in many cases they 
had a lack of industry standards (including in some cases safety standards), 
management systems, and/or professionalism in contracting. Once these 
shortcomings were identified, the Alliance Partners worked to provide capacity-
building services including embedding their own staff for a period with particular 
enterprises. 
6.2.3 Challenges to generating sustainable economic capitals 
Although social capital is generally perceived as creating positive social, and at times, 
economic opportunities, there are manifestations of Indigenous social capital that may 
at times have negative influences. A critical question raised by Moran et al. (2007, 
p.xiv) is whether over-reliance on social capital by Indigenous people is curtailing 
other capitals such as education, training, income generation and private enterprise, 
and thereby increasing the vulnerabilities of remote settlement sustainability. For 
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example, one of the most important findings arising from the Koonibba case study is 
that the fragile KBPL enterprise seemed to follow pre-existing limited social capital 
networks and therefore was not able to readily expand on its enterprise aspirations. 
Although, skill transfer has occurred slowly and gradually over a period of years 
whereby sufficient confidence had been developed to increase capacity at KBPL, few 
economic opportunities presented themselves in the procurement framework 
operating in the region. The lack of availability of reputable contractors willing to work 
in remote centres affected supply greatly, so much so that small housing allocations 
had to be pooled together to generate a contract sufficiently sizable to attract a small 
building company. KBPL was unable to effectively develop bridging capital or increase 
linking capital, thereby reducing economic opportunities to move beyond the 
limitations of its own network and engage with overlapping networks in accessing 
greater resources. This important finding generates a number of key propositions for 
enhancing economic capital in remote Indigenous communities: 
 Small enterprises leveraged off long-term unemployed personnel with limited 
management experience, education and financial capacity, and lacking mentor 
support are economically fragile. Some remote Indigenous communities operating 
a small business enterprise do not have sufficient social capital in the non-
Indigenous regional building economy to access mentoring so as to increase skill 
and capacity to the competitive requirements of regulated mainstream building 
programs and sectors. 
 Indigenous enterprise development based on inconsistent program releases from 
a single supplier offers only limited stop-start employment opportunities and may 
not be sustainable in the long term without wage subsidies from the CDEP 
program. This is the case for intermittent government regional building programs 
which produce inconsistent supply and are unable to generate a recurrent capital 
flow, and may be hampered by a workforce with insufficient capacity in financial 
management, education and licensing accreditation to operate effectively, thereby 
increasing vulnerability. 
 Small building enterprises of like nature to KBPL operate successfully to carry out 
minor works contracts and would benefit from joint venturing which would offer 
mentoring to increase capacity. However, small enterprises levered off minor 
works contracts operate in extremely fragile economic circumstances and have 
limited long-term viability begging caution in promoting enterprise ventures where 
there is insufficient capacity to operate effectively. To increase Indigenous 
engagement in typically remote and very remote regional economic markets, 
strategies for enterprise creation must develop a business plan involving a 
diversified enterprise portfolio and a multi-skilled workforce that reflects the nature 
of such markets. 
Similar to KBPL, Bynoe CACS Ltd at Normanton has been fostering a diversity of 
work activities so as to not rely solely on inconsistent housing contracts and a tenancy 
management service which generate insufficient capital to enable sustainable 
enterprise development. Despite the strong social bonds within the community, a 
limited pool of skilled labour may not be adequately positioned to engage in economic 
opportunities when they do occur. As with Koonibba, Bynoe CAC Ltd was reliant on 
the altruism of an individual loaning their building license, but at Normanton this led to 
the builder’s burn-out, subsequently leading to a predictable collapse of the enterprise 
due to the heavy burden of responsibility. This inter-cultural dependence is all too 
familiar to those with intimate knowledge of ICHO development, and does not appear 
to generate long-term socio-economic capitals or sustainable capacity gains within the 
ICHO. However, tenancy management at Bynoe is one of their inherent strengths and 
it appears to be run professionally, indicating that it may, if given the opportunity, be in 
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a position to increase local economic capacity. This could occur through enterprise 
development that may slowly develop into increased regional capacity. 
Organisations that show a willingness and capacity would benefit from procurement 
systems that are sufficiently flexible to explore joint-venturing and alliance contracting 
as demonstrated under the emerging outcomes from SIHIP. Although, this increase in 
enterprise activity across the SIHIP packages is partly attributed to an increase in 
capital investment in social housing, not previously witnessed under smaller 
procurement programs. However, it appears for any operation to be viable and 
sustainable, it must operate regionally and in the broader socio-economic context, not 
just within the local economy in order to generate sufficient capital with a clear 
business case for long-term viability. The case study findings on enterprise capitals 
illustrate an acute relationship between remoteness, scale of housing procurement 
programs and socio-economic capitals. While each case study demonstrated similar 
challenging issues in relation to remoteness, it was not possible to see a clear pattern 
for a ‘one size fits all’ response. For example, SIHIP alliance packages were spread 
over a number of regions providing unparalleled socio-economic development in 
those selected regions. Alliance contracting enabled pre-existing Aboriginal 
enterprises to increase enterprise activity with a resultant capital flow benefiting from 
on-site access to professional advice and mentoring. 
It appears that due to prioritising inter-cultural socio-economic exchanges as one of its 
key objectives, the Alliance contracting model has motivated alliance teams to 
proactively explore these opportunities in an unprecedented manner. The alliance 
model also allowed for a meteoric shift in government organisational culture, where 
there was a willingness to change the management structure of procurement 
programs that may have previously operated within a single financial year; dispensing 
with a contractual model where risk is borne by individual contractors constrained by 
timeframes unsuited to the vagaries of the location and cultural complexities of remote 
discrete communities. It remains to be seen if increases in capacity are sustainable 
beyond the SIHIP program. As demonstrated in the other case studies, when 
programs reach practical completion, SMEs scale down to a locally sustainable 
capacity and may revert to a dependence on CDEP supplementary funds in the long-
term. Local economies bereft of a steady supply of capital flow produce small 
vulnerable enterprises of relative proportions and, predictably, when these economies 
contract, so do the enterprises. 
The case study at Thursday Island demonstrated that there is an intra-regional 
difference both between Islander and Aboriginal cultural protocols, and between the 
inner islands where opportunities for skills development are greater and the outer 
Torres Strait islands where opportunities are sparser, and acutely deficient. In the 
latter case of the outer islands, resources arrive from even further distances with 
greater transportation logistics effecting project continuity, costs and delivery 
timeframes. There was a clear organisational commitment across governments to 
deliver the TIRP under a traditional contractual system, where there was sufficient 
contractual volume and program duration to achieve considerable training outcomes, 
but no reported enterprise outcomes. 
6.3 Cultural and ethical capitals 
With respect to cultural and ethical capitals in remote Indigenous communities, the 
authors contend that design professionals cannot successfully design housing and 
plan settlements for Aboriginal people unless there is an understanding of their 
everyday social behaviors and climatic/geographic context. The customary use of 
domiciliary space supports distinct types of household groups and sub-groups, typical 
diurnal/nocturnal behaviour patterns suited to different seasonal periods as well as 
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characteristic socio-spatial structures. Culturally distinct behaviour includes set forms 
of approach and departure, external orientation and sensory communication between 
domiciles, different concepts of privacy and crowding, sleeping behaviour, and 
sleeping group composition, cooking and use of fire, and storage of possessions and 
resources. Furthermore, there are other culturally distinct aspects that have a bearing 
on housing design and settlement planning, that are the subject of ongoing research, 
such as frequent residential mobility, avoidance behaviours related to kinship rules, 
different values and attitudes about the possession and sharing of objects, including 
shelter, and response to the death of a householder (Memmott 2003). Of further 
relevance to remote Aboriginal communities is the link between traditional camp 
behaviour patterns and possible contemporary housing design. 
In order to design culturally appropriate housing, design professionals generally rely 
on consultation (through interviewing techniques) with those people who are typically 
the final occupants of the house. This ‘briefing process’ as it is called sets the 
parameters for the functional and also non-functional154 areas of the design. It is within 
the consultative framework that ethical considerations come to the fore. For example, 
conscientious consultation (with a fiduciary duty of care) assumes a set of ethical 
premises; namely, that an interaction exists between two parties whereby one party 
seeks an understanding of another party’s wishes and desires; that the first party 
listens to the second party and is able to incorporate their understanding into the 
design and planning process; and finally, the first party then proceeds to document 
same in order to establish the design parameters and brief for the project. The 
adoption of certain housing procurement methodologies can render an ethical breach 
resulting in a prevailing status quo of poor or even non-existent consultation at key 
decision points. However, the imperative to consult is not sufficient enough in itself; 
effective consultation requires specialist expertise in cross-cultural communication 
skills (including 3-D communication) and this has been the premise of informed 
practitioners in remote settlements for decades, where budgets permit (Long et al. 
2007, p.13, p.16, p.17, p.50). 
Whether negligible consultation in the Koonibba and Bynoe studies is a product of 
low-cost social housing models in these jurisdictions where limited budgets allow only 
very minimal consultation visits to remote settlements, or whether it is a consequence 
of predominant mindsets to impose service delivery with minimal consultation driven 
by lagging unmet need, it is clear that this serious ethical dilemma has not been 
systematically addressed in housing procurement. There needs to be a consistent 
application of primary ethical principles of mutual respect, mutual rights, mutual 
responsibilities in meeting reasonable culturally specific needs of householders, so 
that necessity, location, features, cultural fit of building and infrastructure are 
genuinely considered in current remote housing procurement practice. Consequently, 
the ethical dimension is clearly at play when the design consultant either chooses to 
be bound by the original client brief or deliberately moves away for whatever reason 
from that which has been previously communicated. The current authors contend that 
in order to design culturally appropriate housing for remote Aboriginal communities, 
design professionals need to recognise and respect the original design brief given to 
them by their Aboriginal clients, and if they perceive a necessity to adjust or change 
this brief for whatever reason, they need to at least enter into a dialogue with their 
clients as to the reasons underlying the shift (as was the case when SIHIP 1 moved to 
SIHP 2). 
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In evaluating which procurement systems have proven more effective in creating 
positive outcomes for a close cultural fit in house design, the Thursday Island 
Redevelopment project appears to have had the most success in regard to 
consultation processes, and final design outcomes of the four case studies under 
investigation in this report. An analysis of the TIRP procurement process illustrated 
cultural appropriateness in design through excellent community consultation and 
cultural mapping which was fed back into the design and delivery process. The fact 
that there was significant local input into the project, not only at a strategic level but 
also at the level of delivery and design, resulted in a sense of community ownership 
over the project. The TIRP consultation process also made use of local media as a 
community communication tool, which encouraged the dissemination of project details 
and allowed the airing of local grievances and ideas. It is too early to evaluate the 
effectiveness of SIHIP with regard to final design outcomes, however, the authors are 
aware that extensive design consultation has occurred on this project, but are 
uncertain as to whether this will bear fruit until house construction has been 
completed. At the time of writing, the Design Guidelines were endorsed by leading 
professionals within SIHIP as cutting-edge best practice in Aboriginal Australia. 
Furthermore, by acknowledging culturally distinct lifestyles and behaviours in the 
design brief and discussing them in a constructive way with Aboriginal clients 
(whether they be individual householders or consultative communal housing 
committees of some sort), a second consequence over and above a good design ‘fit’, 
is allowing opportunity in housing procurement for reinforcing of cultural identity, 
thereby strengthening social and cultural capital. Once this process is deemed 
successful, Aboriginal clients are even likely to request forms of symbolic architectural 
references in housing designs to reflect their cultural identity.155 
6.3.1 Culturally appropriate design: to standardise or individualise? 
In order to achieve a close cultural fit in remote Aboriginal housing, there must be a 
common consensus between the initial designer, the builder and the project manager 
overseeing the procurement process. One of the most contentious debates in 
Aboriginal housing over recent years relates to whether or not the standardisation of 
house designs can deliver culturally appropriate housing. The argument once again 
relates to risk management for both the funder or owner (proprietor) and the building 
contractor. For example, the standardisation of house designs can result in less 
community consultation as community members choose from a range of design 
options that have typically been predetermined and do not necessarily fit their needs, 
while the individualisation of house designs requires a much greater commitment to 
community consultation and adds a great deal of complexity to the documentation and 
eventual building process, in addition to cost; factors which are at times deemed 
unacceptable in public service jurisdictions, particularly those aligned with 
mainstreaming policies. 
Individualisation also reduces opportunities for achieving economies of scale as 
building materials cannot be ordered in bulk and architectural detailing and technology 
may vary. The history of housing procurement systems in Aboriginal communities has 
shown that the rigid standardisation of house designs is yet to be proven to result in a 
strong cultural fit, where the individualisation of house design’s while seemingly more 
culturally appropriate, is yet to deliver successful large-scale housing programs. Both 
methods present problems for the successful delivery of affordable and culturally 
appropriate housing within the parameters of prevailing government policies and 
budgets. However, the persistent feature in remote centres of large Indigenous 
households comprised of extended, kin groups is unlikely to disappear and rather than 
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a polarised approach, two of the four case studies indicated that a combined 
approach may be more effective. 
Findings from both the TIRP and SIHIP case studies illustrate that whether to 
standardise or individualise house design is a question of project scale, complexity 
and program budget size and/or restriction. Interviewees from both case studies 
called for a mix of house types ranging between standardised and individualised 
design as the best option. In regard to administering large scale, complex projects, the 
SIHIP 2 approach, whereby house designs were limited to a number of standard 
templates that could then be individualised according to site, climate and social 
context, was noteworthy as it gave an economy of scale in the construction process 
but equally enabled occupants to modify various aspects of the dwelling. 
The ‘cluster housing’ concept designed as part of SIHIP 1 was seen by many 
observers to be an innovative town planning design response, whereby three or four 
houses were provided for an extended family (or clan group) in a common precinct 
with a sense of inter-related communication and visitation, and even a shared central 
facility for socialisation and domestic work. The land tenure system reflected 
separable lots and service connections enabling a future reversion into single lot 
separable tenancies if the original social structure deconstructed for whatever reason 
(e.g. deaths, demographic decline, migration). Additional planning innovations 
included large lots and lot frontages (30 to 35 metres) in various new estates, as well 
as internal bush buffer (or green space) zones within estates to improve residential 
privacy and facilitate socio-spatial separations. Of particular note in this respect was 
the development, through the SIHIP program, of a set of ‘Design Guidelines’ that 
include a complete section on ‘Settlement Planning’. This seminal document makes 
both implicit and explicit reference to the planning of housing layouts to suit socio-
spatial clustering of kinship groups, a planning technique that also generates social 
capital and cultural identity maintenance. 
Cultural appropriateness in house design relates to how well the finished product 
functions to support occupant beliefs, values and their associated domiciliary 
behaviours and household structures. The contractual system itself is important in this 
respect, however, it appears that projects with short timeframes and grand 
expectations in achieving large numbers of houses will automatically severely limit or 
even preclude time-intensive or householder responsive consultation due to the focus 
on standardising house design and the dominance of speedy economies of scale. 
Consequently, it appears that large-scale flexible contractual processes such as 
managing contractor or alliancing, would lend themselves to this methodology 
whereas small-scale traditional lump sum contracts would lend themselves to intense 
pre-design consultation and individualisation in house design, which appears to 
produce better results in relation to cultural appropriateness in house design. 
6.3.2 The design limitation of transportable buildings 
The more recent housing procurement practices across various jurisdictions in 
Australia shows the prevalence of supplying transportable houses for many remote 
Indigenous communities. This subject was also discussed during the interview 
process. In contrast to the tailoring of house design to individual needs discussed 
above, transportable buildings present an alternative approach to housing supply 
whereby the house arrives in a given community on a semi-trailer and requires a 
simple installation process before it is fully functional. While not a specific focus of this 
research analysis, as none of the case studies incorporated such housing solutions, 
discussion of transportable buildings arose on many occasions through the interview 
process (refer to Sections 2.7.3 & 3.7.3). The majority of those interviewed saw 
advantages in the system regarding speed of delivery and subsequent installation; 
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however, a number of Aboriginal respondents questioned the cultural appropriateness 
and long-term construction quality in remote contexts. 
It appears that while transportable housing delivers a quick fix, short-term solution that 
may suit the policy frameworks of certain jurisdictions for the rapid supply of large 
numbers of houses to Aboriginal communities, they also present a possible long-term 
exacerbation of the unmet demand they are meant to alleviate. While it can be argued 
that there are pros and cons of using transportable housing—with them being quicker 
to assemble, but involving less labour at a local level (thus reducing the employment 
spin-off benefit for Indigenous communities)—there is evidence to suggest that the 
transportation of this form of housing had sustained damage due to the harsh road 
conditions into some communities that had resulted in additional costs to repair the 
houses at the assembly site. 
For example, B.D., a long-term foreman on remote projects for QBuild has seen this 
occurring in the recent housing delivered in places such as Doomadgee in northwest 
Queensland. He stated that not only were these houses obviously wrong for their 
cultural settings, it was also difficult for construction workers in a given community to 
maintain commitment to the project when the house they installed two months before 
was already severely damaged and in need of repair. B.D. saw this as a problem for 
both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people for different reasons, and confirmed that 
transportable buildings typically lacked the level of construction quality achieved in the 
one-off houses procured under traditional delivery systems.156 This view was echoed 
by the chairman of the Bynoe CACS housing cooperative in Normanton (Section 
3.7.3). 
6.4 Governance capitals  
In terms of governance as a social capital and its relationship to procurement 
processes, improved housing procurement in remote Aboriginal communities will not 
produce quality governance structures within communities; however, improved self-
governance systems within remote communities will result in greater information 
dissemination and accountability, and thus better housing procurement. It is therefore 
difficult to choose any one particular contractual strategy over another in relation to 
strengthening and working with governance as a social capital. In saying this, after 
reviewing the governance literature and case study analyses, the current authors 
believe that an improvement in self-governance mechanisms, whereby Indigenous 
people administer infrastructure and housing programs themselves will result in the 
positive development of Aboriginal housing procurement throughout Australia. While 
this seems an obvious statement, history has shown this pursuit to be a difficult 
achievement. For example, an historical overview157 of Aboriginal housing has shown 
self-governance of housing procurement was attempted in the recent decades 
through ICHOs administering community consultation in addition to design and 
construction contracts; however, those housing organisations not only had to balance 
a three-tiered system of government, i.e. local, state and federal, in order to continue 
receiving support but also the social and cultural expectations of their respective 
communities, which at times sat in opposition to government political agendas. 
For some, the heavy burden that this situation placed on these small organisations 
resulted in their eventual failure and the abolition of their responsibilities regarding 
housing and infrastructure management. The Normanton and Koonibba case studies 
have shown that unless ICHOs and other community organisations are equipped with 
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the relevant skills and personnel to carry out such an undertaking, they are bound for 
failure in the medium to long-term. Even if they succeed under one policy regime, as 
in the case of Bynoe CACs, they can suffer when policies are abolished and abruptly 
change direction or are reformed (Altman 2010, p.262). Bynoe was thus considerably 
defunded during the sweeping ICHO changes such as the removal of CHIP, NAHS 
funding and the reallocation of CDEP funding, with a significant portion of the 
competencies lost that had been gained in former decades.158 Nevertheless, there are 
some operational ICHOs that continue to have a relatively successful track record of 
maintaining a quality governance structure. In such a case, it would be possible for 
that ICHO to use any one of the different contractual strategies described previously 
to procure housing for that community as to which contractual system worked best for 
a given scenario. 
6.4.1 Capacity building and mentoring 
Another important element of governance realisation in procurement processes 
relates to the advantages of meaningful mentoring and capacity building of ICHOs in 
remote communities. The importance of developing and, at the same time, using local 
expertise cannot be understated. For example, both Normanton and Koonibba have 
shown that building and maintaining an ICHO and community organisation in a remote 
setting is a difficult undertaking, where people are required to deliver outcomes 
outside their immediate knowledge and skill base, yet strive to do so in the face of 
political pressure and apparent failure. As reported earlier, the Chairman of Bynoe 
CACS in Normanton stated that the success of the NAHS housing in Normanton had 
a lot to do with the ICHO itself controlling the project budget, the untied financial profit 
of which assisted in enabling strategic innovations for other community needs, and 
thereby facilitating further skill-building processes on the part of individuals within the 
organisation itself. 
6.4.2 Building licences 
Better governance mentorship would also lead to an improvement in the uptake and 
retention of open building licences on the part of ICHOs and community enterprises in 
remote communities. As seen in both the Koonibba and Normanton case studies, 
without an open building licence, Indigenous organisations are left with simple 
carpentry projects that typically involve small-scale social housing repairs and 
maintenance regimes. Also, not having an open licence results in the Indigenous 
organisation having to partner with a mainstream builder for larger scale projects, with 
evidence suggesting that a recurring challenge is having different expectations, as 
well as the stresses of living and working in remote communities for those who are 
typically not from those regions. This form of procurement is not conducive to a long-
term and relatively stress-free working relationship. The Koonibba case study bore out 
that this reliance upon an external building license contributed greatly to 
inconsistencies in delivery and performance, straining their relationship with their main 
funder, Housing SA. The Normanton case study provided evidence that not having an 
open building licence had led to a focus on refurbishment projects, rather than new-
build projects over the last five to ten years. While this situation may have had a 
negative impact on skill building within the organisation, it also resulted in the Bynoe 
organisation not having to participate in building culturally inappropriate, new build, 
social housing in the community. 
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6.4.3 The division of governance roles: strategists and actionists 
The case study analyses also show the importance of closely aligning and engaging 
those who the current authors are calling ‘strategists’, typically strong committed 
Aboriginal leaders, with a number of other people who have skills in managing and 
administering projects, the ‘actionists’ typically professionally-qualified non-Aboriginal 
or non-local Aboriginal workers.159 The strategists have an important role in managing 
the social and political milieu surrounding a given activity, while the actionists, are 
those who make sure the vision of the strategist comes to fruition. For example, a 
number of case interviewees were aware of the governance frameworks developed by 
the Myuma group at Camooweal in northwest Queensland, whereby one of the local 
traditional owners as the visionary for the group’s activities is supported by a highly 
educated manager whose role it is to ensure that the vision is carried forward. This 
highly skilled manager not only respects Aboriginal methods and beliefs, but also 
understands mainstream ‘white fella’ processes, being able to bind the two systems 
together to achieve positive outcomes for the group. This pairing of complementary 
skill sets appears to have underpinned the Myuma organisation’s successes over the 
past five to ten years. (Memmott 2010) 
Furthermore, a number of interview respondents discussed the importance of 
leadership in the overall governance framework in remote Indigenous settings. At 
Normanton, the ICHO Chairman took on the role as strategist in supporting the 
procurement system, which not only saw the realisation of new housing and 
refurbishments but also meaningful employment and training outcomes for local 
Aboriginal community members. 
6.5 Employment and training capitals 
One of the principal framework objectives of the Australian Government’s Productivity 
Commission’s, Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, key indicators report is to 
obtain, ‘improved wealth creation and economic sustainability for individuals, families 
and communities’.160 Achieving economic outcomes to improve livelihoods in remote 
regions of Australia, where there are considerable economic vulnerabilities of 
professional and trade shortages, which simultaneously exist alongside poor 
educational outcomes and high unemployment in Aboriginal settlements has proven 
elusive. The economic context in remote settlements bears greatly upon sustainable 
livelihood factors, such as the cultural and human capitals of employment, training 
and education, albeit in a context where limited economic opportunities are stifled due 
to geographic location, small populations and mobility. 161  In many instances, the 
largest capital investment by governments in remote communities is settlement 
housing and infrastructure projects, yet variable project delivery often leads to varied 
opportunities for employment and training. As the Normanton and Koonibba case 
studies have shown, when Indigenous labour was involved in housing procurement, 
there was a mismatch of time-pressured delivery, which limited a given community’s 
capacity to participate. Subsequently, the dominance of time-pressured delivery 
frameworks has reduced the capacity to develop human capitals impacting on 
management in housing procurement and resulting in a preference for limited 
unskilled Aboriginal labour involvement. 
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6.5.1 Contractual fit 
In terms of incorporating local labour and implementing training programs within the 
range of different procurement strategies, the case studies illustrate that the issue 
becomes one of risk mitigation for both the proprietor and the building contractor. The 
risk relates to timeframe and budget overruns given the workplace reality of a more 
transient, possibly truant, and low-skilled semi-literate labour force in many remote 
communities. Of the contractual procurement options discussed previously, both the 
traditional lump sum and D&C approaches would see the contractor taking on the 
risks associated with labour force truancy, whereas the alliance form of contracting 
would see all parties sharing those risks. Therefore, our case studies have shown that 
flexible partnering forms of contract are more likely to successfully accommodate local 
training and employment strategies in remote Aboriginal communities. Furthermore, 
as reported in the TIRP case study, the mechanism by which successful training and 
employment outcomes were generated through procurement was the result of 
excellent internal government coordination at a local, state and Australian government 
level, illustrating a positive connection between top-down (strategic) meeting bottom-
up (grass-roots) processes. 
6.5.2 Aboriginal identity in labour organisation 
Larger scales of labour organisation and training need to be explored. High level skills 
uptake by Indigenous staff can occur under key government contract agencies like 
QBuild, because they offer the required perpetual employment to achieve this, yet 
there is a considerable lack of interface and minimal local labour input within the local 
settlements where construction projects are rolled out. A good practice example is the 
Myuma group in northwest Queensland which runs a pre-vocational training source. 
Here there is a unique symbiotic relationship between the practice of Aboriginal law 
and the practice of commerce whereby the two are mutually supportive of one another, 
generating a strong Aboriginality in day-to-day business. The overall positive benefit 
to economic capital is thus supported and underpinned by cultural and social capital 
resulting in a potential for greater livelihood sustainability. 
If the constraints of urgent construction timeframes were not prioritised, synergies 
could occur, contributing significantly to livelihood sustainability. However the use of 
small-sized building teams prevents apprenticeship uptake, and typically there are 
often no qualified Indigenous tradespersons involved in construction projects. Small-
scaled building projects thus appear to only have minor impact on achieving 
significant improvements in livelihood strategies. On the other hand, the promotion of 
housing technology systems that can radically reduce the extent to which 
conventional certifications of on-site skilled labour are required, needs to be 
considered. The example of Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation in Arnhem Land 
demonstrates that sustained employment opportunities can emerge when 
infrastructure is carefully and selectively introduced to match local management 
capacity and skills levels for repairs and maintenance, even if there is a lack of ability 
to uptake recognised trades certification. 
6.5.3 Aboriginal people: the most highly trained, unemployed people 
In reviewing both the KBPL and Bynoe CACS experiences, it was reported that the 
current ‘drip feed’ nature of small intermittent government housing contracts 
interspersed between three-year political cycles is inefficient in providing meaningful 
integration of T&E capitals. Another issue that was raised through the Bynoe case 
study at Normanton, and one which is related to the drip-feed scenario, was the lack 
of long-term employment outcomes from training programs in remote communities. It 
was said on a number of occasions during the interview process that ‘Australian 
Aboriginal people are the most highly trained unemployed people in the world’—a 
  120 
direct result of intermittent short-term building activities where people were unable to 
develop certifiable skills. Even if certifiable skills are obtained, the hybrid economy 
prevalent in remote communities often cannot economically sustain individuals 
through continued employment post housing delivery. Also, many with social bonds to 
the community often prefer to remain intermittently employed within the community 
than seek opportunities away and interrupt these bonds. 
Furthermore, results from the Bynoe case study show that short contractual 
timeframes are counter-productive to training; meaningful accredited training needs to 
be undertaken over longer timeframes where Aboriginal labourers are paid at 
commensurate levels with mainstream labour rates and not less due to CDEP. Also, if 
and when housing procurement does occur, there needs to be a realistic assessment 
of contractual terms to ensure that building contractors are provided with an 
opportunity to negotiate timeframes in order to incorporate measurable training 
outcomes, as well as participating in skills assessments and the supervision of 
trainees for the duration of the contract. Additionally, starting traineeships on 
refurbishment projects was reported as a difficult undertaking given the unknown 
factors involved in renovating existing houses; whereas on new build projects, the 
construction system is simpler to understand and trainees are able to experience the 
building process from the ground up. 
6.5.4 The employment gains of flat-packing 
Flat-packing is where the material elements of a building arrive to site, typically on the 
back of a truck in a ready to assemble format. This delivery system was seen by the 
majority of interviewees as advantageous to T&E capitals given that it includes a 
significant installation process that could be easily tailored to suit remote applications. 
The Myuma group at Camooweal in Northwest Queensland are currently underway 
with a process of flat-packing a number of new accommodation and administration 
buildings for the upgrade of their current facilities.162 The reason flat-packing was 
chosen as an option was due to the efficient use of road transport to deliver the 
materials and also the high labour component involved in the construction process, 
which suits Myuma’s training aims for the pre-vocational construction training program 
it runs on the site. Interestingly, there are a number of prefabricated building systems 
being developed and tested as part of the current SIHIP program. These kit systems 
also aim for simplicity in installation and have been evaluated and promoted as an 
SIHIP asset to community enterprise development through potential long-term 
knowledge building and implementation. 
6.5.5 T&E best practice in SIHIP? 
From the SIHIP case study we learn that the overarching Program Goals called for the 
provision of training and employment of Indigenous people in achieving a sustainable 
workforce in each community for ongoing construction, maintenance and housing 
management. It is hypothesised that SIHIP will generate more Aboriginal employment 
than any previous Indigenous housing program, and will provide a benchmark in this 
regard for future Aboriginal employment and training program evaluation metrics. An 
element of the SIHIP program that the authors consider best practice is the system 
developed to support the training and employment targets. For instance, developing a 
work ethic in communities where there has been a long-term CDEP welfare program 
is a difficult undertaking. One cannot expect to achieve T&E targets of 30 per cent 
Indigenous employment in a short timeframe without establishing a supportive system 
to work within the specific social and cultural context of a given community. For 
example, in various communities, Alliance teams have established a support network 
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whereby workers are picked up from home, daily meals are also provided in an 
attempt to create a critical mass that want to come to work and then more want to join. 
In addition, community mentors are engaged to support capacity building in local 
Indigenous employment brokers. Worker’s families are also consulted to uncover any 
recurring Aboriginal employee absenteeism issues such as cultural avoidance, peer 
group pressure (shame), and having other priorities (e.g. court, community service 
hours), whereby they typically have not told anyone. A published discussion paper on 
the metrics used in SIHIP for this purpose would make a significant contribution to the 
current National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing with an aim 
to introduce a long-term cross-jurisdictional metrics for this purpose. 
6.6 Health capitals 
Unfortunately the case studies appear to have yielded the least data on health 
capitals compared to the other capitals under consideration. Nevertheless, in looking 
at the relationships between housing procurement processes and reducing livelihood 
vulnerabilities, two main health aspects can be considered here—reducing crowding 
and improving health hardware performance. 
While the formula to simply provide more houses to alleviate overcrowding is one that 
may be commonly adopted in certain jurisdictions, a social science analysis of 
Indigenous crowding with a stress-related definition of crowding (e.g. see Long et al. 
2007, pp.13–16, pp.39–44; Birdsall-Jones et al. 2010) demonstrates that architectural 
brief development needs to be informed by a range of data to effectively alleviate 
crowding in Aboriginal houses, including household structures, as well as rules and 
values concerning what constitutes crowding, and what spatial design steps are 
needed to alleviate it. SIHIP research was able to identify a variety of design 
techniques to alleviate crowding, including assessments of private space, social 
spaces, wet areas and neighbourhood spaces. Examples in SIHIP include dual toilet 
and shower facilities, cluster housing layout and new estate layouts. The majority of 
work required to improve reduction of overcrowding outcomes in remote Aboriginal 
housing needs to therefore be undertaken at a strategic design level with a heavy 
focus on household surveys and socio-spatial mapping as well as grass-roots 
consultation with key stakeholders, preferably those who are living in the household 
settings in which the house and related infrastructure is to be constructed. 
The appropriate design of health hardware to suit local lifestyles is another pre-
requisite of the early strategic design stage in housing procurement. One of the case 
studies (SIHIP) adopted the nine ‘Healthy Living Practices’, precepts based on the 
well-known research of Nganampa et al. (1987) and Pholeros et al. (1993), as well as 
the ‘National Indigenous Housing Guide’ (FaHCSIA 2007) to maximise environmental 
health performance of the procured housing, mainly through careful health hardware 
selection and specification, including plumbing, water heating and supply technology, 
sewerage removal, food preparation and storage facilities and electrical installation. 
To improve health and reduce crowding in remote Aboriginal housing therefore 
requires both technical and social design considerations. As discussed previously in 
this paper, while good technical design may improve access to health hardware within 
a house, and thus have a positive effect on some of the health indices of its occupants, 
it may not necessarily reduce crowding nor improve health if day-to-day cleaning and 
repair regimes are not maintained, or are undermined by large-sized households that 
are in excess of the design capacity of the house. However, we do know that a lack of 
quality technical design does exacerbate house hardware functions, and can have a 
flow-on effect on overcrowding. The aim in Aboriginal housing should be the 
construction of quality houses that function to meet social, cultural and healthy living 
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practice requirements and in which the occupants themselves have greater capacity 
to support sustainable livelihoods. 
6.7 Challenges to building socio-economic capitals through 
housing procurement 
One of the major findings of this study has been that numerous best practice housing 
procurement examples exist in the Australian Indigenous housing context. Given this 
situation, the authors are led to question the reasons underlying the continual 
generation of variable, and often poor, housing results. The answer appears to relate 
to a number of fundamental challenges that need to be improved in order for best 
practice housing procurement to become a widespread achievement in Indigenous 
housing delivery. Consequently, the main obstacles or project disruptions identified 
during the case study analyses are detailed below. 
6.7.1 Government funding cycles, remoteness and the challenges in 
achieving employment and training capitals 
In analysing the case studies, one of the main areas identified as a challenge to the 
incorporation of social and economic capitals in remote housing procurement was the 
need for greater understanding within government of the conditions of geographic 
remoteness and seasonal (climatic) variations in such isolated environments. It was 
discussed on a number of occasions that tying remote regions into the same funding 
cycles as mainstream procurement systems in less remote areas, results in undue 
stress on those not only procuring the housing product, but also undermines the final 
quality of the built product when the delivery has been rushed to meet funding 
obligations. Pressures prevail upon government agencies to maximise outputs within 
a given financial year, resulting in contractual systems that prioritise guaranteed 
delivery in specific timeframes that may not meet the struggling capacity of small 
Indigenous enterprises. Also discussed was the value of longer-term governance 
arrangements immune to the shorter cycles seen in the current political climate of 
various jurisdictions, as such short contractual timeframes provide no incentive for 
mainstream contractors to include training and employment objectives in their overall 
work agendas. 
6.7.2 Problems with multiple objectives 
Discussion also arose regarding whether or not it was possible to achieve positive 
outcomes in Australian and state government housing delivery systems given the 
multiple objectives of time, cost and quality. Due to their project experience in remote 
communities, a number of interviewees stated that there was always a disparity 
between certain objectives, such as value for money (cost), and others such as 
training and employment aspirations (time & quality) for Aboriginal people. 
Furthermore, tight project timeframes typically result in less opportunity for training 
and employment in certain situations, while greater pressure to achieve ‘value for 
money’ has the potential to result in poor quality construction as stress is placed on 
the project budget. Also, placing too much emphasis on training and employment 
outcomes, which require a greater timeframe, may result in less housing being 
constructed in an area that is already under housing availability stress. Therefore, it 
appears that the best practice solution is that each community is assessed on its own 
merits in achieving a balance of the Time-Cost-Quality paradigm. This would involve 
community consultation regarding skills audits, tenancy management services and 
administration services, project management options and longer-term repairs and 
maintenance organisation. 
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Once targets can be formed regarding the scale of the program and whether 
additional social economics and other capitals are to be sought, and to what extent, 
appropriate housing procurement methods can be reviewed and one chosen. 
6.7.3 Risks: up and down 
During the course of this research project, a number of risks were identified as 
important to consider for future procurement processes in remote communities. The 
authors believe it important to outline these risks for consideration in future housing 
procurement processes. It must be stated that this is not an attempt to denigrate the 
work being completed under any current project, it is simply an attempt to understand 
how to improve on a program that is already achieving best practice standards when 
compared to past large-scale housing procurement programs. In the case of SIHIP 
achieving the program’s social and other capitals, which are clearly embedded in its 
goals, constitutes a major component of what is referred to as a ‘risk map’. Interviews 
identified two categories of risk. ‘Up risk’ is the risk of project destabilisation from 
above the Alliance Team (by politicians, the media scrutiny, political responses, major 
economic shifts, large-scale industrial disputes, changes of government etc.), 
whereas ‘down risk’ is destabilisation risk from the project site involving managing 
local community expectations, unforeseen community behavioural patterns and 
political responses, weather factors and latent site conditions, such as faulty 
components and service provision hidden underground or within existing structures. 
The infrastructure planning and design process was reported to have been a hidden 
risk factor in SIHIP as the failure by successive governments to maintain and 
document technical servicing resulted in substandard infrastructure conditions in 
many communities. 
6.7.4 Continuity of employment 
With respect to the issue of continuity of employment of trained workers and 
enterprise engagement after SIHIP, recurring questions that were raised during the 
research was: What is there after SIHIP? What continuities will be handed over and to 
whom, so that employment, training, and construction continue in the long-term? It 
should be noted of course that this is not a problem unique to this particular program. 
On the other hand, government tendering policies and the market rights of non-
Indigenous building firms and suppliers were clearly influential political factors. 
Associated other issues were the roles of training organisations and of gaining an 
understanding of the human resources in an Aboriginal region, as well as the limited 
capacity of certain Indigenous workforces to be mobile in seeking future work 
opportunities. This does highlight the importance of developing and maintaining an 
exit strategy from the very beginning of such a large-scale endeavour. 
The authors of this study are not criticising any one particular government in this 
report; however, we are questioning the system of government in dealing with the 
provision of housing in remote settings. The barriers outlined above have arisen due 
to a number of different reasons from a lack of foresight in government administration 
services to challenges of working in remote environments that are subject to many 
different human and natural environmental situations. 
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Table 13: Contract types and potential sustainability livelihoods based on case study 
analysis 
 




































Procurement scales & types  
New Build construction     
Housing renovations     
Repairs and maintenance/ 
upgrades 
    
Social capitals         
Social networks (bonding)     
Overlapping social networks 
(bridging) 
    
Authority networks (linking)     
Cultural & ethical capitals  
Culturally appropriate design 
(incorporating traditional 
beliefs & behaviours) 
    
Community consultation 
    
Constructive/ participatory 
stakeholder relationships 
    
Environmentally appropriate 
design 
    
Health capitals         
Addressing health hardware 
in design 
    
Health through maintenance 
programs 
 INA INA INA   
Reducing crowding     INA    






    
Employment & training capitals 
Training     
Ongoing employment     
Using local enterprise 
operations 
    
Governance capitals  
Aboriginal project 
management 
    
Aboriginal building 
contractors 
    
Aboriginal foremen & 
labourers 
    
(INA = information not available.) 
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6.8 A model for housing procurement in remote Indigenous 
communities 
Mainstream housing procurement contracts and methods that are driven by the 
economic imperatives of minimising financial risk and maximising financial gains, all 
with expected delivery in set timeframes, do not readily lend themselves to integration 
with the largely unskilled, highly mobile labour markets of remote Indigenous 
settlements. Case study evidence suggests that a somewhat different procurement 
system needs to be implemented, one that borrows from local Aboriginal social 
capitals, and that is fostered at communal or regional levels. Consequently, particular 
aspects of Aboriginal social, cultural and economic capitals seem to have been in 
conflict, mismatched or not recognisable under the rigid parameters of conventional 
mainstream housing procurement delivery. If Indigenous people are to derive 
improved livelihood outcomes from housing and infrastructure programs, there needs 
to be recognition at both state and federal government levels that rushed program 
agendas often strip long-term benefits, and may contribute to the burden of livelihood 
vulnerabilities due to increased house maintenance costs and reduced social benefits. 
Thus, the authors have argued that an intercultural and hybridised approach to 
sustainability is needed, based on the procurement realities faced by remote 
settlements. The authors contend that this is possible through an engagement with 
multiple Aboriginal ‘capitals’ consisting of social, health, employment, training and 
governance capitals within a sustainability livelihoods approach. Consequently, the 
case study analyses presented above investigate the relationship between Indigenous 
social and economic capitals and procurement systems in an attempt to draw 
conclusions as to which direction procurement scenarios should head in the future in 
order to benefit all stakeholders more equitably in a given project. 
With this in mind, the question is what would a best-practice procurement model look 
like and how can appropriate construction systems be developed in remote settings 
given a high likelihood of interrupted employment and circular mobility behaviour 
where Aboriginal social priorities often outweigh economic priorities with individuals 
choosing family obligations and responsibilities over their own personal material 
desires? This situation affects procurement strategies given that housing procurement 
takes on a typically linear program until practical completion. Given the transient 
behaviour in remote communities with more adherence to local traditions, life-ways 
and ‘law’, it may be unrealistic to expect Aboriginal people to compromise their long-
held social responsibilities to receive construction training that may not eventuate into 
long-term employment. 
As the case studies have shown, incorporating the entire repertoire of the social and 
economic capitals into a specific procurement agenda may not necessarily occur in all 
circumstances. In a particular project case, the specific human and environmental 
context of a community would also assist in pinpointing which procurement system, 
and thus, contractual strategy to employ in order to gain as much advantage for a 
project from the existing Indigenous capitals present in that community. For example, 
there may be a general shortage of skilled labour in a community, which might lead 
procurement designers down a mainstream, traditional lump sum path that relied on 
an external contractor; whereas, in those communities that have numbers of skilled 
and semi-skilled labour, a mentoring methodology may suit, whereby a community 
organisation enters into a partnership-form of contract with a mainstream builder to 
carry out work in order to lever up to undertake subsequent construction projects on 
their own. Moreover, flexible contractual arrangements can cater for changing 
circumstances as programs evolve and local enterprise corporations gain confidence 
and capacity to take on more challenging contractual roles. 
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The contractual methodology is a tool in the procurement process that can be 
effectively used to gain social and economic capital incorporation into contemporary 
housing provision, but if applied non-strategically, may have inadvertent negative 
impacts on such local capitals. Procurement is only a small part in the larger picture of 
quality of life in remote Indigenous communities, however, it does offer an opportunity 
to improve human livelihoods if designed and administered correctly. The case 
studies have shown that when the designers of a specific procurement system 
engage in a meaningful way with Indigenous people in working towards a shared 
understanding through participation (and not just consultation for its own sake), the 
outcome is likely to be better than not having done so. Another area of importance is 
the relationship between quality social capital outcomes and community engagement 
time. Projects need adequate time in the design stage in order to not only establish 
how to approach a particular problem, but also how to design a constructive exit 
strategy for when a specific project comes to an end, so that gained capitals are not 
lost. There should be no basis for trying something unless one can not only achieve or 
sustain capacity building, but also establish a longer-term legacy from projects. 
Additionally, there needs to be a concerted effort to evaluate and measure project 
outcomes. 
Lessons learned from the case study analyses illustrate that the contractual 
frameworks chosen for a particular project did indeed have a consequential 
relationship in the incorporation and enhancement of Indigenous social and economic 
capitals in housing provision. It is therefore possible to create more innovative, cost-
effective housing delivery methods in remote communities. However, the analyses 
illustrate that, rather than attempting to design a ‘one-size-fits-all’ contractual process 
for the remote Indigenous housing sector, it appears preferable to start with a 
strategic flexible delivery framework to support social and economic capital 
objectives—an approach that tends towards a ‘horses-for-courses’ ideology rather 
than a blanket approach tending toward a single definitive answer. If we take the case 
studies above, such a procurement strategy would be comprised of as many as 
possible of the elements in the following table. 
Table 14: Design elements of an integrated project delivery framework for Aboriginal 
housing 
1. Be adaptable to both large-scale and small-scale project contexts. 
2. Be able to incorporate a joint venture or partnership structure into its contractual framework 
whereby an Indigenous community, organisation or enterprise could align contractually with 
a mainstream building contractor and/or government. 
3. Have the ability to be flexible to allow for major shifts as the program progresses. 
4. Directly encourage and foster collective teamwork and administration mentoring in order to 
build capacity within the Indigenous participants in the system so as to achieve open 
building licences for future work. 
5. Offer incentives for mainstream building contractors to participate through risk mitigation. 
6. Offer incentives to proprietors in having an open-book scenario to all project costs. 
7. Adopt culturally-appropriate design standards (as opposed to mainstream social housing 
‘minimum design standards/guidelines’) with the SIHIP Design Guidelines being the best 
practice benchmark at the time of writing. (Wigley 2008) 
8. Be responsive to shifts in timeframes in the delivery system, so as to facilitate flexibility in 
response to remote community politics and social and climatic contexts. 
9. Give time for appropriate community-based consultation during both the design and delivery 
processes. 
10 Incorporate meaningful training and employment outcomes in the local communities where 
the program is based in an attempt to create as much economic stimulus through labour 
  127 
programs as possible. 
11. Have a longevity of at least five years so as to result in meaningful training outcomes 
whereby local labourers have an opportunity to carry their training through to full 
certification. 
12. Have a long-term exit strategy that not only incorporates training outcomes, but establishes 
a tenancy and asset management program, in addition to a repairs and maintenance 
program within given communities. 
13. Be immune to government political cycles. 
14. Adhere to healthy-living environmental and house design practices. 
15. Achieve cultural capitals through town planning and house design and community 
consultation through Housing Reference Groups (HRGs). 
16. Achieve balance between open-ended scoping and a prescribed approach to formatting 
project briefs. 
17. Be open to innovation and change as the program proceeds. 
18. Encourage the integration and cooperation of government departments in the contractual 
framework. 
The list above was not intended to be an exhaustive representation of what makes a 
good procurement system, but does represent the key elements drawn from our case 
study findings, of a best practice procurement framework for future government and 
non-government housing projects in remote Indigenous communities. As outlined 
earlier, in gaining relevance in remote Indigenous communities, the procurement 
system will be confronted with many challenges, most notably in relation to 
governance structures and frameworks at both a local and government level. 
While functional for one-off projects, the conventional lump sum contract gave less 
opportunity in regard to incorporating many of the social capitals discussed. This is in 
contrast to the ‘strategically administered lump sum’ as exemplified in TIRP, as well 
as other procurement methods, such as alliancing. Furthermore, large-scale contract 
packages offered greater flexibility and capacity to incorporate holistic planning and 
design that encompassed everything from settlement infrastructure on the one hand 
to targeted socio-economic capitals on the other. 
From the case study analyses it can be seen that the ‘strategically administered lump 
sum’, alliance, and relationship MC methods of procurement all have the potential to 
deliver many of the above outcomes listed in Table 14. The design of a procurement 
system that maximises the above outcomes of the strategic framework can be termed 
an ‘integrated project delivery framework’. Such a framework maximises opportunities 
for the incorporation of the broad range of capitals described above into housing 
delivery systems and procurement. 
6.9 Final statement 
Partly due to the paucity of research in this field, the current research project is an 
invaluable addition to the body of knowledge regarding housing procurement 
processes in remote Aboriginal communities in Australia. It has the potential to create 
greater awareness of good practice administrative processes leading to more positive 
outcomes of culturally responsive housing by using the social and economic capitals 
that Aboriginal people can bring to procurement. In order to appropriately procure 
Aboriginal housing in remote communities in Australia, an envelope of ‘ethical 
fairness’ needs to cover all participants in the process; be they building contractors, 
Aboriginal occupants, government officials or others in procuring quality housing 
outcomes that attest to a shared future built environment that will last the test of time 
and are representative and responsive to cultural settings with different social and 
economic values. 
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This research project has shown that irrespective of the differences in program scale, 
contract type, funding, duration and outcomes, significant challenges inevitably arose 
for each of the case study projects in generating socio-economic capitals, but also 
insights were gained from working with the idiosyncrasies of different discrete remote 
centres. Varied infrastructure and resource constraints contributed to an expansion 
and/or contraction of capacity relative to the scale of regional and local economies 
operable for the duration of the program. However, a clear finding was that 
procurement limitation or inertia was not simply due to resource limitations and 
remoteness, but inherent complexities of organisational practice within governments, 
communities and industry, and that a significant shift in organisational culture can 
facilitate system improvement through redesign in order to improve service delivery 
outcomes and meet the challenges and complexities of program execution achieving 
‘capital’ outcomes under unforeseen remote conditions that delivery teams cannot 
fully control. 
Additionally, our research has shown that good grass-roots approaches are valuable 
for small scale projects; however, the key is how to effectively upscale them for 
relevance to larger programs. This is where government support is needed as grass-
roots organisations are typically limited in their abilities to take on larger projects. Our 
analysis has shown that good communication between the upper administrative tiers 
of government departments themselves and those undertaking grass-roots activities is 
the key to successful outcomes on the ground—where top-down processes meet 
bottom-up ones. 
If there has been one clear outcome from this research project, it is that the 
procurement process is arguably just as important as the final housing product itself. 
Focus needs to be placed on a meaningful process and the product that eventuates 
must conform to statutory and regulatory standards. Procurement driven by the 
scenario of maximum numbers of houses on the ground as fast as possible ignores 
the potential to value add multiple Aboriginal social and economic capitals. These 
housing numbers tick the political box in regard to meeting unmet need, but at the 
long-term expense to Aboriginal communities. 
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APPENDIX: WCBT INITIATIVE—CEDUNA AND 
KOONIBBA 
The regional proposal of the West Coast Building Training (WCBT) Initiative was 
developed between 1998 and 2000, with the objective of involving Indigenous 
participants from remote discrete centres within and outside homelands, including 
Ceduna and Koonibba (SAAHA 2000a, p.3). A number of benefits of the program 
stated were: 
1. The ability of the program to address the high unemployment rates and increase 
the opportunities for employment. 
2. The potential to retain capital within community. 
3. The potential for future economic enterprise. 
4. The potential to increase positive youth role models and reduce vandalism within 
communities. 
5. The potential to increase community pride through their own endeavours. 
The role of key agencies is outlined in table A1 below: 
Table A1: Role of Agencies in West Coast Building Training Initiative 
Agency Role 
Former South Australian Aboriginal 
Housing Authority (SAAHA) 
Provide funds as identified by SA Housing Board for 
Capital Infrastructure (new houses, upgrades, repairs 
and maintenance). 
Department of Employment 
Workplace Relations and Small 
Business (DEWRSB) 
Provide trainee wages (50%), mentoring, ancillary 
costs. Provide funding for a Coordinator’s position to 
coordinate all trainees and vocational training 
provided by TAFE. 
Department of Education, Training 
and Employment—Office of 
Employment & Youth (DETE-OEY) 
Provide funding for workplace assessor. Provide 
funding for Builder/Trainer to work with training 
provider. 
ATSIC (now defunct) Provision of funds via CDEP program (two days 
wages). 
TAFE Skills analysis, development of training programs and 
training provider. 
Communities and Homelands Support initiative, make available local coordinator as 
community contact. 
Meet and work with parties on program delivery. 
Tjutjunaku Worka Tjuta (TWT) 
Ceduna CDEP  
Work with parties to allow CDEP participants to work 
on the WCBT Initiative. 
Source: SAAHA (2000a:4) 
The first stage of the project was to identify within the region, competencies relevant 
to the building and construction industry with tenders called for training providers. The 
project had a number of key aims: 
1. To develop a pool of skilled people who are able to provide quality housing repairs 
and maintenance on communities and homelands. 
2. Identify Aboriginal people with the potential to become supervisors on building 
sites. 
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3. Enhance the potential of Aboriginal people to successfully tender and undertake 
housing construction and major housing upgrade projects on their own 
communities and homelands. 
4. Improve the employment potential for Aboriginal people on the West Coast by 
providing them with an opportunity to develop skills and gain industry recognised 
qualifications. 
5. Create an impetus for Aboriginal people to establish an Indigenous Building 
Company able to compete for projects in the competitive market (SAAHA 2000a, 
pp.1–2). 
The process for implementing a community build project, incorporating accredited 
building training was established and outlined in Table A2 below. 
Table A2: West Coast Building Training Initiative: Process for implementing a 
Community build project incorporating accredited building training in an Aboriginal 
community 











To identify the potential 
sources of funding for 
accredited vocational 
training linked to 
Community build and the 




 Group Employer Organisation 
State 
 OEY 
 Former SAAHA 

















To secure fee-for-service 
based assistance by 
developing Project Scope 
and costs for submission 
to former SA Aboriginal 
Housing Authority. 
Scope to identify work for: 
Community labour 
(trainees)/specialised 
trades/contractors using local 
labour (trainees) 
 
Costs to include: 
 Project materials/ site works/ 
documentation / professional 
fees (including architectural and 
council fees) 
 On costs including site 







  budget 
 CDEP budget 
 DEWRSB contribution 
 Training Provider Contribution 
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 To identify all 
stakeholders in the 
project and to confirm 
and document 
committee role and 
responsibilities 
 To develop some 
preliminary 
timeframes for the 
project’s development 
Role, responsibility, critical 
responses and reporting 
requirements of all stakeholders 
including: 
 Employer Management 
including financial/CDEP 
 Project Building Supervisor 
 Preferred Training Provider 
 AHA Training Committee  
















 To apply to former 
SAAHA for approval 
of capital funds 
allocation for the 
project 
Outline of the construction work 
including: 
 plans and specification 
 specialised trades 
 outline of how work will occur 
including 
 CDEP labour 
 on-job supervision 
 specialised trades labour 








 Aspects of training including: 
 on-job supervisor, identification, 
qualifications and relevant 
experience. 
 off-job training provider, 
identification and details of 
formal training arrangements 
for community workers 
Full project costs including: 
 professionals services 
 planning approvals  
 materials 
 specialised trades 
Detail of other contributions 
(economic, in-kind) committed to 
project including: 
 costs absorbed by community 
 DEWRSB 
 Group Employer 
 training provider 
Assess proposal 







For identifying any 
deficiencies in the 
proposal and addressing 
any concerns before 
Letter of outcome to give reasons 
for non-approval or specify the 
conditions under which approval 
has been granted including: 
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ent Group approving it or not 
approving the capital 
works project as a 
community build. 
 required outcomes for 
construction and training 
 critical timeframes and criteria 
for funds release 
 critical reporting requirements 
Finalise selection 





















To ensure that people 
signed up on a 
traineeship are the best 
suited people eligible for 
funding and are fully 
informed about the 
requirements of the 
project regarding their 
commitments, their rights, 
responsibilities and 
avenues for support 
 Seek interest through 
information 
 Undertake interviews 
 Check names of successful 
applicants for traineeship 
eligibility 
 Sign up trainees 













To ensure that trainees 
are receiving formalised 
training relevant to on-job 
skills requirement 
Review project scope of works, 
project schedule and formal training 
curriculum 













 As defined and documented during 








 As defined and documented during 
Project Planning Meeting of key 
stakeholders 
Source: SAAHA (2000a) 
Eligible participants for the program were any person of Aboriginal descent who was 
either (i) currently or previously employed in the building construction industry, (ii) 
involved in community housing repairs and maintenance, or (iii) with an interest in 
employment in the building construction industry. A high degree of interest was 
expressed by people attending a briefing session held in mid-2000 and an 
assessment of 28 people from 10 communities were identified as potential for 
traineeships. 
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In the latter half of 2000, it became apparent that the Department of Workplace 
Relations and Small Business (DWRSB) were not able to meet its commitments to the 
WCBT Initiative. In particular, there were difficulties in developing collaborative 
arrangements with Tjutjunaku Worka Tjuta (TWT) Ceduna CDEP to formulate the 
‘Major Employment Strategy’. The Strategy was a key document and underpinned the 
basis of the formal application for funding to support workers on ‘Contracts of Training’ 
(SAAHA 2000a, p.3). 
According to the SAAHA (2000a, p.3) report, due to a breakdown in communication 
there were also other issues identified in the early stages of establishing the WCBT 
Initiative. Along with the challenges of inter-agency collaborations, some homelands 
and community leaders who had previously expressed in principle support were 
growing ambivalent about the Initiative due to time lags and lack of outcomes. 
Koonibba representatives in particular, were becoming frustrated at the perceived 
long lead time for implementation and were considering a standalone training scheme. 
Tjutjunaku Worka Tjuta (TWT) was having difficulties gaining information about its 
project responsibilities and issues were also encountered with participants travel 
arrangements to Adelaide from remote communities (SAAHA 2000b, p.2). 
By the end of 2000, the SAAHA were expressing concerns that their capital new 
works projects would not be reasonably time managed if incorporated as part of a 
training initiative. The funding cycles of the SAAHA were also at odds with setting up 
such a program. The funding requirements for training needed at least a three-year 
funding cycle (the period specified to gain apprenticeship) however, the Authority was 
funded annually and not able to make financial commitments beyond a single year. At 
the same time, it was identified that some communities did not have capital works 
projects which could be easily incorporated into a training program (SAAHA 2000a, 
p.3). 
There were also a number of other funding issues. As part of the South Australian 
Government’s audit, the SAAHA were required to demonstrate adherence to a 
competitive tendering process and therefore, despite the groundwork, the SAAHA was 
unable to prioritise training outcomes over other management obligations to the state 
and Commonwealth governments. This issue was resolved later through negotiations 
with the Commonwealth funding body and the South Australian Housing Authority and 
permission was granted to give priority to training outcomes (SAAHA 2000a). 
Despite the issues encountered, funding was received through the Commonwealth 
Major Indigenous Strategies Program and a Building Supervisor Trainer was engaged. 
Three apprentices were trained at Koonibba as part of the WCBT Initiative by the 
beginning of 2001, with a work schedule consisting of community housing 
maintenance, the renovation and refit of a three-bedroom house, and the erection of 
steel frame dwellings at the Ceduna Transitional Accommodation Centre (later 
completed under Koonibba Constructions).163 
During the process of undertaking projects, it emerged that trainees were not 
committed to participating in projects outside their own community as required by the 
regional training program. The mentors and supervisors provided feedback on the 
apprentices and it was noted that the Koonibba apprentices worked well as a team, 
and had mutual respect. It was also noted that cultural obligations affected the 
attendance of trainees during certain periods (SAAHA 2000b, p.2). 
Key learning outcomes from the WCBT Initiative demonstrate that there are continual 
barriers to Indigenous involvement in social housing programs, some of which are 
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systemic, and others which need to include greater long-term assessments based on 
achievable goals. These needs are described as follows: 
1. Delivery of training programs to residents in dispersed remote, very remote and 
discrete Indigenous centres are complex and require multi-agency commitments 
across government agencies. 
2. Inflexibility of government funding cycles limited to 12 months prohibit and further 
disadvantage Indigenous involvement in state-funded social housing programs 
and need to extend to a three-year time frame to guarantee continued supply. 
3. Inflexibility of government and contractual time frames to accommodate 
reasonable extensions of contractual time periods to make allowance for 
Indigenous training requires revision of contractual clauses or contract types. 
4. Guaranteeing continuity of work through selective tendering of contractors 
employing Indigenous participants contravenes current Trade Practices Act 1974 
(C'th) and constitutes anti-competitive behaviour and needs to be addressed if 
training outcomes are to be viable. 
5. Training and building schedules may need to allow flexibility to accommodate 
cultural obligations. 
6. Long-term Indigenous unemployment presents challenges to maintaining 
commitment to accredited training outcomes. 
7. The need for vocational accredited building skills training Certificate I, II, III needs 
to occur in a remote regional centre only if a significant cohort of Indigenous 
trainees are identified with clear paths to employment opportunities. 
8. Consideration must be given to the lack of transport and/or funds available in 
remote and very remote centres to access training in major or regional centres. 
9. Inclusion of local building teams on capital works projects on local community 
lands must be embedded in an identified economic flow of sufficient building 
contracts. 
10. Community building teams and enterprises have limited opportunity to increase 
building skill and management capacity due to a limited exposure to a diverse skill 
base and will be unable to competitively operate in a broader regional context. 
11. Kin-based obligations may limit individual incentive to participate in training 
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